Going Dutch? Collaborative Dutch Privacy Regulation and the Lessons it Holds for U.S. Privacy Law by Hirsch, Dennis D.
GOING DUTCH? COLLABORATIVE DUTCH 
PRIVACY REGULATION AND THE LESSONS IT 
HOLDS FOR U.S. PRIVACY LAW 
Dennis D. Hirsch* 
2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 83 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................. 85 
I. RECENT U.S. PROPOSALS INCORPORATE THE SAFE HARBOR 
APPROACH ............................................................................................. 92 
A. Baseline Privacy Rights ................................................................. 92 
B. Privacy Safe Harbors ..................................................................... 96 
II. COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE THEORY AND THE QUESTIONS 
THAT IT RAISES ..................................................................................... 99 
A. The Case for Collaborative Governance ..................................... 1 00 
1. Process .................................................................................. 100 
2. Substance .............................................................................. 103 
3. Compliance ........................................................................... 104 
4. Reasons for Choosing a Collaborative Approach ................ 104 
B. Concerns about Collaborative Governance ................................. 1 05 
1. Process .................................................................................. 105 
2. Substance .............................................................................. 107 
3. Compliance ........................................................................... 1 07 
* Geraldine W. Howell Professor of Law, Capital University Law School. Ful-
bright Senior Professor (2010), Institute for Information Law, University of Amsterdam, 
Faculty of Law, Amsterdam, the Netherlands. This Article would not have been possible 
without the assistance and support of others. The author conveys his deepest thanks to: the 
Fulbright Program, sponsored by the U.S. Department of State, which funded the author's 
semester in the Netherlands; the Institute for Information Law (IViR) of the University of 
Amsterdam, Faculty of Law, particularly Professor Bernt Hugenholtz, Professor Nico van 
Eijk, and Anja Dobbelsteen, who made the author feel welcome and facilitated his research; 
Capital University Law School, which provided the sabbatical and summer research grant 
required for the research and writing; the interviewees, who gave generously of their time 
and knowledge; Professors Peter Swire and Dan Solove, who offered early encouragement 
and support; Professors Bert-Jaap Koops, Ira Rubinstein and Dan Fiorino, who commented 
on early drafts; Kim de Beer, Bob de Jong, Jennifer Lause, and Abi Zimmerman, who pro-
vided highly effective research assistance; and, most especially, the author's wife Suzanne 
and children Clara and Zander, who embarked with him on an adventure to the Netherlands 
and were the best traveling companions anyone could ever hope for. The author claims sole 
responsibility for the any errors or omissions in this Article. 
84 Michigan State Law Review Vol. 2013:1 
4. Reasons for Choosing a Collaborative Approach ................ 108 
III. DUTCH DATA PROTECTION CODES OF CONDUCT: AN 
EXPERIMENT IN COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE ............................... 1 08 
A. Legal Foundations ....................................................................... 109 
1. European Data Protection Law ............................................ 109 
2. The 1989 Law on Personal Data Files ................................ . 111 
3. The 2000 Personal Data Protection Act ............................... 112 
B. Comparing the Dutch and the Proposed American 
Safe Harbor Programs ................................................................. 120 
IV. WHAT THE DUTCH EXPERIENCE CAN TELL US ABOUT 
COLLABORATIVE PRIVACY REGULATION ........................................... 122 
A. Why the Dutch Government Utilized, and Dutch 
Industry Embraced, Data Protection Codes of Conduct ............. 122 
1. Why the Dutch Government Utilized Codes ofConduct ....... 122 
2. Industry's Reasons for Participating .................................... 125 
B. The Process of Producing Codes of Conduct .............................. 126 
1. Information Sharing .............................................................. 127 
2. Joint Problem Solving ........................................................... 129 
3. Agency Capture and Industry Influence ................................ 131 
4. Adaptability ........................................................................... 133 
C. The Substance of the Codes ofConduct ...................................... 135 
1. Tailoring and Workability ..................................................... 135 
2. Cost-Effectiveness ................................................................. 137 
3. Leniency ................................................................................ 138 
4. Anti-Competitiveness ............................................................ 138 
D. Compliance and the Code of Conduct Approach ........................ 139 
1. Traditional Enforcement ....................................................... 139 
2. Building Awareness .............................................................. 140 
3. Ownership and Acceptance ................................................... 141 
4. Self-Policing: Bringing up the Bottom .................................. 142 
5. Self-Policing: Monitoring Peers ........................................... 143 
6. Third-Party Certification .................................................... .. 145 
E. Unanticipated Functions of the Dutch Codes of Conduct.. ......... 146 
1. A Dialogue About Statutory Meaning ................................... 146 
2. Migrating Codes ................................................................... 148 
3. Codes to Integrate Statutes ................................................... 149 
4. Codes to Resolve Conflicts Between Statutes ........................ 150 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY ................. 151 
A. Minimizing Weaknesses .............................................................. 152 
1. Require Third-Party Audits ................................................... 152 
2. Build in Stakeholder Input .................................................... 153 
3. Protect New Entrants ............................................................ 155 
4. Improve Adaptability ............................................................ 156 
B. Maximizing Strengths ................................................................. 157 
U.S. Privacy Law and Dutch Privacy Regulation 85 
1. Make the Safe Harbor Program Sector-Based ..................... 157 
2. Include All Statutory Requirements ...................................... 158 
3. Pass a Baseline Privacy Statute ............................................ 159 
4. Recognize Safe Harbor Participants ..................................... 159 
5. Use Codes to Create a Global Standard. .............................. 160 
CONCLUSION: TRANSFERABILITY AND THE QUESTIONS IT RAISES ........... 161 
INTRODUCTION 
Privacy law in the United States is at a crossroads. The revolutions in 
information and communication technology have put individual privacy at 
risk. 1 Corporate tracking of purchases, online activities, and locations/ the 
commercial aggregation, use, and sale of massive databases of personal 
information, and the data security breaches and identity theft to which these 
practices give rise have convinced many that government should do more to 
rein in the private sector and protect personal information. They have called 
for laws that will give individuals more control over how companies collect, 
handle, and disclose their personal information. 3 
Yet others strongly oppose such government intervention. They main-
tain that government officials cannot keep up with the rapid changes in in-
formation and communication technology and that regulation will therefore 
impede growth in this increasingly important economic sector.4 They insist 
that only industry, which knows the emerging technologies and business 
models far better than government, is in a position to establish workable 
I. See generally, Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 
STAN. L. REv. 1193 (1998) (providing a clear and informative overview of this phenomenon). 
2. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS iii (1998) 
(stating that Federal Trade Commission research "shows that the vast majority ofwebsites-
upward of 85o/o--eollect personal information from consumers"); accord Paul M. Schwartz, 
Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REv. 1609, 1629-31 (1999) (describing 
how and why websites collect personal information). 
3. Jared Strauss & Kenneth S. Rogerson, Policies for Online Privacy in the United 
States and the European Union, 19 TELEMATICS & TN FORMA TICS 173, 188 (2002) ("Many 
privacy advocates and legislators have argued that the US Congress should pass legislation 
requiring businesses to follow fair information practices as has been done in the member 
states of the European Union."). 
4. See, e.g., Orson G. Swindle, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Address to the 
Reston Chamber of Commerce (Apr. 8, 1999), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/swindle/reston.shtm ("[G]overnment regulation of privacy ... 
will inevitably be inflexible and outdated and will stifle the growth and innovation of elec-
tronic commerce."). 
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rules. 5 They believe that industry self-regulation should provide the frame-
work for protecting individual privacy interests. 6 
Over the past decade the government regulation and the industry self-
regulation camps have largely fought each other to a standstill. Members of 
Congress have proposed numerous bills to regulate the commercial use of 
personal information, but the opponents of regulation have defeated them. 7 
At the same time industries have tried self-regulation, but nongovernmental 
organization (NGO) and government evaluations of these efforts have re-
peatedly found them to be lacking. 8 Creative proposals that might bridge the 
gap between the opposing sides and provide a way to move forward have 
been largely missing from the debate. 
Until recently, that is. Three bills currently before Congress9 and a 
long-awaited 2012 White House policy paper on privacy regulation (the 
White Paper) 10 contain a kernel of something new. Each calls for govern-
ment and regulated industries to work together to produce commercial pri-
vacy rules. Under these proposals, Congress would pass broadly-worded 
privacy requirements for business. 11 The regulated companies themselves, 
5. /d. (calling for "an Internet privacy initiative under which industry takes the lead 
to address citizens' concern[s] about privacy through self-regulation devoid of government 
intrusion"). 
6. /d.; see also Robert E. Litan, Law and Policy in the Age of the Internet, 50 DuKE 
L.J. 1045, 1045 (2001) (explaining that when it comes to regulation of the Internet "policy-
makers' first instinct should be to rely on markets and technology to address troublesome 
issues"); Strauss & Rogerson, supra note 3, at 181 (discussing those who hold this view). 
7. See MARCIA S. SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. RL 31408 INTERNET PRIVACY: 
OVERVIEW AND LEGISLATION IN THE J09TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION 18 (2006) (describing 
Internet privacy bills proposed in the 1 09th Congress and concluding that while some such 
bills were introduced in the House and Senate, none have passed). 
8. FED. TRADE COMM'N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID 
CHANGE: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS iii (2010) (stating 
that industry self-regulation has been "too slow, and up to now [has] failed to provide ade-
quate and meaningful protection"); Dennis D. Hirsch, The Law and Policy of Online Priva-
cy: Regulation, Self-Regulation or Co-Regulation?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 439, 455-64 
(2011) (describing industry efforts at self-regulation and explaining how they have come up 
short). 
9. Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of2011, S. 799, 112th Cong. (2011) 
[hereinafter Kerry-McCain Bill]. 
10. THE WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A 
FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL 
DIGITAL ECONOMY (2012) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER]. Prior to the issuance of the White 
Paper, the Department of Commerce released a preliminary version of the document known 
as the Green Paper. DEP'T OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, COMMERCIAL DATA 
PRIVACY AND INNOVATION IN THE INTERNET ECONOMY: A DYNAMIC POLICY FRAMEWORK 
(2010) [hereinafter GREEN PAPER]. Together, the White and Green Papers set out the Admin-
istration's position. 
II. Kerry-McCain Bill, supra note 9, Titles I-III; WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 
35; GREEN PAPER, supra note 10, at 23-30 (calling for adoption of a set of a baseline com-
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possibly joined by other interested parties, 12 would then draft the detailed 
rules that spell out how the statute applies to specific industry sectors and 
situations and would submit these industry "codes of conduct" to regulators 
for approval. 13 Companies that followed an approved code of conduct would 
be deemed to be in compliance with the statute and would inhabit a legal 
safe harbor. 14 Firms that voluntarily committed to adhere to a code, and then 
failed to do so, would be subject to government enforcement. 15 The con-
gressional bills call this method a "safe harbor" approach. 16 The White Pa-
per calls it "enforceable codes of conduct." 17 Despite this different termi-
nology, the basic concept is the same, and this Article uses the terms "safe 
harbor programs" and "code of conduct programs" interchangeably. 
Safe harbor programs do not constitute direct government regulation 
since industry representatives draft the rules that spell out how the statute 
applies to particular firms. But neither do they represent pure industry self-
regulation since Congress sets the baseline requirements and a regulatory 
agency must agree that the industry code fulfills the terms of the statute. 
Safe harbor programs are, instead, a blended form of regulation that com-
bines elements of direct government regulation and industry self-regulation 
and requires regulators and businesses to work together to produce the rules 
that will guide corporate behavior. It is an example of what scholars have 
mercia! data privacy framework and noting that many commentators favored doing this 
through legislation). 
12. The three bills and the White Paper differ somewhat on this point. The White 
Paper clearly calls for codes to be developed by "multistakeholder" groups consisting of 
industry representatives and other stakeholders such as "privacy advocates, consumer groups, 
crime victims, academics, international partners, State Attorneys General, Federal civil and 
criminal law enforcement representatives, and other relevant groups." WHITE PAPER, supra 
note I 0, at 23. The bills, however, are far less clear on this point. The Rush and Steams Bills 
refer to the safe harbor organizations as "self-regulatory programs." H.R. 611, I 12th Cong. § 
401 (2011) [hereinafter Rush Bill]; H.R. 1528, I 12th Cong. § 9 (20ll) [hereinafter Steams 
Bill]. This language suggests that the groups will be made up of business representatives, as 
is generally the case in a self-regulatory initiative. The Kerry-McCain Bill somewhat ambig-
uously says that "nongovernmental organizations" will administer the safe harbor programs. 
Kerry-McCain Bill, supra note 9, § 501. It offers no further definition of this term. While a 
privacy advocacy group would likely qualify as an NGO, so would an industry trade associa-
tion. Thus, the Kerry-McCain Bill does not make clear whether business representatives will 
administer the safe harbor programs alone or whether they will be joined by privacy advo-
cates and other interested parties. 
13. WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 37; GREEN PAPER, supra note 10, at 42; Kerry-
McCain Bill, supra note 9, § 501 (referring to these industry-drafted rules as "safe harbor 
programs" and allowing any NGO, including but not limited to industry associations, to 
develop such a program). 
14. WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 37; GREEN PAPER, supra note 10, at 43-44; 
Kerry-McCain Bill, supra note 9, § 502(a). 
15. WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 27; Rush Bill, supra note 12, § 403(2)(C). 
16. Kerry-McCain Bill, supra note 9, Title V. 
17. WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 23; GREEN PAPER, supra note 10, at 41. 
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called "collaborative govemance"-a hybrid form of regulation in which 
government, industry, and, potentially, other stakeholders collaborate on the 
drafting and/or enforcement of rules. 18 The proponents of collaborative gov-
ernance claim that it can combine the flexibility and business savvy of in-
dustry self-regulation with the accountability and public-spiritedness of 
government rules. 19 Such a blended approach might provide a way to trans-
cend the current political impasse and pass comprehensive legislation to 
protect individual privacy in the digital economy. 20 
But is collaborative governance good policy? Will bringing industry 
into the rule drafting process really allow it to infuse government rules with 
flexibility and business knowledge? Or will industry use the opportunity to 
draft rules that favor its own interests? If the latter, will the government 
approval process be enough to inoculate the rules against industry bias? The 
safe harbor bills, and the momentum that they are gathering, require us to 
ask whether or not the tum towards collaboration is a good one. 
How to figure this out? One place to look for an answer is the scholar-
ly literature on collaborative governance. As Part II explains, scholars have 
analyzed the questions just posed. Proponents, such as Professors Jody 
Freeman of Harvard Law School and Philip Harter of the University of Mis-
souri School of Law, maintain that collaborative methods can fundamental-
ly change the relationship between traditional adversaries in the regulatory 
process. 21 Instead of pitting industry, public interest stakeholders, and gov-
ernment against one another, as traditional regulation does, collaborative 
methods can allow them to put their heads together and generate solutions 
that are both workable for industry and protective of social interests. 22 Yet 
the collaborative approach also raises important concerns. Industry may 
seek to manipulate the rules to serve its own interests, and the government 
approval process may not be able to check this behavior. 23 As a result, col-
laborative methods may produce rules that favor industry over the public. 24 
18. See generally Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative 
State, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1997). Others use the term "co-regulation" to describe the middle 
ground between direct government and pure self-regulation. See, e.g., Ira S. Rubinstein, 
Privacy and Regulatory Innovation: Moving Beyond Voluntary Codes, J. L. & PoL'Y FOR THE 
INFO. Soc'y 355,357,371 (2010). 
19. NEIL GUNNINGHAM & DARREN SINCLAIR, LEADERS & LAGGARDS: NEXT-
GENERATION ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 154-55 (2002). 
20. Indeed, that may be one of the reasons why each of the current bills incorporates 
this alternative. 
21. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 18, at 2; Philip J. Harter, Collaboration: The 
Future of Governance, 2009 J. DISP. RESOL. 411,412. 
22. See Freeman, supra note 18, at 26-28. 
23. See GUNNINGHAM & SINCLAIR, supra note 19, at 105 (stating that industry "is 
likely to negotiate hard to minimise its commitments"). 
24. Daniel J. Fiorino, Toward a New System of Environmental Regulation: The Case 
for an Industry Sector Approach, 26 ENVTL. L. 457, 485 (1996) (explaining that collaborative 
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Riven by these conflicting views, the literature alone cannot settle the ques-
tion of whether collaborative regulation is a good choice for information 
privacy law, or a bad one. How, then, to assess the new congressional and 
regulatory proposals for safe harbor programs and enforceable codes of 
conduct? Is there a body of practical experience on which to draw? Has 
anyone actually tried using collaborative governance to protect personal 
information? 
The Dutch have. In 1989, the Dutch government began using a meth-
od of privacy regulation that is very similar to the one that Congress and the 
White House have proposed. 25 It involves a privacy statute with broad re-
quirements; sectoral industry-drafted "codes of conduct"; government eval-
uation and approval of these codes; and a legal safe harbor for those firms 
that follow the approved code for their sector. 26 The main difference be-
tween the Dutch approach and the American proposals is that the Dutch 
have been implementing their program continuously for more than twenty 
years. During this time, they have approved codes for twenty sectors includ-
ing banks, insurance companies, direct marketers, pharmaceutical compa-
nies, private investigators, commercial information bureaus, personnel re-
cruitment agencies, medical researchers, and many other industry sectors. 27 
The Dutch experience represents the most comprehensive body of experi-
ence to date on how a collaborative approach actually works--or fails to 
work-as a means of protecting personal information in a developed, West-
ern economy. Studying this real-life experience can shed light on whether 
processes "could increase the chance that the regulatory process would be co-opted by indus-
try"). 
25. See irifra Part III (describing this Dutch regulatory program). 
26. Wet persoonsregistraties, Stb. 1988, p. 665 (Neth.), amended by Stb. 1989, p. 
480, ch. 4, art. 15 (Neth.) [hereinafter Law on Personal Data Files] (establishing a process for 
agency approval of industry codes of conduct); Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens, Stb. 
2000, p. 302, ch. 3, art. 25 (Neth.) [hereinafter Personal Data Protection Act] (further ex-
plaining the process for agency approval of industry codes of conduct). Professors Bennett 
and Raab have identified five types of privacy codes of practice: organizational codes, sec-
toral codes, functional codes, technological codes, and professional codes. COLIN J. BENNEIT 
& CHARLES D. RAAB, THE GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY: POLICY INSTRUMENTS IN GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVE 155 (2006). They define sectoral codes as those "developed by industry associa-
tions for adoption by their member organizations," and functional codes as those "defined 
less by the economic sector and more by the practice in which the organization is engaged." 
!d. at 157. The Dutch codes, which are to be drawn up by industry "organisations" and inter-
pret the statute in light of the "particular features of the sector or sectors of society in which 
these organisations are operating," Personal Data Protection Act, supra, art. 25(1), would 
qualifY as sectoral or functional codes in the Bennett and Raab typology. 
27. See Appendix: Dutch Data Protection Codes of Conduct (listing all twenty 
codes). 
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and how to implement such a program and on potential stumbling blocks 
and pitfalls that it might encounter. 28 
In the spring of 2010, I served as a Fulbright Professor at the Universi-
ty of Amsterdam where I studied the Dutch "code of conduct" approach to 
privacy regulation. I conducted face-to-face interviews with the regulators, 
industry representatives, and privacy advocates who had drafted and negoti-
ated the codes. I sought to learn what the program, as implemented, could 
tell us about how collaborative governance could function as a tool for pro-
tecting personal privacy. I publish the results of that research, for the first 
time, in this Article. Here, I synthesize and draw insights from my inter-
views. I then make normative recommendations, grounded in the Dutch 
experience, as to whether the United States should employ a collaborative 
approach to commercial privacy regulation and, if so, how it should go 
about this. 
In conducting my research, I reviewed primary source documents (e.g. 
the codes of conduct and Data Protection Authority (DPA) publications) 
and the secondary literature on codes of conduct and Dutch privacy regula-
tion more generally. However, I focused my research effort on face-to-face 
interviews with those who have been centrally involved in the Dutch data 
protection codes of conduct. I conducted twenty-six interviews with gov-
ernment officials/9 industry representatives,30 privacy advocates31 and aca-
demics with expertise in data protection law (including two who had 
28. For other relevant and informative literature on privacy and data protection 
codes of conduct, see generally Colin J. Bennett & Deirdre K. Mulligan, The Governance of 
Privacy Through Codes for Codes of Conduct: International Lessons for U.S. Privacy Policy 
(2012) (copy on file with author); BENNETI & RAAB, supra note 26, at 151-75; Peter J. Hus-
tinx, Co-Regulation or Self-Regulation by Public and Private Bodies - the Case of Data 
Protection, Freundesgabe Biillesbach 283, 283 (2002), available at 
http://www.cbpweb.nUdownloads _ artikelen/art _phu _ 2002 _ coregulation.pdf; Rubinstein, 
supra note 18. 
29. The Data Protection Authority (the College bescherming persoonsgegevens) 
allowed me only a single interview with Commissioner Madeleine McLaggan-van Roon. I 
was not permitted to meet with other, current CBP employees. However, I was able to identi-
fy and meet with five former CBP employees (Uico van de Pol, John Borking, Peter Hustinx, 
Richard Wishaw, and Jacqueline Wierdak) with long experience at the agency and with the 
codes of conduct. 
30. I met with ten industry representatives who, among them, represented the fol-
lowing industries: banking (Jan Berkvens, Bruno van der Burgh), pharmaceuticals (Matthijs 
van Blokland), private investigators (Felix Olijslager, Pieter Ijfs, Carlo Cahn), trade infor-
mation bureaus (A. van Herk, E. Rhein, and G.J. Nobel), and direct marketing (Alexander 
Singewald, Alistair Tempest). I also interviewed a leading consultant (Jeroen Terstegge) and 
a leading attorney (Lokke Moerel). 
31. I met with two privacy advocates, including the Executive Director of the lead-
ing Dutch privacy organization Bits of Freedom (Ot van Daalen), a highly influential and 
experienced privacy advocate who had been involved in some of the very first code negotia-
tions (Jan Holvast), and a significant journalist with a long-standing interest in privacy issues 
(Frank Kuitenbrouwer). 
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worked at the DPA and two who had authored formal evaluations of the 
Data Protection Act). 32 I studied in depth five of the twenty Dutch data pro-
tection codes of conduct (banking, pharmaceuticals, private investigators, 
trade information bureaus, and direct marketing). I chose these because they 
were among the most developed and detailed codes and because, taken to-
gether, they reflected a variety of industries. However, my research results 
must be viewed as a partial study of the Dutch codes, not a comprehensive 
one. 
In preparing for the interviews, I surveyed the literature on collabora-
tive governance and found that scholarly disagreements over this approach 
focused on four areas: the process of negotiating a code of conduct; the sub-
stance of the code itself; compliance under a code system; and the reasons 
for adopting a code-based system in the first place. 33 I used these four major 
topic areas to structure my interview questions, although I did not require 
strict adherence to the "script" when the interviewee ventured onto a differ-
ent topic. The interviews were, accordingly, semi-structured. 
This Article presents the results of those interviews and of my re-
search as a whole. It proceeds as follows. Part I describes the recent con-
gressional bills and the White Paper each of which proposes using a collab-
orative, safe harbor approach to regulate commercial privacy. Part II syn-
thesizes the literature on collaborative governance. It describes both the 
proponents' optimistic vision of this method and the skeptics' concerns. As 
suggested above, it concludes that the literature raises more questions than it 
answers. It therefore makes sense to look not just to theory, but also to actu-
al experience with the safe harbor approach to privacy regulation. Part III 
describes the Dutch safe harbor program. It sets out the program's legal 
foundations and describes its central components. It shows that the Dutch 
program resembles the American proposals and that, like them, it consti-
tutes a form of collaborative governance. Drawing on interviews, Part N 
explores whether the Dutch experience provides reason to be optimistic, or 
pessimistic, about using collaborative governance for privacy regulation. 
Part V draws on both collaborative governance theory and the Dutch expe-
rience with privacy safe harbors to make concrete, normative recommenda-
tions as to whether, and how, the United States should implement a collabo-
rative safe harbor approach to privacy regulation. 
32. I met with Professors Bert-Jaap Koops, Corien Prins, Pieter Ippel, Pieter Glas-
bergen, Ivo Giesen, Jan Kabel, Gerrit-Jan Zwenne, Heinrich Winter, Marguerite Overkleeft-
Verburg, and with Vice-Chancellor Philip Eijlander. 
33. See infra Part II (describing how the literature treats these four areas). 
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I. RECENT U.S. PROPOSALS INCORPORATE THE SAFE HARBOR APPROACH 
In recent years, Washington D.C. has been abuzz with the question of 
how best to protect individual privacy in the commercial realm. Congres-
sional committees have held hearings on the topic, agencies have hosted 
roundtable discussions and issued reports, and members of Congress have 
proposed legislation. The most significant current developments are the 
three commercial privacy bills pending in Congress34 and the recently-
issued White Paper35 that expresses the Obama Administration's views on 
the topic. While the bills and the White Paper differ from each other in 
some respects, they have much in common. Each would have Congress pass 
comprehensive privacy requirements. Each would then rely, at least in part, 
on the safe harbor approach to implement these broad legislative require-
ments.36 Collectively, the bills and the White Paper represent a rather re-
markable and bipartisan37 embrace of the safe harbor approach to privacy 
regulation by both the legislative and executive branches. 38 They suggest 
that the relatively untested safe harbor approach is fast becoming the domi-
nant model for future commercial privacy law. 39 Due to their similarities, it 
makes sense to describe the bills and the White Paper as a unified approach 
and then note the differences between them. 40 
A. Baseline Privacy Rights 
The three bills and the White Paper each envision broad, legislatively-
established privacy requirements that would apply to a wide variety of 
commercial entities.41 Like the original Fair Information Practice Principles 
(FIPPs),42 the bills and the White Paper begin with notice and choice. 43 Each 
would require regulated companies to notify individuals that they are col-
34. See generally Kerry-McCain Bill, supra note 9; Rush Bill, supra note 12; 
Stearns Bill, supra note 12. 
35. See generally WHITE PAPER, supra note 10. 
36. !d. at 23. The Administration encourages rnultistakeholder groups to develop 
codes of conduct to implement broad statutory principles. !d. 
37. The bills have sponsors from both parties. 
38. Kerry-McCain Bill, supra note 9; Rush Bill, supra note 12; Stearns Bill, supra 
note 12; WHITE PAPER, supra note 10. 
39. Kerry-McCain Bill, supra note 9; Rush Bill, supra note 12; Stearns Bill, supra 
note 12;WHITEPAPER,supranote 10. 
40. Kerry-McCain Bill, supra note 9; Rush Bill, supra note 12; Stearns Bill, supra 
note 12; WHITE PAPER, supra note 10. 
41. WHITE PAPER, supra note I 0, at 9-22 (setting forth these rights). 
42. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDU., & WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS: RECORDS, COMPUTERS 
AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS, at XXV -XXVI (DHEW Publ'n 1973). 
43. See infra note 44 and accompanying text. 
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lecting, using, and/or disclosing their personal information,44 and to do so in 
a way that is "clear, concise, and timely."45 Each would further require these 
entities to provide individuals with either opt-out46 or opt-in47 choices as to 
the collection, use, sale, and disclosure of their information.48 Having stated 
these requirements, the bills and the White Paper go beyond notice and 
choice to include other important privacy protections. They require compa-
nies to take reasonable steps to ensure that the personal information they 
collect is accurate49 and to provide individuals with access to their personal 
information and the opportunity to correct it. 50 They require regulated enti-
ties that collect personal information to articulate the purpose for which they 
intend to use it51 and to employ it only for that intended purpose. 52 They 
44. Steams Bill, supra note 12, § 4(a); Rush Bill, supra note 12, §§ 101-02; Kerry-
McCain Bill, supra note 9, § 201; WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 14-15 (transparency). The 
Steams and Kerry-McCain bills would also require such notice when a company makes a 
material change to its privacy policy. Steams Bill, supra note 12, § 4(a)(2); Kerry-McCain 
Bill, supra note 9, § 20l(a)(2). 
45. Steams Bill, supra note 12, § 4(b) ("clear and conspicuous" notice); Rush Bill, 
supra note 12, § 1 02(a) (notice that is "concise, meaningful, timely, prominent, and easy-to-
understand"); Kerry-McCain Bill, supra note 9, § 20l(a) (notice that is "clear, concise, and 
timely"). The Steams Bill would further require covered parties to establish and make public 
a privacy policy that governs the company's "collection, sale, disclosure for consideration, 
dissemination, use, and security of the personally identifiable information." Steams Bill, 
supra note 12, § 5. 
46. Rush Bill, supra note 12, § 103(a) (opt-out of collection and use of personal 
information); Steams Bill, supra note 12, § 6(a) (opt-out of the sale or disclosure of personal-
ly identifiable information to a non-affiliate); Kerry-McCain Bill, supra note 9, § 202(a)(l)-
(2) (opt-out of unauthorized use of personal information and opt-out of use by third parties 
for behavioral advertising or marketing). 
47. Rush Bill, supra note 12, § 104(a)(l) (opt-in required for disclosure of personal 
information to third-party); Kerry-McCain Bill, supra note 9, § 202(a)(3) (opt-in required for 
transfer to third party for unauthorized use where such use carries risk of economic or physi-
cal harm). 
48. Kerry-McCain Bill, supra note 9, § 202(a)(3); Steams Bill, supra note 12, § 6; 
Rush Bill, supra note 12, §§ 103-04; WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 11-14 (individual con-
trol). 
49. Rush Bill, supra note 12, § 20l(a) (stating that regulated entities must establish 
"reasonable procedures" to ensure the accuracy of the information they collect); Kerry-
McCain Bill, supra note 9, § 303(a) (stating that regulated entities shall attempt to establish 
"reasonable procedures" to ensure the accuracy of information the entity collects); WHITE 
PAPER, supra note 10, at 19-20 ("Companies should use reasonable measures to ensure they 
maintain accurate personal data."). 
50. Rush Bill, supra note 12, § 202(a) (requiring "reasonable access to, and the 
ability to dispute the accuracy or completeness of, covered information or sensitive infor-
mation about that individual"); Kerry-McCain Bill, supra note 9, § 202(a)(4) (requiring 
"reasonable access" to "any individual to whom the personally identifiable information that 
is covered information pertains, and which the ... service provider stores"). 
51. WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 15-19; Kerry-McCain Bill, supra note 9, § 
20l(a)(l)(B); Rush Bill, supra note 12, § 101(3)-(4). 
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further require companies to retain the personal information only for so long 
as it takes to accomplish the intended purpose53 and to notify and obtain 
consent from individuals before using the data for a purpose other than the 
one originally specified. 54 In sum, the bills and the White Paper establish an 
expanded set of FIPPs that include not only notice and choice, but also pur-
pose specification, data minimization, opportunities for access and correc-
tion, and other protections. 55 
The bills and the White Paper also share another feature. Each states 
its requirements in broad, ambiguous language. 56 For example, the bills and 
the White Paper require companies to notify individuals that they are col-
lecting, using, and sharing their personal information and to do so in a way 
that is "concise, meaningful, timely, prominent, and easy-to-understand."57 
Fair enough. But how is a company to tell whether its notice is sufficiently 
"concise" or "meaningful" or "timely" or "easy-to-understand"?58 The bills' 
and the White Paper's other main requirements are similarly open-ended. 
Companies are to provide the consumer with a choice mechanism that is 
"easy to access and to use"59 and that offers "reasonable means to exercise 
52. WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 15-19; Rush Bill, supra note 12, § 104(d) (ex-
plaining that third party recipients of information are limited to the originally specified pur-
pose). 
53. Rush Bill, supra note 12, § 303 (providing that a covered entity can retain data 
"only as long as necessary to fulfill a legitimate business purpose or comply with a legal 
requirement"); Kerry-McCain Bill, supra note 9, § 301; cf WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 
21 (giving an example where a party would have to make sure that it does not retain personal 
data beyond the time that is needed to achieve its stated purpose). 
54. WHITE PAPER, supra note I 0, at 16 (enhanced choice required). 
55. See generally id.; Steams Bill, supra note 12; Rush Bill, supra note 12; Kerry-
McCain Bill, supra note 9. 
56. See generally Steams Bill, supra note 12; Rush Bill, supra note 12; Kerry-
McCain Bill, supra note 9; WHITE PAPER, supra note I 0. 
57. See Rush Bill, supra note 12, § 102(a); see also WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 
14 (stating that notice must be "easily understandable and accessible"); Steams Bill, supra 
note 12, § 4(b) (stating that notice "shall be provided in a clear and conspicuous manner"); 
Kerry-McCain Bill, supra note 9, § 201(a)(l) (notice that is "clear, concise, and timely"). 
58. Must a company provide a shorter notice to those who access its website on a 
mobile device than to those who access it on a computer in order to make the notice "easy-
to-understand"? If it does so, is the shorter notice still "meaningful"? If a company provides 
only rudimentary notice on its home page with a link to a more detailed notice, does this 
quality as "conspicuous"? Or, must the firm provide the entire notice all at once? If the no-
tice is available in the company's privacy policy, which is on an interior page of its website, 
is that "conspicuous" enough? How does a data broker or other company that does not direct-
ly interact with the individuals whose data it holds provide them with "clear" and "timely" 
notice of its information practices? Can a third party or service provider provide the notice 
on behalf of the covered entity, or must the entity provide the notice itself? 
59. See Steams Bill, supra note 12, § 7(2); see also Kerry-McCain Bill, supra note 
9, § 202(a)(l) (requiring "clear and conspicuous mechanism for opt-out consent"). 
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an opt-out right and decline consent for such collection and use."60 Regulat-
ed parties may, as a condition of providing a given service or other benefit, 
require their customers to provide a "reasonable" amount of information 
about themselves, but not more. 61 Companies must institute "reasonable 
procedures to assure the accuracy of the covered information or sensitive 
information it collects, assembles, or maintains."62 And they must provide 
individuals with "appropriate and reasonable" access to their personal in-
formation and mechanisms to correct it. 63 Each of these requirements is 
stated in very general terms that would make it difficult for a regulated par-
ty, even one with good intentions, to know what it needed to do in order to 
achieve compliance. 
Why would the Obama Administration and Congress use such open-
ended language? The Administration's White Paper explains that "[i]n do-
mains involving rapid changes in technology and business practices," it is 
better to use "flexible standards" that can keep up with the changes rather 
than to adopt narrow rules that are specific to "technologies and practices 
that exist at the time."64 While that makes sense, it does not answer the 
question of how regulated parties, faced with such broad, flexible standards, 
are to figure out what they need to do to comply with them, or how individ-
uals and stakeholders are to track such compliance. 65 
60. Rush Bill, supra note 12, § 103(a)(2). Is it sufficient for a company to post an 
opt-out notice on its website? Does it have to be on the opening page of the site, or can it be 
on an interior page? Does it matter whether the company provides its primary service or 
product on the Web, or not? Must the company provide a single opt-out option for all data 
collection and use, or can it require separate opt-outs for its various data practices? Must 
each affiliate of the covered entity offer its own opt-out? Or can a parent company offer a 
single opt-out opportunity that covers all of its subsidiaries? Once again, the questions, and 
the need for guidance on how to comply, are substantial. The bills create further ambiguities 
with respect to the "opt-in" consent requirements. For example, the Kerry-McCain Bill re-
quires opt-in consent if a covered party changes its stated data practices in a material way 
and, as a result, the use or transfer of an individual's personal data would cause "risk of 
economic or physical harm to [the] individual." Kerry-McCain Bill, supra note 9, § 
202(a)(3)(B)(ii). What is the threshold of economic harm? $1? $1 ,000? $5,000? How much 
of a risk of physical harm is required? Significant risk? Or will any small risk do? 
61. Rush Bill, supra note 12, § 103(f). 
62. See id. § 20l(a); see also Kerry-McCain Bill, supra note 9, § 303(a) (requiring 
"reasonable procedures to ensure that personally identifiable information that is covered 
information and maintained by the covered entity is accurate"). 
63. See Kerry-McCain Bill, supra note 9, § 202(a)(4); see also Rush Bill, supra note 
12, § 202(a) (requiring "reasonable access to, and the ability to dispute the accuracy or com-
pleteness of, covered information"). 
64. See, e.g., WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 36. 
65. The Department of Commerce acknowledged this point in its Green Paper. See 
GREEN PAPER, supra note 10, at 41 ("FIPPs are designed to be comprehensive and general .. 
. . [A]dopting a FIPPs-based framework would not necessarily help companies determine 
when they have adequately implemented the principles, leaving the complaint about the lack 
of certainty in the current commercial data privacy framework unaddressed."). 
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B. Privacy Safe Harbors 
The bills and the White Paper provide two mechanisms for clarifying 
the broad statutory provisions. First, each would authorize the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) to promulgate rules that flesh out and interpret the statu-
tory requirements. 66 This is traditional agency rulemaking of the type that 
can be found in many regulatory statutes. Second, the bills and the White 
Paper would authorize the safe harbor approach. That is, each would allow a 
nongovernmental organization-referred to as a "safe harbor program"67 or 
a "multistakeholder process"68-to draft a set of rules that interprets the 
statute and spells out how it will apply to a particular sector or group of 
firms. 69 The bills and the White Paper then instruct the FTC70 to evaluate the 
safe harbor rules to determine whether they are "substantially equivalent to 
or superior to the protection otherwise provided under" the statute. 71 If the 
FTC finds that the rules meet this test and formally approves them, then 
firms that follow the approved rules are deemed to be in compliance with 
the statute. 72 They inhabit a legal "safe harbor." Companies would be able 
to choose whether to sign up for a safe harbor program and be governed by 
its rules, or to stay outside these programs and be subject to the general stat-
utory obligations as interpreted through default FTC rules. 73 Those firms 
that voluntarily committed to follow a given safe harbor program's rules, 
66. Steams Bill, supra note 12, § IO(b); Rush Bill, supra note 12, §§ 102(b), 201(a), 
202(k), 301(b); Kerry-McCain Bill, supra note 9, §§ 101(a), 201(a), 202(a), 501(a). 
67. This is the term that the Kerry-McCain Bill uses. Kerry-McCain Bill, supra note 
9, § 501. The Steams Bill refers to "self-regulatory programs." Steams Bill, supra note 12, § 
9. The Rush Bill refers to "Choice Programs." Rush Bill, supra note 12, § 401. The White 
Paper refers to "multistakeholder processes." WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 23. For the 
sake of simplicity, we will refer to all of these as "safe harbor programs." 
68. WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 23. 
69. Kerry-McCain Bill, supra note 9, § 501(a)(1); Steams Bill, supra note 12, § 
9(c)(l); Rush Bill, supra note 12, § 403(2)(A)-(B). The rules are sometimes referred to as a 
"codes of conduct." See WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 2. 
70. Kerry-McCain Bill, supra note 9, § 501(b)(3); Steams Bill, supra note 12, § 
9(b ); Rush Bill, supra note 12, § 402(b ); WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 37. 
71. See Kerry-McCain Bill, supra note 9, § 501(b)(3); see also id. § 502(a) (requir-
ing that safe harbor rules must be "substantially the same as or more protective of privacy of 
individuals"); Steams Bill supra note 12, § 9(c)(1) (requiring that self-regulatory programs 
must contain guidelines and procedures that are "substantially equivalent" to or "greater" 
than protections that statute itself sets out); Rush Bill, supra note 12, § 403(2)(0) (requiring 
that the programs establish "guidelines and procedures requiring a participating covered 
entity to provide equivalent or greater protections for individuals and their covered infor-
mation and sensitive information as are provided under titles I and II"); WHITE PAPER, supra 
note I 0, at 37 (FTC should "review codes of conduct against the Consumer Bill of Rights"). 
72. Kerry-McCain Bill, supra note 9, §· 502(a); Steams Bill, supra note 12, § 9(a); 
Rush Bill, supra note 12, § 401; WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 37 (giving the FTC the 
"authority to grant a 'safe harbor"'). 
73. WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 36-37. 
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and then failed to do so, would be subject to FTC Section 5 enforcement for 
engaging in an "unfair" or "deceptive" business practice74 or, potentially, for 
violating the underlying terms of the Act itself. 75 Safe harbor programs 
would accordingly be both "voluntary" and "enforceable." 
The bills and the White Paper also differ in some respects in their ap-
proach to the safe harbor method. To begin with, the bills appear to give 
industry representatives the lead role in the safe harbor programs that will 
draft the codes of conduct. The House bills call the entities "self-regulatory 
programs," a term that suggests that the regulated parties-i.e., business 
representatives-will take the lead. 76 The Senate bill calls them "nongov-
ernmental organization[s]."77 While this term opens the door to many types 
of private sector and public interest groups, it could certainly encompass an 
industry trade association. By contrast, the Obama Administration White 
Paper makes clear that "multi-stakeholder groups" are to draft the codes and 
that these groups are to include not only industry representatives but also 
"privacy advocates, consumer groups, crime victims, academics, interna-
tional partners, State Attorneys General, Federal civil and criminal law en-
forcement representatives, and other relevant groups."78 
The bills and the White Paper also differ on the scope of the safe har-
bor. The Stearns Bill would extend the legal safe harbor to all of the legisla-
tion's substantive provisions-notice, choice, access, data security, and 
more. 79 The Rush Bill would extend the approach to notice, choice, and 
access, but not to data security or data minimization.80 The Kerry-McCain 
Bill would narrow the safe harbor still further. It expressly extends it only to 
the opt-out choice that companies must provide before transferring personal 
data to a third party81 and not to the bill's other substantive requirements, 
74. The White Paper affirms the FTC's ability to use its Section 5 enforcement 
authority in this way. See id. at 29; Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 
(2006). 
75. See Kerry-McCain Bill, supra note 9, § 402 (stating that the FTC can bring 
enforcement actions against regulated entities that engage in "knowing or repetitive" viola-
tions of the Act); Steams Bill, supra note 12, § 10 (stating that the FTC can bring enforce-
ment actions against regulated entities that violate the Act); Rush Bill, supra note 12, § 
602(a)-(b) (stating that the FTC can bring enforcement actions against regulated entities that 
violate the Act); WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 36 (arguing that Congress should authorize 
the FTC to enforce the Privacy Bill of Rights). 
76. Rush Bill, supra note 12, § 401; Steams Bill, supra note 12, § 9. 
77. Kerry-McCain Bill, supra note 9, § 501. 
78. WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 23. 
79. Steams Bill, supra note 12, § 9(a)(1). 
80. Rush Bill, supra note 12, § 404(6). 
81. Kerry-McCain Bill, supra note 9, § 501(a)(l)-(2). 
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such as notice, access, correction, and data minimization, although the text 
is somewhat ambiguous on this point. 82 
The bills and the White Paper also diverge with respect to monitoring 
and enforcement. Each gives the FTC the power to enforce the Act against 
companies that violate it. 83 The House bills would also require the safe har-
bor program itself periodically to review whether its participants were in 
compliance with its rules84 and to impose consequences on them if they 
were not. 85 The Steams Bill would go even further and require the program 
participants annually to self-certify their compliance with the program re-
quirements. 86 
Finally, the White Paper diverges from the bills by calling for multi-
stakeholder processes to develop codes of conduct even in the absence of 
privacy legislation. 87 In such a situation, the safe harbor program would 
function as a way to identify "best practices" rather than as a vehicle for 
interpreting statutory requirements. The FTC would use its Section 5 au-
thority to enforce a code of conduct against a company that agreed to abide 
by it and then failed to do so. 88 
These differences aside, the bills and the White Paper display a re-
markable consistency in that each embraces the safe harbor approach to 
privacy regulation. Why do they do this? Why do they depart from the tradi-
tional model that relies primarily on agency rules? The Obama Administra-
tion Green Paper (the preliminary version of the document that later became 
the White Paper) provides a rationale. It explains that the technologies and 
business models in the information economy are evolving at an unusually 
rapid pace. 89 This poses two problems for traditional regulation. Slow-
moving, notice-and-comment rulemaking will not be able to keep up with 
rapidly changing technologies, business practices, and consumer expecta-
tions. 90 Moreover, the regulators themselves will not be able to learn enough 
82. A later section of the bill would appear to extend the safe harbor approach to all 
of the bill's substantive provisions./d. § 502(a). But this is in conflict with the provision just 
discussed, § 50l(a)(l). !d. § 50l(a)(l). Congress will need to clear up this ambiguity should 
it decide to pass this bill into law. 
83. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. 
84. Stearns Bill, supra note 12, § 9(c)(2)(E). 
85. Rush Bill, supra note 12, § 403(2)(D). The White Paper also envisions that self-
regulatory bodies will provide the first line of enforcement. WHITE PAPER, supra note I 0, at 
29. 
86. Stearns Bill, supra note 12, § 9(c)(2)(B), (C), (E). 
87. WHITE PAPER, supra note I 0, at 24. 
88. !d. at 27. 
89. GREEN PAPER, supra note 10, at 47. 
90. !d. ("[T]he rate at which new services develop, and the pace at which consumers 
form expectations about acceptable and unacceptable uses of personal information, is meas-
ured in weeks or months. In contrast, a rulemaking can take years and often results in rules 
addressing services that may be long abandoned."). 
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about quickly evolving industries to design intelligent rules for them. 91 The 
Administration papers see codes of conduct as a way to address these prob-
lems.92 As the Administration presents it, stakeholder groups will be able to 
modify codes of conduct far more quickly than regulators can revise tradi-
tional rules. This will help regulation to keep pace with changing business 
and consumer realities. 93 In addition, codes will bring industry members and 
consumer advocates to the rule-drafting table and so will enable the regula-
tory process to tap into these parties' superior knowledge about evolving 
business, technological, and consumer realities.94 The result should be more 
responsive and intelligent rules that do a better job of keeping up with rapid-
ly changing conditions. 95 
II. COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE THEORY AND THE QUESTIONS THAT 
IT RAISES 
The safe harbor approach sounds great on paper. But will it work the 
way that the Administration papers and (implicitly) the congressional bills 
say that it will? One way to explore this question is to see what scholars 
have had to say about it. Recent years have seen the emergence of a sub-
stantial literature on collaborative govemance.96 These writings use the term 
to refer to those regulatory processes in which government officials and the 
regulated parties expressly share responsibility for the drafting and/or en-
forcement of rules. 97 Privacy safe harbor programs are a form of collabora-
91. Cf id. at 49-50 (explaining that the government should "leverage" corporate 
privacy officers' superior knowledge). 
92. /d. at 47 (showing codes that stakeholders develop will be "more responsive" 
than traditional rulemaking). 
93. WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 27 (stating that the safe harbor approach will 
"enable stakeholders to modify privacy protections in response to rapid changes in technolo-
gy, consumer expectations, and market conditions, to assure they sufficiently protect con-
sumer data privacy"); GREEN PAPER, supra note 10, at 20 ("The premise behind this ap-
proach was that industry codes would develop faster and provide more flexibility than legis-
lation or regulations."). 
94. GREEN PAPER, supra note 10, at 5. 
95. !d. at 47 ("A dynamic system in which both private and public stakeholders 
participate would yield privacy practices that are more responsive to evolving consumer 
privacy expectations than would a traditional rulemaking system."). 
96. See generally Freeman, supra note 18; Harter, supra note 21; GUNNINGHAM & 
SINCLAIR, supra note 19, at 134-56; JOSEPH V. REES, REFORMING THE WORKPLACE: A STUDY 
OF SELF-REGULATION IN OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY (1988); LYLE SCRUGGS, SUSTAINING 
ABUNDANCE: ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE IN INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES (2003). 
97. Freeman, supra note 18, at 6, 30 (arguing that there should be shared responsi-
bility at all stages in the rulemaking process and suggesting shared responsibility in monitor-
ing and enforcement). Collaborative governance can be distinguished from government-
centered regulation, in which government holds the primary responsibility for drafting and 
enforcement of rules, and from industry self-regulation, in which industry bears this primary 
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tive governance. Regulatory negotiations (reg-neg) would be another, more 
familiar example of this regulatory approach. 
One group of scholars, led by Professors Jody Freeman of Harvard 
Law School and Philip Harter of the University of Missouri School of Law, 
argue that the collaborative approach, if properly implemented, can perform 
better than traditional administrative rulemaking. 98 Yet other writers are far 
more cautious about reaching such a conclusion. 99 The debate in the litera-
ture focuses on four key areas: (1) whether collaborative methods are pro-
cedurally superior to notice-and-comment rulemaking; (2) whether they 
produce substantively better rules; (3) whether they engender better compli-
ance; and ( 4) the true motivations behind the recent interest in collaborative 
methods. This Section sets out the differing views on these topics in order to 
assess what the literature can tell us about this regulatory approach. 
A. The Case for Collaborative Governance 
The proponents' arguments center on four areas: process, substance, 
compliance, and the reasons for the interest in collaborative governance. 
1. Process 
As the proponents see it, the central problem with traditional rulemak-
ing is that it is adversarial in nature. 100 Interested parties in notice-and-
comment rulemaking occupy a position similar to litigants in a court pro-
ceeding. They stand at arm's length from the neutral arbiter (here, the agen-
cy) and submit written briefs (comments) that they hope will convince it to 
adopt their position. 101 Each group seeks to push the agency as hard as it can 
responsibility. Defining collaborative governance in this way is not intended to suggest that 
industry plays no role in traditional government-centered rulemaking. It does play a role 
through written comments and other, more informal, contributions. It is also not to say that 
government plays no role in industry self-regulation. Government frequently gives industry 
feedback on its self-regulatory efforts. The point is that collaborative governance expressly 
and intentionally puts the emphasis on shared responsibility for rule drafting and enforce-
ment. One way to think about it is that collaborative governance stands in the center of a 
continuum that begins with pure industry self-regulation and ends with purely government-
driven prescriptions. 
98. See id. at 3-4; see generally Harter, supra note 21; REES, supra note 96; 
GUNNING HAM & SINCLAIR, supra note 19; SCRUGGS, supra note 96. 
99. See, e.g., David A. Dana, The New "Contractarian" Paradigm in Environmental 
Regulation, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 35, 51-59 (expressing concerns about, and identifying the 
costs of, the shift to a "contractarian" model of regulation). 
100. Freeman, supra note 18, at 19 (stating that traditional regulation assumes rela-
tionships are adversarial). 
101. Freeman, supra note 18, at 11-12, 19 (citing Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regu-
lations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 19-23 (1982)). 
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in its own direction, believing that it must do so in order to offset its oppo-
nents' equally vigorous advocacy. 102 This has a number of negative effects. 
It prevents parties from revealing their true priorities, instead leading each 
to put forth a one-sided, extreme version of its position. 103 It deters parties 
from sharing information about the nature of the regulatory problem, and 
possible solutions to it, for fear that others might use the information to un-
dermine their position. 104 Thus, for example, even where companies know 
of a more cost-effective way to achieve social goals, they may not reveal it 
for fear of undermining their argument that the anticipated regulations will 
prove too costly and should be eliminated altogether. Finally, it often leads 
interested parties to challenge final rules in court resulting in further delays 
and the "ossification" of the rulemaking process. 105 
As the proponents see it, collaborative processes are far less adversari-
al. 106 Instead, they confront the government and interested parties with a 
regulatory problem and get them to work together on finding a mutually 
acceptable solution to it.' 07 They thereby "[reorient] the regulatory enter-
prise around joint problem solving." 108 In this sense the process is closer to 
dispute resolution than to litigation. This change alters the dynamic in high-
ly positive ways. By requiring parties to interact face-to-face over multiple 
meetings, collaborative methods force them to respond to each other's ar-
guments and to offer positions of their own that the other parties might ac-
tually find to be convincing. 109 This deters the posturing and extreme posi-
102. See Harter, supra note I 0 I, at 19-23 (explaining that both agencies and parties 
take extreme positions in traditional regulation). 
103. Freeman, supra note 18, at 11-12 (stating that interest groups "often take ex-
treme positions in notice and comment, preferring to posture in anticipation of litigation 
rather than focus on the regulatory problem posed by the agency"); Harter, supra note 101, at 
19 (explaining that parties do not express their true concerns). 
104. Freeman, supra note 18, at 15-16 (explaining that under the traditional model, 
the agency and the regulated party "typically adopt an adversarial posture toward each oth-
er," and this results in a failure to share useful information); Harter, supra note I 0 I, at 19 
(arguing parties do not want to share information that may reveal weaknesses). If they do 
share information, they are likely to do so in rulemaking comments that often come so late in 
the process that agencies cannot make good use of it. Freeman, supra note 18, at 12-13. The 
rulemaking process itself also works against timely sharing of information. By the time that 
the agency has published its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, and the public gets a chance to 
comment on it, the agency has already reviewed and approved the proposal and is heavily 
committed to it. Commenters face an uphill battle in trying to convince the agency to make 
major changes to the proposal. !d. at 12. 
105. Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Pro-
cess, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1397-98 (1992). 
I 06. Freeman, supra note 18, at 24; Harter, supra note 21, at 420. 
I 07. GUNNING HAM & SINCLAIR, supra note 19, at I 09 (stating that collaborative pro-
cesses lead to "consensus building"). 
I 08. Freeman, supra note 18, at 22; see GUNNING HAM & SINCLAIR, supra note 19, at 
109. 
109. Freeman, supra note 18, at 23. 
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tions that are so characteristic of adversarial rulemak:ing. 110 The frequent 
interactions can have another salutary effect. They can build an atmosphere 
of familiarity and trust among the participants. 111 This can make them more 
willing to share important information. 112 It can also lead them to reveal 
their true bottom-line positions and so increase the chance of finding a solu-
tion that allows each to meet its core needs. 113 
The proponents further point out that the parties to a collaborative ne-
gotiation have a hand in drafting the rules and so will be less likely to chal-
lenge them in court. 114 They are also free to arrive at initial solutions, and 
revise them over time, without having to observe the lengthy formalities of 
notice-and-comment rulemak:ing. 115 These two factors should make collabo-
rative methods more nimble and adaptive than traditional rulemak:ing pro-
cesses.116 This is particularly important in areas where technologies, busi-
ness realities, and consumer expectations change rapidly. 117 In sum, the pro-
ponents claim that collaborative processes will generate a problem-solving 
110. See id.; SCRUGGS, supra note 96, at 143 (explaining that when trying to build 
consensus, they must acknowledge some information that is contrary to their own original 
positions). 
111. Freeman, supra note I8, at 24 (arguing that the process of working together 
itself forges trust, good faith, civility, and improved relationships); SCRUGGS, supra note 96, 
at I43 (stating that frequent interactions reduce "ill will"). 
Il2. Freeman, supra note I8, at 22-24; SCRUGGS, supra note 96, at I45; see 
GUNNINGHAM & SINCLAIR, supra note I9, at 97, 109; Rubinstein, supra note 18, at 413. See 
generally Bert-Jaap Koops, et a!., Should Self-Regulation Be the Starting Point?, in 
STARTING POINTS FOR ICT REGULATION: DECONSTRUCTING PREVALENT POLICY ONE-LINERS 
I 09 (Bert-Jaap Koops, et a!. eds., 2006). 
I13. Freeman, supra note I8, at 7, 22-23; GUNNINGHAM & SINCLAIR, supra note I9, 
at I 09 (inferring that multiple parties working together will learn from each other and so will 
come up with more creative solutions than any single party working alone); Harter, supra 
note IOI, at 29 (stating that parties can find solutions that "accommodate fully the competing 
interests"). 
II4. Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. 
U. L. REv. 2I, 9I (2001). 
II5. Freeman, supra note 18, at I4, 22, 28. They further recommend that such initia-
tives build in feedback mechanisms for evaluating and reassessing the existing rules on an 
ongoing basis. 
II6. !d. at 9 n.I9 ("There appears to be consensus that the rule-making process is 
excessively costly, rigid, and cumbersome."); Fiorino, supra note 24, at 485; IAN AYRES & 
JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 
112-13 (1992). See generally Koops, eta!., supra note 112. 
117. Cf Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Gov-
ernance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REv. 342, 408 (2004) (arguing that 
new governance models are needed in a competitive global market where "constant change 
and adaptation" are key to remaining competitive); Daniel J. Fiorino, Voluntary Initiatives, 
Regulation, and Nanotechnology Oversight: Charting a Path, Woodrow Wilson Internation-
al Center for Scholars Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies 7 (Nov. 2010) available at 
http:/ /www.nanotechproject.org/process/assets/files/834 7 /pen-19 .pdf (arguing that voluntary 
agreements are particularly useful in sectors that are rapidly and constantly evolving). 
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rather than an adversarial mentality, promote trust, information sharing, and 
consensus-building, and respond quickly to changing technologies and cir-
cumstances. 118 
2. Substance 
The proponents maintain that such collaborative methods will generate 
better rules. 119 To begin with, by bringing regulated companies into the rule 
drafting process and making them more willing to share information, col-
laborative methods tap into these parties' superior knowledge about tech-
nology, industry realities, and low-cost compliance solutions. 120 They can 
then use this information to produce more tailored, workable, and cost-
effective rules than those that traditional rulemaking would generate. 121 By 
getting regulators and interested parties to reveal their bottom-line needs in 
a problem-solving environment, collaborative methods should also tend to 
generate more creative, win-win solutions. 122 Finally, proponents argue that 
nimble collaborative methods will be more likely to produce rules that keep 
up with changing realities than will cumbersome notice-and-comment rule-
making.123 
118. Freeman, supra note 18, at 26 (arguing that collaborative methods will be more 
likely to produce "creative, implementable regulatory solutions capable of adaptation and 
revision than [will] informal notice and comment"). 
119. Some go the next step and argue that collaborative methods will produce better 
social results. SCRUGGS, supra note 96 at 15, 123, 146 (environmental results); REES, supra 
note 96, at 2, 224, 233 (workplace safety). 
120. Harter, supra note 21, at 420, 422. 
121. Freeman, supra note 18, at 22, 26-27; GuNNINGHAM & SINCLAIR, supra note 19, 
at 104; SCRUGGS, supra note 96, at 146, !52; Fiorino, supra note 24, at 485 (stating that a 
negotiated, sector-based approach can allow "companies to tailor rules to their own circum-
stances"); BENNETI & RAAB, supra note 26, at 156 ("Sectoral codes permit, therefore, a more 
refined set of rules tailored to the issues within each industry."); AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, 
supra note 116, at 116-19. Some proponents further argue that such combined efforts com-
port better with democratic principles than traditional rulemaking which seeks to insulate 
government decision-makers from direct interaction with the public. Freeman, supra note 18, 
at 22. Others maintain that collaborative agreements can serve a useful role when regulators 
identify a problem but do not yet know enough about it to regulate it directly. They can use 
collaborative processes to learn more about the nature of the issue and possible solutions to 
it. In this way, collaborative governance can serve a transitional role that can lead to more 
effective direct regulation. GUNNINGHAM & SINCLAIR, supra note 19, at 107. 
122. See Freeman, supra note 18, at II n.26, 12 n.29, 19. Some claim that, in ex-
change for the greater flexibility that comes with collaborative rulemaking, industry will be 
more likely to accept ambitious standards. For this reason, they believe that collaborative 
governance can yield stricter standards than traditional regulation otherwise would. 
SCRUGGS, supra note 96, at 146-47. 
123. Freeman, supra note 18, at 28; STEPHEN JOHNSON, ECONOMICS, EQUITY, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 236,240 (2004); Stewart, supra note 114, at 82-83. 
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3. Compliance 
The proponents claim that collaborative governance also improves 
compliance and enforcement. 124 They start with the idea that, due to limited 
enforcement resources, any system that relies exclusively on government 
inspections will necessarily produce only partial compliance. 125 To achieve 
something closer to full compliance, regulatory systems must activate the 
attitudes and social norms that generate pro-social behavior even when no 
one is looking. The proponents maintain that collaborative processes will do 
a far better job of this than will traditional administrative rulemaking. 126 
Imposing rules from the outside tends to breed resistance. 127 Bringing regu-
lated parties into the drafting process, by contrast, gives them a sense of 
ownership over the requirements 128 and tends to generate rules that they fmd 
legitimate and workable. 129 Businesses should comply more readily with 
such rules than with those that regulators impose on them. 130 The propo-
nents further maintain that collaborative mechanisms will generate greater 
industry self-policing, either because those who helped to draft and intend 
to comply with the rules want to bring potential free-riders up to this stand-
ard, 131 or because they feel a sense of mutual accountability with the other 
parties engaged in the process and want to make good on this. 132 
4. Reasons for Choosing a Collaborative Approach 
The move from traditional to collaborative regulation is not an easy 
one. As the proponents see it, governments are starting to make this change 
because they have a strong need for the virtues of the collaborative ap-
124. SCRUGGS, supra note 96, at 146. 
125. REES, supra note 96, at 235 (arguing that inspectors cannot monitor every com-
pliance point); cf Freeman, supra note 18, at 16 (discussing EPA's difficulty in monitoring 
hundreds of thousands of permitted facilities). 
126. Freeman, supra note 18, at 23. 
127. Harter, supra note 101, at 22. 
128. Freeman, supra note 18, at 12,23-24. 
129. GuNNING HAM & SINCLAIR, supra note 19, at 109 (inferring that lower cost regu-
lation is generally more politically acceptable); SCRUGGS, supra note 96, at 146 (increasing 
flexibility and efficiency of standards makes the rules easier to accept); Harter, supra note 
101, at 31 (arguing that regulated parties generally believe negotiated rules are more legiti-
mate). 
130. Freeman, supra note 18, at 12, 23; Koops, et al., supra note 112, at 124; Rubin-
stein, supra note 18, at 371. 
131. SCRUGGS, supra note 96, at 14, 143-44, 147-48, 151. Some maintain that the 
relationships formed between industry leaders and government regulators during the course 
of negotiations will cause the parties to feel accountable to each other for the success of their 
agreed-upon framework. Freeman, supra note 18, at 22. 
132. Freeman, supra note 18, at 30. 
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proach, as just described. 133 They believe that the recent shift to an infor-
mation economy, with its rapid changes in technologies and business mod-
els, exacerbates the problems with slow, costly, traditional rulemaking pro-
cesses. 134 They argue that this shift is one of the reasons that governments 
are more interested today in collaborative models of governance, which 
promise more adaptive, intelligent and cost-effective rules. 135 This claim 
resonates strongly with the Obama Administration's rationale 136 for utilizing 
this alternative form of regulation. 
B. Concerns about Collaborative Governance 
The proponents' claims are subject to question on all four levels-
process, substance, compliance, and the reasons for the recent interest in 
this approach. 
1. Process 
Some scholars suggest that industry may use its place at the drafting 
table to push for rules that serve its own interests, rather than the public 
interest. 137 They wonder whether regulators will be able to check this ten-
dency sufficiently, especially in light of industry's informational superiority 
and political clout. 138 This can make the collaborative process seem more 
analogous to the proverbial "fox guarding the hen house" than to dispute 
resolution. 
These writers express particular concern about those collaborative 
processes-such as the Dutch code of conduct program and, potentially, the 
133. See, e.g., MANDELKERN GRP. ON BETTER REGULATION, FINAL REPORT (2001) 
(explaining the European Union's interest in alternative regulatory methods). 
134. Lobel, supra note 117, at 408; See generally JAN MAZUREK, MAKING 
MICROCHIPS: POLICY, GLOBALIZATION, AND ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING IN THE 
SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY (1999). 
135. Lobel, supra note 117, at 408; Dennis D. Hirsch, Lean and Green? Environmen-
tal Law and Policy and the Flexible Production Economy, 79 IND. L.J. 611, 639-43 (2004). 
136. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text. 
137. See GUNNINGHAM & SINCLAIR, supra note 19, at 105 (stating that industry will 
push hard to "minimise its commitments"). See generally William Funk, When Smoke Gets 
in Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation and the Public Interest-EPA's Woodstove Standards, 
18 ENVTL. L. 55 (1987); Harter, supra note 21, at 439-40 (describing those who believe that 
negotiated approaches will disserve the public interest). 
138. Fiorino, supra note 24, at 485 (stating that collaborative processes "could in-
crease the chance that the regulatory process would be co-opted by industry"); GUNNING HAM 
& SINCLAIR, supra note 19, at I 05 (discussing "asymmetry of information" between govern-
ment and industry participants). 
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recent congressional proposals for privacy safe harbors 139-that allow indus-
try members alone to draft the rules and negotiate them with the regulators 
before bringing public interest stakeholders into the process. 140 They see 
such industry-government negotiations as opportunities not for cooperative 
problem solving, but for backroom deal-making that will favor industry and 
undermine the public interest. 141 Some take this argument a step further and 
assert that the road of collaborative governance can lead, ultimately, to 
"agency capture"-the scenario in which the regulators come to serve in-
dustry's interests rather those of the broader society. 142 They note that the 
conditions that lend themselves to industry-government collaboration-
frequent, confidential meetings to discuss key issues of policy-are the 
same as those that have led in the past to improper influence and to agency 
capture. 143 
Even where backroom deals and agency capture do not emerge, there 
remains reason to question whether collaborative governance will, in fact, 
produce the new dynamics that the proponents claim. Will industry be as 
forthcoming as the proponents predict, or will it share information only 
where doing so suits its purposes? Will business, driven by the need to in-
crease shareholder value, drop its adversarial stance and truly engage m 
good faith problem-solving? 
139. While the Obama Administration policy papers expressly call for a multi-
stakeholder process, the commercial privacy bills do not and could be read to allow an indus-
try-only group to draft a set of safe harbor rules and submit them to the FTC for approval. 
140. Dana, supra note 99, at 52 (criticizing the bilateral nature of contractarian regu-
lation which can limit the influence of other interested parties such as public interest groups). 
141. Cf Koops, eta!., supra note 112, at 124-25 (identifYing a lack of transparency 
and accountability); JOHNSON, supra note 123, at 243 (stating that regulatory contracting and 
similar programs have been criticized for lack of accountability and allowing back room deal 
making); Stewart, supra note 114, at 83 ("The 'closed-door' nature of the negotiations raises 
serious concerns about transparency and democratic accountability."). 
142. GUNNINGHAM & SINCLAIR, supra note 19, at 105 (stating that collaborative ne-
gotiations "generate risks of a phenomenon tantamount to regulatory capture"); JOHNSON, 
supra note 123, at 243 (describing the significant opportunities for agency capture); 
SCRUGGS, supra note 96, at 128 (describing those who hold this view); REES, supra note 96, 
at 12, 236 (describing those who hold this view). Agency capture is the control or domina-
tion of administrative agencies by private parties who are subject to the regulatory authority 
of the agency. It occurs when a regulated entity, for example a group of corporations, replac-
es the public-policy agenda of the agency with its own private and self-serving agenda 
through lobbying or other influential methods. See Mark C. Niles, On the Hijacking of Agen-
cies (and Airplanes): The Federal Aviation Administration, "Agency Capture," and Airline 
Security, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. PoL'Y & L. 381,401 (2002); Bradford C. Mank, Super-
fund Contractors and Agency Capture, 2 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 34, 35 (1993); Eric R. Pogue, 
The Catastrophe Model of Risk Regulation and the Regulatory Legacy of Three Mile Island 
and Love Canal, 15 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REv. 463,480 (2007). 
143. GUNNINGHAM & SINCLAIR, supra note 19, at 105 (quoting AYRES & 
BRAITHWAITE, supra note 116, at 55). 
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These questions and others have led some commentators to express a 
preference for the traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking process, 
which requires all parties to work through formal, written channels, reduces 
the ability to bring pressure on regulators, and levels the playing field. 144 
2. Substance 
The procedural flaws just described could conceivably undermine the 
substance of the rules that collaborative mechanisms produce. Some com-
mentators worry that collaborative processes, stacked in industry's favor, 
will tend to generate overly lenient rules that place business interests over 
those of the public. 145 They further point out that industry representatives, 
who by definition come from existing firms, will have an incentive to pro-
mote rules that increase the barriers to entry and secure their own competi-
tive position. 146 This could be particularly damaging for the fast-changing 
information economy that relies so heavily on innovation and entrepreneuri-
al energy. 
3. Compliance 
Some scholars have questioned whether regulators, or the industry as-
sociations with whom they negotiate, will monitor and enforce collaborative 
arrangements to the degree necessary to make them effective. 147 Industry 
trade associations, which must look to their membership for support and 
funding, lack an incentive to police vigorously these very same members. In 
addition, collaborative governance, by encouraging regulators to establish a 
more cooperative relationship with industry, may make it more difficult for 
them to take hard-nosed enforcement positions that could damage these 
relationships. Industry members could perceive this decreased enthusiasm 
for enforcement and, acting rationally, put less effort into compliance. The 
result could be a decrease in compliance, not the increase that the propo-
nents predict. 
Free riding is also a concern. When a sector negotiates a collaborative 
agreement with the government-a code of conduct, for example-this im-
proves the reputation of the sector as a whole. Yet participation in the col-
144. Cf Dana, supra note 99, at 53, 57. 
145. !d. at 52 (suggesting that the content of contractarian regulation may favor the 
cost-saving agenda of the regulated entities over the interests of public interest groups). 
146. Koops, eta!., supra note 112, at 124-25 (stating that the process of negotiating 
rules will increase the power of strongest or best-organized participating parties). 
147. Stewart, supra note 114, at 85 (citing those who hold this view); BENNETT & 
RAAB, supra note 26, at 171 (stating that critics remain skeptical about compliance with and 
enforcement of industry codes of conduct); Susan Ridgley, Environmental Protection 
Agreements in Japan and the United States, 5 PAC. RIM L. & PoL'Y J. 639, 642 (1996). 
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laborative arrangement is often voluntary. Individual firms are not required 
to participate; they must voluntarily commit to do so. This raises the possi-
bility that some firms will decide not to participate and will, instead, free 
ride on the reputational benefits that their competitors' voluntary commit-
ments bring to the industry as a whole. 
4. Reasons for Choosing a Collaborative Approach 
In short, some writers express concerns that the proponent's dream of 
collaborative governance could tum into a nightmare of industry influence, 
lenient standards, and loose enforcement, with the public paying a heavy 
price. They prefer traditional notice-and-comment processes in which the 
rulemaking power remains squarely in the hands of government regulators. 
They view recent government moves away from this tried-and-true method, 
and towards collaborative approaches, not as a response to the information 
economy but as an extension of the deregulatory movement that seeks to 
tear down the vital structures of the administrative state. 
III. DUTCH DATA PROTECTION CODES OF CONDUCT: AN EXPERIMENT IN 
COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE 
Collaborative governance theory crystallizes the questions about this 
regulatory method but does not answer them. It does not tell us whether to 
embrace, or reject, the collaborative approach to privacy regulation. To fig-
ure this out, we need to look beyond theory to practice. The Dutch data pro-
tection codes of conduct program provides an excellent opportunity to do 
so. It represents more than twenty years of regulatory experience with the 
very instrument-industry codes of conduct and safe harbor agreements-
that U.S. legislators and policymakers are getting ready to use to protect 
consumer privacy. While the Netherlands and the United States are very 
different countries, the Dutch experience should shed at least some light on 
the merits of collaborative governance in the privacy area. This Part intro-
duces the Dutch code of conduct program. It outlines the initiative's legal 
and programmatic foundations and explains why the Dutch decided to use 
this form of regulation in the first place. It shows that the Dutch codes of 
conduct are, indeed, a form of collaborative governance and that they are 
similar in nature, though not identical, to the U.S. "safe harbor" programs. 
Part IV draws on interviews with Dutch regulators, industry representatives, 
and privacy experts to determine what the Dutch experience can tell us 
about the merits of collaborative privacy regulation. Based on this analysis, 
Part V makes normative recommendations for U.S. privacy law and policy. 
Readers who are already familiar with European data protection law and the 
Dutch code of conduct program, and are particularly interested in the re-
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search findings and policy recommendations, may want to skip directly to 
Part IV. 
A. Legal Foundations 
Just as the proposed U.S. privacy bills would establish a safe harbor 
initiative, so the Dutch Data Protection Acts authorize and establish the 
Dutch code of conduct program. 148 In order to understand the codes, it is 
accordingly important to begin with European data protection law and the 
Dutch data protection statutes that implement it on a national level. 
1. European Data Protection Law 
There have been two generations of European data protection statutes. 
The first, passed in the 1970s and 1980s, focused on stand-alone databases 
of personal data. 149 These statutes regulated the "data users" who ran these 
databases. They sought to protect the "personal data files" that made up the 
databases and that contained personal information about specific individu-
als. Over time, organizations developed new ways of storing and manipulat-
ing personal data. Instead of using stand-alone databases, they began to em-
ploy more networked, dispersed, and transient systems. 150 These new reali-
ties did not fit well with the first generation statutes which assumed the ex-
istence of stand-alone databases. By the early 1990s, European nations 
needed a new, updated set of data protection laws. At about this time, the 
European Commission began work on a data protection directive that would 
harmonize data protection laws throughout the European Union. 151 Like 
other directives at the time, this one would be a legislative act of the Euro-
pean Community (one of the three pillars of the European Union until it was 
abolished, and succeeded by the European Union, in 2009). 152 It would set 
148. Personal Data Protection Act, supra note 26, art. 25. 
149. DOUWE KORFF, DATA PROTECTION LAWS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 13 (2005); 
Bert-Jaap Koops, The Evolution of Privacy Law and Policy in the Netherlands, 13 J. COMP. 
PoL'Y ANALYSIS 165, 168 (2011). 
150. Koops, supra note 149, at 168. 
151. The Commission hoped that the new directive would facilitate the free flow of 
information within the European Union, and it hoped to ensure protection of the right to 
privacy that the European Convention on Human Rights had recognized as fundamental. 
Council Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 
1995 on the Protection oflndividuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, Preamble, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 31-32 [hereinafter Coun-
cil Directive 95/46/EC]. 
152. Pillars of the European Union, EUROPA.EU, 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/eu_pillars_en.htm (last visited May 23, 
2013). 
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out broad standards and require the E.U. member nations to pass imple-
menting statutes to incorporate these standards into nationallaw. 153 
In 1995 the Commission proposed, and the European Parliament and 
the Council of the European Union formally adopted, the Directive on the 
Processing of Personal Data (1995 Data Protection Directive). 154 The 1995 
Data Protection Directive required each member state to pass implementing 
legislation and to establish a DPA to administer these laws. 155 Unlike the 
first generation statutes, the 1995 Data Protection Directive took account of 
the new type of decentralized and networked information systems. It took as 
its organizing principle, not the personal data file in the stand-alone data-
base, but rather the "processing" of personal data. 156 It targeted its require-
ments, not at the owner or user of a particular computer, file, or filing sys-
tem, but rather on the "controller" of a given processing operation, a term of 
art that referred to the entity that "determine[ d] the purposes and means of 
the processing of personal data." 157 lt sought to protect, not the personal data 
file, but rather the "data subject," by which it meant the individual whose 
personal data the controller was employing in the processing operation, 
which could involve many data files. 158 To implement the 1995 Data Protec-
tion Directive, European Member states passed a second generation of data 
protection statutes. 159 These second generation laws adopt the Directive's 
basic concepts and structure. 160 They focus on data processing, regulate data 
controllers, and seek to protect data subjects. 161 
153. See Application of EU Law: What Are EU Directives?, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
http:/ /ec.europa.eu/eu _law/introduction/what_ directive_ en.htm (last updated June 25, 20 12) 
(describing the role and function of directives); KORFF, supra note 149, at 2. 
154. Council Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 151. 
155. !d. art. 28. 
156. KORFF, supra note 149, at 13; Hustinx, supra note 28, at 286 (explaining that the 
post-Directive Dutch data protection law "[replaced] ... the concept of 'personal data file' 
[with] the 'processing of personal data'"). The Directive defined the "processing" of personal 
data to encompass "any operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal 
data, whether or not by automatic means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage, 
adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemina-
tion or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruc-
tion." Council Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 151, art. 2(b). 
157. /d. art. 2(d); KORFF, supra note 149, at 13. 
158. Council Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 151, art. 2(a). 
159. Examples would include Data Protection Act, 1998, c. 29 (U.K.); Protection of 
Personal Data Law (B.O.E. 1999, 298) (Spain); Lei da Protecr,:ao de Dados Pessoais [Law to 
Protect Personal Data], Oct. 26, 1998, Diario da Republica at 5536, (Port.); and Bun-
desdatenschutzgesetz [BDSG] [Federal Data Protection Act], May 22, 2001, 
BUNDESGESETZBLATT I [BGBL I] (Ger.). 
160. KORFF, supra note 149, at 2. 
161. /d. at 2, 10-12 (describing these aspects of the Directive and explaining that 
national laws have adopted them). 
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2. The 1989 Law on Personal Data Files 
The Dutch have passed two data protection acts, the 1989 Law on Per-
sonal Data Files, or Wet persoonsregistraties, 162 and the 2000 Personal Data 
Protection Act, or Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens. 163 This Subsection 
treats these two statutes separately. Later Sections refers to them collective-
ly as the "Data Protection Act" when discussing Dutch data protection law 
more generally. 
The 1989 Law on Personal Data Files was in many respects a typical 
first generation European statute. 164 As its name suggests, it sought to pro-
tect the "personal data files" contained in large, stand-alone databases. 165 To 
this end, it established regulatory requirements for "data users," which it 
defmed as the parties "with control over ... personal data file[s]." 166 It also 
set up a regulatory agency, the Registration Chamber (Registratiekamer), to 
oversee the implementation of the Act. 167 
The Law on Personal Data Files established many requirements for 
data users. For example, it required data users, each time they opened a new 
162. Law on Personal Data Files, supra note 26. 
163. Personal Data Protection Act, supra note 26. The Dutch first became seriously 
concerned with information privacy in the 1960s. The expansion of the welfare state had 
increased the government's need for accurate and comprehensive records about its citizens. It 
accordingly proposed the creation of a computerized national registry that would assign to 
each individual a registration number. MARGRIET G. 0VERKLEEFT-VERBURG, DE WET 
PERSOONSREGISTRATIES: NORM, TOEPASSING EN EVALUATIE 699 (1995). This provoked protest 
in a country whose non-computerized registration records, only a couple of decades before, 
had been utilized as a tool of repression and persecution by the occupying German army. In 
1971, when the government attempted to implement the first national census to make use of 
computer-ready forms, it met wide-spread protest and non-compliance. Koops, supra note 
149, at 167; 0VERKLEEFT-VERBURG, supra, at 699; A.C.M. NUGTER, TRANSBORDER FLow OF 
PERSONAL DATA WITHIN THE EC 146 n.4 (1990). The battle over information privacy was on. 
Partially as a result of this controversy, the Dutch, in 1983, amended their Constitution to add 
a general right to privacy. 1983 Gw. art. 10 (Neth.); OvERKLEEFT-VERBURG, supra, at 699; 
NUGTER, supra, at 146 n.4 (providing unofficial translation). The provision called upon Par-
liament to pass legislation for the protection of personal data by 1988, the effective date of 
the 1983 amendments. Koops, supra note 149, at 168; OvERKLEEFT-VERBURG, supra, at 700; 
1983 Gw. art. I 0(2)-(3) (Neth.). In 1989, the Dutch Parliament responded to this mandate by 
passing the Law on Personal Data Files (Wet Persoonsregistraties), the first major infor-
mation privacy statute in the Netherlands. See Koops, supra note 149, at 168 (describing this 
history); DOUWE KORFF, DATA PROTECTION LAWS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2005), attached 
cd-rorn, vol. 2, The DUTCH DATA PROTECTION LAW§ I; NUGTER,supra, at 147. 
164. KORFF, supra note 163, § I. 
165. Law on Personal Data Files, supra note 26, art. I; NUGTER, supra note 163, at 
148. 
166. Law on Personal Data Files, supra note 26, art. I; NUGTER, supra note 163, at 
149. 
167. Law on Personal Data Files, supra note 26, art. 37; NUGTER, supra note 163, at 
173. 
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personal data file, to "register" that file with the Registration Chamber. 168 
To do so, they had to submit a form that stated, among other things, the 
purpose for which they had opened the personal data file and the types of 
data they would be entering in it. 169 The Law further allowed data users to 
employ the personal data in their files only for the purpose for which they 
had collected the data (as stated in their registration form) and for other pur-
poses that were "compatible" with the initial purpose. 170 The Law also regu-
lated the relationship between the data user and the data subject. It required 
a data user to notify each data subject individually the first time that it rec-
orded information about that person in a data file. 171 When a data subject 
requested it, the Law further required the data user to provide an overview 
of the information that it held about that data subject; 172 to let that person 
correct or erase inaccurate data; 173 and to tell the data subject whether it had 
disclosed information about him to a third party. 174 Technological advances 
and the issuance of the 1995 Data Protection Directive soon rendered the 
1989 Law on Personal Data Files, a first generation statute, out-of-date. 175 
The Dutch needed a new data protection law. 
3. The 2000 Personal Data Protection Act 
In 2000, the Dutch Parliament passed the Personal Data Protection Act 
or Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens. 176 The Personal Data Protection Act 
implements the 1995 European Data Protection Directive 177 and follows the 
second generation model. It applies to all "processing" of personal data and 
does not limit itself to personal data files or stand-alone databases. 178 It tar-
gets "responsible part[ies ]," which it defines as the persons or organizations 
168. Law on Personal Data Files, supra note 26, art. 24; NUGTER, supra note 163, at 
165. 
169. Law on Personal Data Files, supra note 26, art. 24; NUGTER, supra note 163, at 
165. 
170. Law on Personal Data Files, supra note 26, art. 6(1 ); NUGTER, supra note 163, at 
168. 
171. Law on Personal Data Files, supra note 26, art. 28(1 ); NuGTER, supra note 163, 
at 160-62. 
172. Law on Personal Data Files, supra note 26, art. 29(1 ); NUGTER, supra note 163, 
at 157. 
173. Law on Personal Data Files, supra note 26, art. 31 (1 ); NUGTER, supra note 163, 
at 158. 
174. Law on Personal Data Files, supra note 26, ait. 32; NUGTER, supra note 163, at 
159. 
I 7 5. See Koops, supra note 149, at I 7 4; KORFF, supra note 163, § 1. 
176. Personal Data Protection Act, supra note 26. 
177. KORFF, supra note 163, § I (stating that the 2000 Law replaces the 1989 Law in 
order to implement the 1995 Directive). 
178. Personal Data Protection Act, supra note 26, art. 2 (establishing conditions for 
the lawful processing of personal data); KORFF, supra note 163, § 2. 
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that "determine[] the purpose of and means for processing personal data" 179 
(a term directly analogous to the 1995 Data Protection Directive's term 
"controller.") 180 It seeks to protect data subjects. 181 It creates a Data Protec-
tion Authority known as the College Bescherming Persoonsgegevens 
(CBP). 182 From this point forward, and for the sake of simplicity, this Arti-
cle refers to both the Registratiekamer, which the 1989 Law created, and the 
CBP, which the 2000 Law established, as the Dutch Data Protection Au-
thority (DPA). 
The 2000 Law's most important provisions are those that define the 
line between acceptable and unacceptable processing of personal data. 183 
Following the 1995 Directive, the 2000 Dutch Personal Data Protection Act 
draws the line by means of five broad principles and a complementary set of 
six criteria. 184 To be legally acceptable, a given data processing operation 
must comply with all five of the principles and satisfy at least one of the 
criteria. 
Under the five data processing principles, responsible parties may pro-
cess data only where: (1) they do so "fairly and lawfully"; 185 (2) the data 
were collected for defined purposes, and the processing is "not . . . incom-
patible" with these purposes; 186 (3) the data is "adequate, relevant and not 
excessive" in relation to the purposes for which it is being processed; 187 ( 4) 
the data is as accurate and current as it needs to be to serve the defined pur-
pose; 188 and (5) the responsible parties retain the data no longer than is nec-
essary for the purpose. 189 Processing operations that do not satisfy each of 
these principles are illegitimate and can violate the Act. 190 
179. Personal Data Protection Act, supra note 26, art. 1 (d) (defining "responsible 
party"). 
180. Council Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 151, art. 2(d) (defining "controller" to 
include those who "determine[] the purposes and means of the processing of personal data"). 
181. KORFF, supra note 163, § 2. 
182. The official name for the DP A is the College Bescherrning Persoonsgegevens. 
This Article will refer to it as the Dutch DP A. 
183. Personal Data Protection Act, supra note 26, arts. 6-11. 
184. KORFF, supra note 163, § 4 (explaining that the 2000 Law incorporates the prin-
ciples and criteria laid out in the 1995 Directive). 
185. Personal Data Protection Act, supra note 26, art. 6; Council Directive 95/46/EC, 
supra note 151, art. 6(1)(a). 
186. Personal Data Protection Act, supra note 26, arts. 7, 9; Council Directive 
95/46/EC, supra note 151, art. 6(1 )(b). 
187. Personal Data Protection Act, supra note 26, art. II (1 ); Council Directive 
95/46/EC, supra note 151, art. 6(l)(c). 
188. Personal Data Protection Act, supra note 26, art. 11 (2); Council Directive 
95/46/EC, supra note 151, art. 6(l)(d). 
189. Personal Data Protection Act, supra note 26, art. 10; Council Directive 
95/46/EC, supra note 151, art. 6(1 )(e). 
190. Personal Data Protection Act, supra note 26, arts. 15, 65. 
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In addition, processing operations must satisfy at least one of the fol-
lowing criteria which focus on data subject consent or exceptions to it. 191 
The criteria are: (1) the data subject unambiguously consented to the pro-
cessing; 192 (2) "the processing is necessary for the performance of a con-
tract" into which the data subject entered; 193 (3) the processing is necessary 
to "comply with a legal obligation" "to which the [data] controller is sub-
ject"; 194 ( 4) the "processing is necessary ... to protect the vital interests of 
the data subject"; 195 (5) "the processing is necessary for the proper perfor-
mance of a public law duty" by the appropriate "administrative body"; 196 or 
( 6) the processing is necessary to accomplish the legitimate purposes of the 
controller, unless the data subject's "fundamental rights and freedoms" 
override these purposes. 197 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to describe more fully the provi-
sions of the 2000 Personal Data Protection Act or of the 1989 Law on Per-
sonal Data Files. Instead, this Article focuses on two things that the 1989 
and 2000 laws have in common. First, as was true with the proposed con-
gressional bills described above, 198 both statutes employ broad language that 
requires extensive interpretation before it can be applied to specific indus-
tries and firms. For example, the 1989 Law and the 2000 Law each require 
that data users and controllers employ personal data only for the purpose for 
which they had initially collected it or for purposes that were compatible 
with that purpose. 199 However, they do not clarify how the user is to tell 
whether a given use is or is not "compatible" with a given purpose. For ex-
ample, if a company that owns both a bank and an insurance company col-
lects financial information from its bank customers and uses it to market 
banking products to them, can it also use this information to market insur-
ance products to these customers? Is that a "compatible" use because it in-
volves marketing or an incompatible one because the first use involves the 
banking side of the business and the second the insurance side? The 1989 
191. Id. art. 8; Council Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 151, art. 7(a). 
192. Personal Data Protection Act, supra note 26, art. 8(a); Council Directive 
95/46/EC, supra note 151, art. 8(2)(a). 
193. Personal Data Protection Act, supra note 26, art. 8(b ); Council Directive 
95/46/EC, supra note 151, art. 7(b ). 
194. Personal Data Protection Act, supra note 26, art. 8(c); Council Directive 
95146/EC,supranote 151,art. 7(c). 
195. Personal Data Protection Act, supra note 26, art. 8(d); Council Directive 
95/46/EC, supra note 151, art. 7(d). 
196. Personal Data Protection Act, supra note 26, art. 8( e); Council Directive 
95/46/EC, supra note 151, art. 7(e). 
197. Personal Data Protection Act, supra note 26, art. 8(f); Council Directive 
95/46/EC, supra note 151, art. 7(f). 
198. See text accompanying notes 56-63. 
199. Law on Personal Data Files, supra note 26, art. 6(1 ); NUGTER, supra note I 63, at 
168; Personal Data Protection Act, supra note 26, arts. 7, 9. 
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and 2000 laws, with their broad language, do not define "compatible" or 
spell out how it applies to the banking industry. They leave points such as 
this one unclear and open to interpretation. 200 
The 2000 Law's broadly worded principles and criteria open up a host 
of other ambiguities and interpretative questions. How is a given data con-
troller to know whether the data employed in a given processing operation 
are "adequate, relevant and not excessive" in relation to the purposes for 
which they are being processed?201 How is it to know whether they are as 
accurate and current as they need to be to serve the defined purpose202 or 
whether it is retaining the data for longer than is necessary for the pur-
pose?203 How is it to determine whether the processing is required to protect 
a "vital interest" of the data subject204 or whether the data user's legitimate 
purposes override the data subject's "fundamental rights and freedoms"? 205 
Each of these very basic issues requires a judgment call. Each requires that 
someone interpret the statute's broad principles and apply them to particular 
business sectors, firms, and situations. 206 
The Dutch program does not rely on administrative regulations to 
flesh out the statute and fill these gaps. The Data Protection Act does not 
require, or even authorize, the DP A to promulgate legally binding regula-
tions interpreting the statute. 207 Instead-and this is the second main thing 
200. The 2000 Act does offer a bit more guidance on how to tell whether purposes 
are compatible or not. It instructs responsible parties to take into account: 
a. the relationship between the purpose of the intended processing and the 
purpose for which the data have been obtained; 
b. the nature of the data concerned; 
c. the consequences of the intended processing for the data subject; 
d. the manner in which the data have been obtained; and 
e. the extent to which appropriate guarantees have been put in place with re-
spect to the data subject. 
Personal Data Protection Act, supra note 26, art. 9(2). These additional guidelines remain 
quite broad and do not resolve many of the ambiguities about how this requirement applies to 
specific businesses and their uses of data. 
201. Personal Data Protection Act, supra note 26, art. II; Interview with Jacqueline 
C. Wierdak, Att'y, IP advocaten, in Amsterdam, Neth. (Apr. 13, 2010) [hereinafter Weirdak 
Interview] (raising this issue). 
202. Personal Data Protection Act, supra note 26, art. II. 
203. !d. art. I 0. 
204. /d. art. 8(d). 
205. /d. art. 8(f). 
206. Wierdak Interview, supra note 201 ("That's a very vague law ... and so compa-
nies will need to know how long they are to store this data. Two years? Five years? Seven 
years? Ten years? ... [T]hose are the gaps that [the codes] are filling."). 
207. As the former Chair of the DPA has put it, the DPA sees itself as a "second line 
institution" that supports and enforces rules that the sectors develop themselves, rather than 
an institution that promulgates and enforces rules from the top down. Hustinx, supra note 28, 
at 287. "What emerges is co-regulation." /d. Still, it should be noted that the DPA can and 
does conduct investigations, publish studies of industries and other background papers, and 
116 Michigan State Law Review Vol. 2013:1 
that these statutes have in common-the Dutch laws delegate this task to the 
industry sectors themselves. 208 As was briefly explained above, each statute 
allows industry representatives to draft a "code of conduct" that specifies 
how the statutory requirements apply to their specific sector. 209 Sectors often 
start this process by figuring out how they collect and use personal data in 
their operations. They then review the Data Protection Act, apply this law to 
their industry circumstances, and identify the main questions or areas that 
need interpretation. 21° Finally, they draft a code that would provide "an in-
terpretation of these questions'@ and submit it to the DP A for approval. 212 
provide advice and guidance. In so doing, it interprets the statute. These interpretations carry 
some weight, though they are not legally binding on courts in the sense that duly promulgat-
ed American regulations are. 
208. Personal Data Protection Act, supra note 26, art. 25. The 2000 Law does author-
ize the Ministry of Security and Justice to issue rules for a particular sector where the sector 
itself fails to develop a code of conduct. !d. art. 26. However, the Ministry has seldom used 
this authority. Thus, in practice, the Dutch authorities do not promulgate sector-based regula-
tions. 
209. An industry trade association generally drafted the code on behalf of the sector. 
For example, the Netherlands Bankers Association created a data protection committee, 
made up largely of lawyers, and gave them the task of drafting the code. Interview with Jan 
Berkvens, Deputy Dir., Legal & Fin. Affairs, Rabobank Nederland, in Eindhoven, Neth. 
(May II, 2010) [hereinafter Berkvens Interview]. In some instances, sectors hired "special-
ists" to handle the drafting. Interview with Richard Wishaw, Courthouse Rotterdam, in Rot-
terdam, Neth. (Apr. 23, 2010) [hereinafter Wishaw Interview]; Interview with Felix 
Olijslager, Dir. ofthe Dutch Info. Ctr. for Sec. & Law, in Amsterdam, Neth. (June 17, 2010) 
[hereinafter Olijslager Interview]. These individuals had prior experience with, and had 
developed expertise in, data protection law. Some were former CBP employees. Others had 
broken into the field as advocates for the public interest. Still others were industry lawyers or 
consultants who had been involved in data protection compliance and training. Olijslager 
Interview, supra. Where specialists were involved, the drafting and negotiation process often 
went more smoothly. Interview with Peter Hustinx, European Data Prot. Supervisor, in Brus-
sels, Belg. (May 18, 2010) [hereinafter Hustinx Interview]. 
210. Interview with Ulco van de Pol, Mun. Ombudsman, City of Amsterdam, in 
Amsterdam, Neth. (June 14, 2010) [hereinafter van de Pol Interview]. 
211. Berkvens Interview, supra note 209. 
212. The Personal Data Protection Act states that "[a ]n organisation or organisations 
planning to draw up a code of conduct may request the Data Protection Commssion [sic] to 
declare that, given the particular features ofthe sector ... the rules contained in the said code 
properly implement this Act or other legal provisions on the processing of personal data." 
Personal Data Protection Act, supra note 26, art. 25(1 ). The 1989 Law on Personal Data 
Files was similar. It provided that industry sectors may develop a code of conduct and then 
may formally request that the Registration Chamber declare that "in the Chamber's judgment 
the code concerned conforms with the provisions of ... this Act and meets reasonable re-
quirements for the protection of the privacy of data subjects." Law on Personal Data Files, 
supra note 26, art. 15; NUGTER, supra note 163, at 175 (providing the unofficial translation 
just quoted). The phrase "reasonable requirements" appears to have referred to obligations 
that existed independent of the Act itself, but it is not clear whether they were based in the 
Constitution, other statutes, or some other authority. The 1995 Directive essentially adopted 
a very similar model. Article 27 of the Directive requires member states to "encourage the 
U.S. Privacy Law and Dutch Privacy Regulation 117 
The Act requires the DPA to reach a preliminary decision within thir-
teen weeks of submission. 213 It must publish notice of its draft decision in 
the official Government Gazette (Staatscourant), 214 make the draft decision 
available for public inspection, 215 give interested parties six weeks to com-
ment on the draft decision, 216 and declare no later than six months after hav-
ing received the initial application whether the code properly embodies the 
statute. 217 This declaration has the status of a final agency decision under 
Dutch administrative law, so it must be published in the Government Ga-
zette, 218 and is subject to judicial review. 219 
In theory, the thirteen-week deadline for the DPA's preliminary deci-
sion and the six-month deadline for its final decision following public 
comment should make for a relatively speedy process. In practice, however, 
the situation often turns out quite differently.220 Thirteen weeks is an unreal-
istically short time for the industry and regulators to negotiate all the issues 
that they must resolve in order to arrive at an approvable code. 221 As de-
scribed by a former DPA Official, the negotiation "usually involved [at 
least] two to three meetings and that was just the standard ... [a ]nd it could 
drawing up of codes of conduct intended to contribute to the proper implementation of the 
national [data protection laws and] ... taking [into] account[] the specific features of the 
various sectors." Council Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 151, art. 27(1). It further instructs 
the national data protection authorities to review the sectoral codes to determine "whether the 
drafts submitted to [them] are in accordance with the national [data protection laws]." !d. art. 
27(2). The 1989 Dutch Law on Personal Data files served as the model on which this aspect 
of the Directive was based. Hustinx, supra note 28, at 285. For a description of Article 27 of 
the 1995 Directive, and of the national laws that implement it, see generally Hirsch, supra 
note 8. 
213. Personal Data Protection Act, supra note 26, art. 25(4). 
214. The Personal Data Protection Act states that the DP A should follow the proce-
dures laid down by the General Administrative Regulations Act. Personal Data Protection 
Act, supra note 26, art. 25(6). The General Administrative Law Act, in tum, requires admin-
istrative authorities to publish notice of draft decisions. Algemene Wet Bestuursrecht [Gen. 
Admin. Law Act] art. 3:12 (2009). Thus, the Personal Data Protection Act, by way of the 
General Administrative Law Act, requires the DPA to publish notice of its draft decision. 
The other requirements mentioned immediately after this footnote derive from the same 
source. 
215. Algemene Wet Bestuursrecht [Gen. Admin. Law Act] art. 3:11 (2009). 
216. !d. arts. 3:15,3:16. 
217. /d. art. 3:18. 
218. Personal Data Protection Act, supra note 26, art. 25(4), (6); Law on Personal 
Data Files, supra note 26, art. 15(4); KORFF, supra note 163, § 8; Wierdak Interview, supra 
note 201. 
219. An interested party (a citizen, a competitor) could potentially bring a legal chal-
lenge to the DPA's formal approval of a code. Wierdak Interview, supr'a note 201. 
220. Wierdak Interview, supra note 201. 
221. See id. 
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involve ten, twenty meetings during three, four years."222 In one particularly 
lengthy example, it took the agency and the banking sector a full five years 
to reach agreement on a relevant code.223 Due to the fact that the parties 
need more than thirteen weeks to negotiate and come to agreement on a 
code, the deadline has the unintended effect of encouraging the industry and 
the DPA to negotiate the code informally before the sector formally applies 
for approval. 224 This prevents the thirteen-week clock from beginning to run 
and so allows the DPA more time to consider the proposed code and negoti-
ate changes to it. The result is that the real substantive work takes place 
before the sector applies for approval. 225 By the time that it does apply, the 
DP A and the sector have usually worked through all their differences and 
reached agreement on the key provisions. 226 This, in tum, reduces interested 
parties' ability to influence the DPA with their comments since, by the time 
the comment period occurs, the DPA has already been working on the pro-
posed code for many months and is strongly committed to it. 227 
While the industry-government negotiations are lengthy, they can also 
provide a very useful forum for identifying and working through questions 
about how properly to interpret the statute. As a former DPA official ex-
plained it, 
the discoveries about these problems ... and the solutions developed for them ... 
were quite often a secondary benefit of the negotiations of the code[ s] of conduct. 
It was not generated by complaints; it was not generated typically by a request for 
information .... [It was developed] in the context of codes of conduct ... what 
does this mean, in that situation? Oh, I haven't thought about this. Well, come up 
with texts next time. 228 Through the process of negotiating the code, the [DP A] 
learned more about the industry it was regulating. 229 
222. Hustinx Interview, supra note 209; see also Wierdak Interview, supra note 201 
(stating that as a former DPA regulator her "personal experience is that it takes a lot of time 
and effort from the branch organizations that are trying to get a code approved," and that it 
takes a lot of time and effort from the agency as well). 
223. Interview with Bruno van der Burgh, Gen. Counsel, Neth. Bankers' Assoc., in 
Amsterdam, Neth. (June 2, 2010) [hereinafter van der Burgh Interview]. This may have been 
due to the way that this particular sector, the banking sector, approached the process. Soon 
after the enactment of the 1989 Law, the banking sector created its own code and presented it 
to the Registration Chamber in a public meeting as a "fully fledged, completely developed" 
code. Hustinx Interview, supra note 209. When the DPA raised concerns about the proposal 
the two sides had to engage in four to five years of discussions and "endless meetings" to 
arrive at a meeting of the minds. /d. The process may have gone more quickly had the sector 
and the agency met first to discuss preliminary ideas before the sector put pen to paper and 
publicly presented a 'finished' code. 
224. See Wierdak Interview, supra note 20 I. 
225. See id. 
226. See id. 
227. See id. 
228. Hustinx Interview, supra note 209. 
229. See id. 
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A lead negotiator for the banking industry expressed a similar view, 
explaining that if industry engages in open discussions with the regulators 
and tells them that "they are not bound by what they say, then you have 
good dialogue and the outcome is realistic."230 The DPA may also use the 
pre-submittal period to conduct on-site reviews of data practices and files 
and "field test" whether a draft code actually addresses the data protection 
issues that the sector presents. 231 Since the passage of the 1989 Law, the 
Dutch have approved at least twenty codes for sectors that include banking, 
pharmaceuticals, information bureaus, direct marketing, medical research, 
and others. 
Once the DPA has approved a code, it considers companies that fol-
low the code to be in compliance with the statute. 232 Such firms essentially 
occupy a legal safe harbor similar to the one that the proposed American 
bills would create for those who follow the rules of a safe harbor program. 233 
By contrast, the DP A considers firms that sign up for a code but then fail to 
follow it to be in violation of the statute. 234 The DPA will subject such firms 
to written compliance orders and, if the violation is a failure to notify, ad-
ministrative fines. 235 Interestingly, while the DPA must accept a code of 
conduct that it has approved to be a valid interpretation of the Data Protec-
tion Act, the courts need not do so; they remain free to interpret the Act for 
230. Berkvens Interview, supra note 209. 
231. van de Pol Interview, supra note 210. One former DPA Official described the 
process this way: "Let's see your files. Let's see, this is the code. When we apply the code to 
these files, do they cover all the problems? And ... that was an important way. Real testing. 
Reality based testing. And we had discussions at the same moment with private investiga-
tors." !d. If the regulators saw problems in the files that the code did not address, then they 
went back and revised the code. /d. 
232. According to one former CBP official, when the CBP does an audit and there is 
an industry code of conduct in existence, "you have to take the code of conduct into your 
frame of reference ... [you have to take it], into the body of norms that you look to in order 
to make a legal judgment. You look at the facts, the law and the code of conduct, and then 
you make your judgment. You cannot ignore it." Wishaw Interview, supra note 209. 
233. Hustinx Interview, supra note 209 ("If you follow the guidance of the code, that 
[provides] ... a safe haven, that would be a safe harbor [with respect to the DPA]."); Inter-
view with Madeleine W. McLaggan-van Roon, Comm'r, Dutch Data Prot. Auth., in The 
Hague, Neth. (Apr. 26, 2010) [hereinafter McLaggan-van Roon Interview]; van der Burgh 
Interview, supra note 223. 
234. In such an enforcement action the DP A would assert that the firm was violating 
the statute, not the code. Hustinx Interview, supra note 209; McLaggan-van Roon Interview, 
supra note 233. This follows from the fact a code is an approved interpretation of the statute, 
and that failure to abide by a code accordingly constitutes a violation of an approved inter-
pretation of the statute. Berkvens Interview, supra note 209. 
235. KORFF, supra note 163, § 7. The controller can challenge such an enforcement 
action in court. 
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themselves and to find a firm to be in violation of the statute, even if it is in 
compliance with its sectoral code. 236 
An approved code of conduct remains in place for five years. 237 After 
that, the code expires and the sector must seek the DPA's approval of a new 
code or of a new term for the existing one. 238 
B. Comparing the Dutch and the Proposed American Safe Harbor Programs 
The Dutch code of conduct program, just described, shares many fea-
tures with the safe harbor programs that the U.S. bills and the White Paper 
propose. Each allows private entities, rather than administrative agencies, to 
draft the rules that implement the statute; each requires an agency to evalu-
ate these rules and approve them if they are consistent with legal require-
ments;239 and each creates a safe harbor for firms that sign up for and follow 
the code.240 Moreover, the Dutch code of conduct and the proposed U.S. 
safe harbor programs each require the regulators and the regulated to work 
together and share responsibility for the drafting of rules. 241 Each thus con-
stitutes a form of collaborative governance. 
The programs are not identical, however. The Dutch program differs 
from its proposed American counterparts in at least five ways. First, the 
Dutch codes each correspond to a particular industry sector, e.g., the bank-
ing sector, the pharmaceuticals sector. 242 By contrast, the American bills do 
236. NuGTER, supra note 163, at 176; see also Personal Data Protection Act, supra 
note 26, art. 25(1) (giving the DPA's decision the status of a "declaration" which is not bind-
ing on the courts); Korff, supra note 163, § 8 (stating that the DPA's decisions are a declara-
tion not binding on the court); BENNETT & RAAB, supra note 26, at 142 (stating that Dutch 
codes are "not formally binding on the courts"). In practice, however, courts are likely to 
look to an approved code of conduct for guidance on how to interpret the law. Hustinx Inter-
view, supra note 209 (stating that the codes in the Netherlands are not binding on the courts, 
but that the courts may look to them to see what good practices are in the sector); Wishaw 
Interview, supra note 209 (stating also that the codes in the Netherlands are not binding on 
the courts, but that the courts may look to them to see what good practices are in the sector); 
BENNETT & RAAB, supra note 26, at 142 (stating that courts treat violation of a code as prima 
facie evidence of liability under the law). 
237. Personal Data Protection Act, supra note 26, art. 25(5); Law on Personal Data 
Files, supra note 26, art. 15(5). 
238. Personal Data Protection Act, supra note 26, art. 25(1)-(2). 
239. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text (describing these aspects of the 
proposed U.S. approach); supra notes 208-19 and accompanying text (describing these fea-
tures of the Dutch code of conduct program). 
240. See supra notes 72, 232-33 and accompanying text. 
241. See supra notes 67-72, 208-31 and accompanying text. 
242. Dutch law is quite clear on this point. It provides that the sector must be "suffi-
ciently precisely defined." Personal Data Protection Act, supra note 26, art. 25(3); see also 
Law on Personal Data Files, supra note 26, art. 15. The organization representing a sector 
and the drafting code must be "sufficiently representative" of that sector. Personal Data 
Protection Act, supra note 26, art. 25(3); Law on Personal Data Files, supra note 26, § 15. 
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not require safe harbor programs to be sector-specific. They allow any non-
governmental organization to propose a safe harbor program. 243 Second, in 
the Netherlands, the industry sector drafts the code and then negotiates it 
with the agency. 244 Public interest groups and other stakeholders do not 
weigh in on the document until it is proposed for public comment245 and, 
even at that stage, typically do not provide much input.246 The Obama Ad-
ministration White Paper, by contrast, calls for wide-ranging, multi-
stakeholder groups to draft the codes, 247 and the congressional bills, too, 
appear to allow for such a process. 248 This is a departure from the Dutch 
model where industry and government negotiate the codes. 249 
Third, Dutch industry and government negotiate their codes against 
the background of a comprehensive data protection statute, which the codes 
are supposed to interpret. 250 While the bills discussed above do propose 
comprehensive legislation for the United States, Congress has not yet 
passed such a statute and may not do so for some time. Recognizing this, 
the Administration White Paper calls for the negotiation of voluntary multi-
stakeholder codes even in the absence of comprehensive legislation. 251 This 
differs from the Dutch approach. Fourth, the Dutch codes of conduct are 
The DPA will not consider a code that fails to meet both of these threshold criteria. Personal 
Data Protection Act, supra note 26, art. 25(3); see also Law on Personal Data Files, supra 
note 26, § 15. 
243. Kerry-McCain Bill, supra note 9, § 501; Stearns Bill, supra note 12, § 9; Rush 
Bill, supra note 12, § 401; WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 23. 
244. See supra notes 209-12 and accompanying text. 
245. Hustinx Interview, supra note 209 (stating that third party stakeholders were 
never involved in the negotiation). Originally Dutch law, too, created a role for privacy ad-
vocates. The 1989 act required industry drafters to consult with representatives of data sub-
jects and instructed the DPA to approve a code only if"there has been sufficient consultation 
with organizations of interested persons, including data subjects." Law on Personal Data 
Files, supra note 26, § 15. However, due to the lack of organized privacy groups in the Neth-
erlands, business representatives found it hard to find enough qualified privacy advocacy 
groups to consult with. Hustinx Interview, supra note 209. This made the consultation re-
quirement unworkable. Jd. The 2000 Law accordingly dropped this requirement. The upshot 
is that, today, the industry sector drafts the code and negotiates it with the DP A. 
246. Hustinx Interview, supra note 209 (stating that CBP has typically received very 
few comments); Wierdak Interview, supra note 201 (stating that CBP has typically received 
very few comments). 
247. WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 23. 
248. The Congressional bills say that "nongovernmental organizations" and "self-
regulatory organizations" will draft and sponsor the safe harbor programs. Kerry-McCain 
Bill, supra note 9, § 501; Stearns Bill, supra note 12, § 9; Rush Bill, supra note 12, § 401. 
This could allow for a sector-based approach similar to the Dutch model. However, it could 





See supra notes 209-10 and accompanying text. 
Personal Data Protection Act, supra note 26, art. 26(1 ). 
See WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 24. 
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themselves comprehensive. They implement, and create a safe harbor with 
respect to, all statutory requirements. 252 The U.S. bills that propose safe har-
bor programs, on the other hand, extend the safe harbor only to certain 
statutory requirements and reserve the rest for traditional agency rulemak-
ing. 253 Finally, the Dutch have been negotiating and approving codes since 
1989, while the American proposals have yet to be implemented.254 This 
twenty-three-year experience with data protection codes of conduct pro-
vides an empirical basis on which to assess the merits of the collaborative 
approach to privacy regulation. This Article turns now to that assessment. 
IV. WHAT THE DUTCH EXPERIENCE CAN TELL US ABOUT COLLABORATIVE 
PRIVACY REGULATION 
In the spring of2010, I lived in the Netherlands and interviewed regu-
lators, industry representatives, public advocates, and academics who had 
been directly involved with, or had studied, the Dutch data protection codes 
of conduct. I organized the interviews around the four central areas on 
which collaborative governance theorists disagree: the reasons why gov-
ernments adopt collaborative methods; the merits of the collaborative pro-
cess itself; the quality of the substantive rules that it produces; and the ef-
fects that it has on compliance. This presentation of my research results 
follows this same structure. At each step, it draws on the Dutch experience 
to shed light on the merits of collaborative privacy regulation. 
A. Why the Dutch Government Utilized, and Dutch Industry Embraced, 
Data Protection Codes of Conduct 
The initial drafts of the legislation that became the Law on Personal 
Data Files did not utilize industry codes of conduct. Instead, they proposed 
a prescriptive approach in which the government would issue regulations 
and would license particular company data operations. 255 
1. Why the Dutch Government Utilized Codes of Conduct 
The Dutch Ministry of Justice, which drafted the legislation, and Par-
liament ultimately moved towards the code of conduct model. They did so 
for four principal reasons. The first was administrative efficiency. The Min-
istry of Justice recognized early on that it would take a great deal of time 
252. Personal Data Protection Act, supra note 26, art. 25(1). 
253. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text. 
254. Law on Personal Data Files, supra note 26. 
255. !d.; Hustinx Interview, supra note 209. For example, see the early Swedish data 
protection Jaw. 
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and resources to develop sector-specific rules256 and that this would be be-
yond the means of the small agency (the Registration Chamber). 257 It ac-
cordingly sought to achieve a "division oflabor"258 in which the government 
would lay down broad principles and promote compliance, but industry 
associations would draft specific rules for their sectors, subject to regulatory 
approval. 259 According to one who was present at the time, "we needed to 
speed up the implementation process. One way was to let the sectors 
help."260 Second, the Reagan Administration's emphasis on deregulation 
during the 1980s had an "echo" in Europe at the time that the Ministry was 
drafting the 1989 Law on Personal Data Files. 261 This contributed to the 
move away from a prescriptive model to a code of conduct approach that 
contemplated a smaller, more cooperative role for govemment. 262 Third, the 
Ministry believed that sectors could draft and update codes of conduct more 
quickly than government officials could draft and update rules. 263 Codes 
would therefore do a better job of keeping up with the fast-changing infor-
mation economy. 264 This reason for utilizing codes of conduct corresponds 
to that which the Obama Administration, and some proponents of collabora-
tive approaches, have articulated. 265 
Finally, history and culture appear to have played a role. A number of 
interviewees explained that the Dutch history of constructing "polders"-
land reclaimed from the sea-generated a culture of cooperation that has 
contributed to the choice of a consensus-based regulatory method. 266 In the 
Netherlands, significant amounts of land lie below sea level. Such land is 
currently habitable because, over the generations, the inhabitants have built 
256. Hustinx Interview, supra note 209. 
257. Wishaw Interview, supra note 209 (stating that while the DPA could also have 
fleshed out the statute, "it takes a lot of energy to do that ... [w]ith a small [DPA] of 70 
people, you cannot do that"). 





263. Interview with Jeroen Terstegge, PrivaSense [hereinafter Terstegge Interview] 
(stating that government regulation cannot keep up with the pace of technological change). 
264. Wishaw Interview, supra note 209 (explaining that "[s]ociety changes constant-
ly, so if you make a rule very concrete and specific then it might describe a certain situation 
in the year 1980, but five years after that there is something completely different and the rule 
doesn't apply anymore. For example, e-mail. For example, access. It used to be people went 
directly to company to ask for access to information about them. Now they can ask by e-
mail. If you put that in law and made it specific but did not mention e-mail, you would make 
this less possible"). 
265. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text. 
266. van de Pol Interview, supra note 21 0; Hustinx Interview, supra note 209; van 
der Burgh Interview, supra note 223. 
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a system of dikes and pumps to push the sea back and reclaim the land. 267 
Historically, the construction of these "polders" was a massive task that 
required close cooperation among members of each local community re-
sponsible for a given system of dikes. 268 As a result, negotiation and consen-
sus-building became an integral part of Dutch daily life and culture. 269 
Scholars believe the cooperative, Dutch approach to regulation owes 
much to this tradition.270 They see a similarity between the cooperation and 
consensus-building needed to maintain the system of dikes and the attempts 
by the Dutch government to engage regulated industries and build consen-
sus on regulatory measures. 271 The approach can be found in many parts of 
the Dutch administrative state and has come to be referred to as the "polder 
model" of regulation. 272 
These cultural factors appear to be at work in the Dutch approach to 
data protection regulation. Interviewees referenced the polder approach in 
explaining why they felt that data protection codes of conduct worked well 
in the Netherlands. For example, a leading regulator stated: 
I think in Holland it's a very well accepted concept, in various areas not only in da-
ta protection .... Our polder model ... is that at meetings you try to get agreement 
with all the organizations involved, [it is a] consensus-oriented approach. That's a 
very high standard in Holland .... For Holland it is a normal way of thinking tied 
to each agreement .... It's in our culture. 273 
A representative of the banking sector echoed this sentiment, explaining that 
"Holland is a [small] country that works with consensus .... It is what you 
call the famous 'polder model.' . . . [T]he same goes for this type of prob-
lem. We always try to fmd solutions for things, which are acceptable for 
267. RUDY B. ANDEWEG & GALEN A. IRWIN, DUTCH GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 5-7 
(1993). 
268. See CORINA HENDRIKS, THE STORY BEHIND THE DUTCH MODEL: CONSENSUAL 
POLITICS OF WAGE RESTRAINT 94 (20 I 0). 
269. See id. 
270. See id. (stating consensus seeking is part of Dutch national history and culture 
and influences regulatory style in the Netherlands). 
271. See id. at 94. 
272. The government has for many years met with representatives of management 
and labor to negotiate and reach consensus on the issues that divide these groups. It has ne-
gotiated environmental "covenants" with industry sectors that set out how firms in that in-
dustry will go about reducing greenhouse gases or meeting other environmental goals. See, 
e.g., Y da Schreuder, The Polder Model in Dutch Economic and Environmental Planning, 21 
BuLL SCI. TECH. & Soc. 237 (2001). 
273. van de Pol Interview, supra note 210. Confirming the point, a lead drafter of the 
1989 Law explained that while some countries used more prescriptive regulation, "[i]n the 
Netherlands it went different. Maybe that is also why it made more sense from the point of 
view of say division of labor. But it is also part of the culture which is very much of [seek-
ing] consensus. Working it out together is ... a characteristic of Dutch culture." Hustinx 
Interview, supra note 209. 
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everyone. That's the way we ... work."274 This link between codes of con-
duct, Dutch history, and culture raises questions about whether the model is 
transferable to the United States. The concluding Part of this Article will 
return to this question. 275 
2. Industry's Reasons for Participating 
The safe harbor approach relies on voluntary industry participation. 
Thus, it is equally important to know why industry sectors decided to invest 
time and resources in drafting a code. 276 Industry representatives explained 
two main reasons for investing in the development and implementation of 
codes of conduct. First, Dutch industry saw codes of conduct as a valuable 
mechanism through which to clarify the broad terms of the Data Protection 
Act. 277 As was explained above, the Data Protection Act speaks in spacious, 
ambiguous terms. 278 Yet it does not authorize the DPA to promulgate regu-
lations fleshing out these provisions and, in any event, the DP A does not 
have the staff or resources to do so. 279 Companies accordingly found them-
selves facing a new, broadly-worded set of legal obligations with few in-
structions on how to comply. 280 One industry lawyer compared the situation 
to "feeling our way in the dark."281 This was an untenable situation for larg-
er, more visible sectors that utilized a great deal of personal information. 282 
These sectors put resources into codes so as to gain clearer guidance on 
what the statutes required of them. 283 In its 2010 Green Paper, the Obama 
274. van der Burgh Interview, supra note 223. 
275. See infra p. 161. 
276. See GREEN PAPER, supra note 10, at 51. The Department of Commerce recog-
nized the importance of this question. In its 2010 Green Paper, in which it proposed that the 
United States utilize codes of conduct for privacy regulation, the Department of Commerce 
asked for suggestions as to how it could convince industry sectors to draft and commit them-
selves to such a code. !d. 
277. Berkvens Interview, supra note 209. 
278. See supra notes 198-206 and accompanying text. 
279. Hustinx Interview, supra note 209. The DPA did, over time, generate a number 
of guidance documents. For example, it produced "reports" on specific sectors that analyzed 
the main data protection issues raised by that industry's practices and gave some indication 
of the DPA's views on those topics. Wishaw Interview, supra note 209. 
280. Wierdak Interview, supra note 201. 
281. !d. 
282. See id. 
283. As a lawyer for the banking industry explained it, "legislation is very general 
and [it is often] not clear how to apply it [to] specific issues. So the code serves as an inter-
pretation of the Data Protection Act and its application in certain banking situations." 
Berkvens Interview, supra note 209. This attorney, who played a leading role in the drafting 
and negotiation of the banking code, provided a number of examples of how the code clari-
fied the legislation. !d. ("The Act says that there has to be a purpose for the possession of 
personal data, and the code says what the purpose exactly is. So it's clarification on voice 
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Administration sought comment both on how it could encourage the private 
sector to draft enforceable codes of conduct and on the need for privacy 
legislation. 284 The Dutch experience suggests that these two questions are 
linked. Broadly-worded privacy legislation gives the private sector an in-
centive to invest in producing codes of conduct as a way to interpret the 
statute and achieve more regulatory certainty. 
Some industry representatives expressed a second reason to invest in 
codes of conduct: to forestall more direct government regulation. The repre-
sentatives of the trade information bureaus explained that public sentiment 
was building for legislation to regulate the industry's use of personal infor-
mation. 285 The industry saw the development of a code of conduct as an 
opportunity to give a positive signal to the government that legislation was 
not needed, and thereby "get ahead of' and prevent direct regulation that 
might tum out to be considerably more strict. 286 A representative of the di-
rect marketing industry told a similar story about his sector's decision to 
engage in self-regulation. 287 
B. The Process of Producing Codes of Conduct 
As described above, scholars disagree as to whether collaborative 
governance constitutes an effective process for producing rules. 288 The 
Dutch experience provides some support for each viewpoint. 
logging and on the processing of video pictures. The Act says nothing, and the Code says 
what we do in [these areas]. ... [W]e wanted to clarify how to deal with cameras, and ... 
how [to] inform the public of the usage ofthese cameras."). The code helps to clarify this. !d. 
("[T]he Act says nothing about direct marketing. The code is more explicit about what kind 
of use of customer data is permitted in groups of banks, and for what purposes .... [The Act] 
says that we can process data to be in compliance with the other legislation. The code gives 
[a] listing of such laws."). 
284. See GREEN PAPER, supra note 10, at 30, 51. 
285. Interview with A. van Herk (Chair), E. Rhein (Secretary) & J. Nobel (Treasur-
er), Dutch Assoc. of Trade Info. Bureaus (Nederlandse Vereniging van Handelsin-
formatiebureaus), in The Hague, Neth. (June, 2010) [hereinafterNVH Interview]. 
286. !d. 
287. See Interview with Alexander J.J.T. Singewald, Singewald Consultants Grp., in 
Aalsmeer, Neth. (June II, 2010) [hereinafter Singewald Interview] (facing the threat of 
legislation that would have created an "opt-in" system for direct mail advertising, the indus-
try developed an extensive self-regulatory "opt-out" system that has proven to be highly 
effective). This suggests that some in industry believed codes of conduct to be valuable not 
only as a means to clarify and interpret the existing Data Protection Act, but also as a way to 
pre-empt and forestall more targeted legislation directed at their particular industry. See 
Hustinx, supra note 28, at 285 (discussing that self-regulation may be "advanced as a means 
of preventing or postponing legislation"). 
288. See supra Part II (setting out this argument and citing sources). 
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1. Information Sharing 
The Dutch codes did appear to build trust between the regulators and 
the sectors and so to facilitate the sharing of business information. For ex-
ample, a DPA official recounted that, in the course of negotiating the pri-
vate investigator sector code, industry members allowed the agency to enter 
their offices and review their files in order to "field test" the draft code 
against actual client records. 289 They did this even though they knew that 
this inspection would likely reveal some violations of the Act. 290 He ex-
plained that the code negotiation process created the trust that made this 
possible: 
It [was] not our aim [to] ... detect[] illegal acts whatsoever. We just want[ed] to 
see whether the code [was] working .... [They allowed us to do this because] [ w ]e 
trust[ ed] each other. Personal trust. That was the basis .... During the process we 
were really listening to them. We want[ed] to solve the problems which they [had] 
with data protection law. Our approach was, we want to reach a common solution . 
. . to allow them to do their work on a legal basis .... When you show that you are 
really interested in the way they operate, [then they trust you.] 291 
Business representatives explained that, for their part, they shared in-
formation so as to correct regulators' misconceptions about their industry's 
data practices. 292 
While these interviews painted an optimistic picture, others suggested 
that the government should not rely exclusively on code negotiations to 
learn about industry data practices. One former regulatory official recounted 
how a DPA investigation of the trade information bureau sector (roughly 
equivalent to American credit rating agencies) unearthed valuable infor-
mation that the code negotiation had not revealed. 293 As the official ex-
plained: 
You learn most by doing an investigation of a complaint, not by negotiating a code. 
You are on the spot in a company. You can interview people on the work floor and 
can read internal memos. You can see the computer programs they use. You can 
even review the buying and selling of information. Then you see how do they 
make their money. Do they buy information? From whom? That gives you an idea 
of the network. By negotiating a code of conduct you do not get that infor-
mation.294 
289. van de Pol Interview, supra note 210. 
290. !d. 
291. ld. 
292. See Singewald Interview, supra note 287 ("They also think we are doing all 
kinds of things we really don't do."); van der Burgh Interview, supra note 223 (describing 
how the sector decided to develop a code so as to provide "information for the Supervisor"). 
293. See Wishaw Interview, supra note 209. 
294. ld. The regulators found it particularly useful to be able to review company 
transactions related to personal data. !d. This revealed that professionals such as lawyers and 
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This suggests that while code negotiations may provide valuable in-
formation, regulators should carry out independent investigations as well. 
The Dutch experience also showed that information sharing does not 
just go in one direction. Government officials, too, can share valuable in-
formation.295 During the course of negotiating a code, regulators often ex-
plain how they view and interpret the law. This can help industry to under-
stand where the lines are drawn and so to act with greater certainty. For 
example, banks typically shared with each other information on customers 
who had behaved fraudulently. 296 During the negotiations over the banking 
industry's code of conduct, regulators clarified that this would not violate 
the Data Protection Act's limitations on sharing personal information with 
third parties so long as the security personnel at each bank were the only 
ones given access to the data. 297 The parties memorialized this interpretation 
in the Financial Institutions Code. 298 One of the negotiators of the banking 
code explained the value of such clarifications: 
Every Supervisor has his own policy. You have the legislation, but between the 
lines they have their own policy .... So you have to know very well what ... the 
policy is, and one of the ways to ... know that is to get into a discussion with 
them. A code like this is a very useful instrument for it. . . . I think it is very im-
portant especially because ... data protection is very general. 299 
The lead negotiator for the private investigator industry provided sev-
eral other examples of how code negotiation served as a vehicle for clarify-
ing the statute. 300 He, too, identified that as the added value of the code. 301 
bailiffs, who had special rights to obtain personal information in their official capacities, 
were unlawfully sharing it with trade information bureaus in exchange for access to other 
information that these professionals found useful in their work as debt collectors. See id. The 
bureaus were like "spiders at the center of a web" of information transactions, and the inves-
tigation allowed the regulators to see the Web. !d. 
295. Cf Peter Hustinx, The Use and Impact of Codes of Conduct in the Netherlands, 
Paper Presented to the 161h Conference of Data Protection Commissioners, The Hague, Neth. 
(1994) (stating that codes of conduct can lead to an "enhanced measure of understanding on 
both sides"); BENNETT & RAAB, supra note 26, at 141 (stating that negotiating codes can 
enhance the understanding of privacy problems between parties). 
296. van der Burgh Interview, supra note 223. 
297. !d. 
298. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA BY FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS § 5.2.2 (2003) (hereinafter PROCESSING OF PERS. DATA BY FIN. INSTS.]; /d. § 
2.5; van der Burgh Interview, supra note 223. 
299. van der Burgh interview, supra note 223. 
300. For example, the Code stated that private investigators should refrain from ob-
serving people "in circumstances where these persons ... should not suffer any restrictions 
on their ability to be free of restraints." PRIVACYGEDRAGSCODE SECTOR PARTICULIERE 
ONDERZOEKSBUREAUS (PRIVACY CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE PRIVATE INVESTIGATION 
INDUSTRY] § 7.4(3) (2004) (hereinafter PRIVACY CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE PRIVATE 
INVESTIGATION INDUSTRY]. It then clarified that these circumstances include "private resi-
dences, hotel rooms, bathing cubicles at swimming pools, changing rooms in stores, rest 
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The industry is able to clarify what is in-bounds and what is out-of-bounds 
in a way that is useful to the industry and that the agency approves. 302 
In addition to clarifying the statute, regulators also use the code nego-
tiation process to flag potential legal issues that the industry drafters may 
have missed. For example, a former DPA official explained that, in the 
course of negotiating the medical research code, the DPA was able to identi-
fy a host of issues that the industry had not yet considered: 
Is this identifiable or isn't this? What is anonymous? What is pseudo-anonymity? . 
. . It is not so easy. The discoveries of these problems, and the solutions developed 
for them, were quite often a secondary benefit of the negotiations of the code of 
conduct. It was not generated by complaints; it was not generated by requests for 
information. It was developed in the context of codes of conduct. What does this 
mean, in that situation? Oh, we haven't thought about that. Well, come up with 
texts on it for next time. 303 
In this way the code negotiation process could serve as a vehicle for 
educating the industry on the statute and the legal issues that it raises. 
2. Joint Problem Solving 
The proponents of collaborative governance predict that it will pro-
duce a problem-solving, rather than an adversarial, mentality. 304 The inter-
views offered a number of instances of this. For example, banks wanted to 
take their customers' personal and financial data, collected during the 
course of providing banking services, and use it to construct profiles of 
areas and toilets, [but that] ... observing an individual in a private residence for a few mo-
ments from the public highway whilst the windows are exposed does not fall under the re-
strictions of this rule." /d. § 7.4. In another instance, the code made clear that "[o]bservation 
may be supported using technical" resources (such as cameras) or positioning "equipment 
(e.g. GPS equipment when shadowing vehicles)." /d. However, it then qualified this state-
ment by setting limits on the use ofGPS devices so as to protect individual privacy: 
Usage of other technical auxiliary devices, such as a Global Position System (GPS) 
beacon, is only permissible under restricted circumstances. . . . Deployment of 
these means shall be limited to company vehicles and private vehicles used for pro-
fessional purposes by the person under investigation and shall further be limited to 
those times that are relevant to the investigation contract. Affixing a technical aux-
iliary device onto an individual's private property such that at all times an exact 
and complete picture is obtained of the places where the person under observation 
is or has been inflicts too great a breach of privacy and cannot find its justification 
in the nature of the contract. 
/d. See generally Olijslager Interview, supra note 209 (describing these features of the 
Code). 
30 I. Olijslager Interview, supra note 209. 
302. /d. 
303. Hustinx Interview, supra note 209. 
304. Freeman, supra note 18, at 22; GUNNINGHAM & SINCLAIR, supra note 19, at 109; 
see also Harter, supra note 21, at 420. 
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those who may be interested in certain banking products. 305 Yet the Data 
Protection Act did not allow personal data to be processed for purposes that 
were "incompatible with the [one] for which they [were originally] ob-
tained."306 Would taking data collected for the purpose of providing banking 
services, and using it to construct marketing profiles, be "incompatible" and 
hence contrary to the Act? The banks and the DP A debated this while nego-
tiating the Financial Institutions Code. 307 
According to a representative for the banks, the turning point came 
when each party expressed its bottom-line need. 308 For the regulators, the 
most important thing was that the banks not use data on individual custom-
ers to create profiles of those individuals. 309 That was not a problem for the 
banks. They wanted aggregate customer data that would help them to identi-
fy the type of customers who might be interested in certain products. 310 
They readily agreed to create only aggregate profiles, not individual ones. 311 
Once the parties realized that their core interests could be reconciled, 
they were able to identify an interpretation of the Act that was consistent 
with this solution and to build it into the Code. The Financial Institutions 
Code states that analysis of aggregate customer data is "[p ]rocessing ... for 
statistical ... purposes."312 It then provides that processing for statistical 
purposes is not incompatible with the purposes for which the data were ini-
tially collected, so long as the bank makes "the [necessary] provision[ s] to 
ensure that the further processing of personal data [shall be effected] for 
these specific purposes."313 The pharmaceutical sector and the DPA reached 
a very similar solution regarding that industry's desire to use the personal 
data of those participating in clinical trials to construct profiles of the types 
of people who might best be able to benefit from new drugs. 314 
Articulation of bottom line interests in a way that allows these inter-
ests to be reconciled is classic problem solving. A representative of the di-
rect marketing sector, having himself negotiated such a solution with the 
DP A, 315 summed up the dynamic in this way: 
305. Berkvens Interview, supra note 209. 
306. Personal Data Protection Act, supra note 26, art. 9. 





312. CODE PROCESSING PERSONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS§ 5.3.2 (2010). 
313. !d. § 5.3.1. To make matters perfectly clear, Section 5.3.3 says that "[i]n order to 
target marketing activities at certain groups, personal data may be analysed that have been 
collected within the framework of marketing activities." 
314. Interview with Matthijs van Blokland, Senior Policy Adviser on Legal Affairs, 
Nefarma, in Amsterdam, Neth. (June 15, 201 0) [hereinafter van Blokland Interview]. 
315. According to the representative for the direct marketing industry, the initial 
disagreement concerned whether the industry should be prohibited from having any com-
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I approached the representative of the CBP and I said, 'let's sit together. If you 
have specific needs, let's talk about those needs. And then we can give, on behalf 
of industry, what our needs are.' And so we aligned our work in such a way that 
we both were content. And we submitted it for approval, and it was approved. 316 
3. Agency Capture and Industry Irifluence 
131 
The interviews did not suggest full-scale agency capture. The DPA 
appeared to have well-defmed institutional values that were independent of 
and different from industry interests.317 Both government officials and in-
dustry representatives told of contested, protracted negotiations, 318 and in-
dustry representatives complained about regulators being too "technical" 
and "legalistic."319 This does not indicate agency capture. The literature on 
agency capture suggests that it is more likely to occur when an agency regu-
lates a single industry than when it regulates many different ones. 320 The 
Data Protection Act covers many different industries. Thus, the literature is 
consistent with the idea that agency capture had not occurred. 
While the Dutch experience did not suggest agency capture, it did re-
veal one instance in which an industry sector seemed to exercise a dispro-
portionate and unhealthy influence over the shape of its code. This involved 
the private investigator industry's compliance with the statutory require-
ment that companies notify a data subject when collecting personal infor-
mercial communications with children at all or whether it should be allowed to do so with 
parental consent. Singewald Interview, supra note 287. After discussion, it emerged that the 
DPA's real concern was that the industry would condition online prizes on children's disclo-
sure of personal data. !d. The industry agreed not to do this, and this became part of the code. 
/d.; FEDMA Code, § 2.6.4. "Once we learned what their real opinion was, we were able to 
address it." Singewald Interview, supra note 287. 
316. Olijslager Interview, supra note 209. 
317. For example, a former DPA official explained that the DPA's "reputation was at 
stake" in the codes that it negotiated. Hustinx Interview, supra note 209. "[T]he agency 
could not afford to approve and recommend a code, and then receive the next month a com-
plaint. Have you overlooked this? How come? So the agency's reputation also was in-
volved." /d. This sense of an agency reputation, and the need to protect and build it, suggests 
an independent set of values. /d. ("This is an independent government agency whose task it 
is to insist on adequate safeguards."). 
318. /d. (describing the difficult five-year process for negotiating the Financial Insti-
tutions Code); van de Pol Interview, supra note 210 (describing the "heavy discussions" 
between the DPA and the direct marketing industry over that sector's code). 
319. NVH Interview, supra note 285 (stating that government officials do not under-
stand the industry, take a "formal approach based on laws," and are not open to industry 
input). 
320. See Scruggs, supra note 96, at 147 (stating that corporatist tradition that brings 
in extensive sets of interest groups leads to reduced risk of agency capture); Niles, supra note 
142, at 399 (stating that threat of agency capture is greater where the agency regulates only a 
single industry). 
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mation about that person. 321 Private investigators complained that this re-
quirement was particularly burdensome when an employer hired them to 
investigate an employee, and the person later turned out to be innocent. 322 In 
these circumstances, the employer often insisted that the employee not be 
told of the investigation for fear of damaging the employment relation-
ship. 323 The private investigators pushed to be let out of the requirement in 
these instances.324 While the DPA did not grant this wish in its entirety, it 
did make a significant concession. The DP A agreed that it would be ac-
ceptable for the employer that had hired the private investigator to assume 
the obligation to notify the employee in question and that, where the em-
ployer provided proof to the investigator that it had given such notification, 
the private investigator itself would not be required to do so. 325 This prob-
lematic solution put the burden of notifying the innocent employee in the 
hands of the one party that did not want that notification to occur-the em-
ployer.326 While it purportedly required the employer to document the noti-
fication, it did not compel anyone to check the accuracy of this documenta-
tion. 327 This created a significant risk of non-compliance. Indeed, a later 
study of the private investigator industry found widespread violation of the 
notification requiremene28 and explained that most violations occurred 
where an employee was found to be innocent because, in those cases, the 
employer did not want to damage its relationship with the employee. 329 
The private investigator story is indeed a troubling one. Yet the fact 
that industry got its way in this instance does not mean that it did so in eve-
ry case. To the contrary, the DPA did stand its ground during difficult nego-
tiations with the credit rating industry or, as they are known in the Nether-
lands, the trade information bureau sector (handelsinformatiebureaus). 330 In 
the Netherlands, trade information bureaus, such as Experian, use their large 
321. Personal Data Protection Act, supra note 26, arts. 33-34. 
322. Wishaw Interview, supra note 209. 
323. See id. 
324. Olijslager Interview, supra note 209. 
325. !d.; Wishaw Interview, supra note 209; Interview with Carlo Cahn, Sec.-Gen. of 
the Dutch Private Investigators Assoc. (de Nederlandse Veiligheidsbranche), in Amsterdam, 
Neth. (July 2, 2010) [hereinafter Cahn Interview]. 
326. A DP A official involved in the negotiations made clear that the agency knew 
this was a weak solution: "We were always aware in advance that protection of rights of data 
subject[s] was an illusion in terms of informing them of the investigation. But we did not 
push it. They were proposing texts. We said okay. I always knew that it was a very weak 
point." van de Pol Interview, supra note 210. 
327. Wishaw Interview, supra note 209. 
328. See Regioplan Policy Research, Evaluation of the Privacy Code of Conduct for 
Private Detective Agencies, 85, 89-90 (Oct. 2007). 
329. See id. at 88. 
330. See Nederlandse Vereniging van Handelsinformatiebureaus, 
http://www.nvhinfo.nl/htm/nvh_home.htm?30 (last visited July 14, 2013). 
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stores of personal information not only to generate credit ratings but also to 
provide information for other purposes, such as debt collection. To carry out 
these functions, industry members frequently ask third parties, e.g. a land-
lord or employer, about a given individual's whereabouts, financial situa-
tion, or employment status. 331 The DPA took the position that the industry 
had to obtain the individual's consent before doing so-a position that the 
industry believed would undermine its debt collection-related service. 332 In 
the face of strenuous industry argument, the DPA remained committed to its 
position. 333 Negotiations over the renewal of the trade information bureau 
code broke down over this issue, and the code expired. 334 The trade infor-
mation bureau and private investigator examples present different pictures 
of industry influence. For now, the most that can be said is that industry 
appears able to exercise undue influence in some, but not all, instances. As 
will be discussed further below, the code negotiation process should be de-
signed to minimize this possibility by, for example, including public interest 
stakeholders in the discussion. 335 
4. Adaptability 
The proponents of collaborative governance and the Obama Admin-
istration claim that this method is more nimble and adaptive than traditional 
notice-and-comment rulemaking336 and that this quality is particularly im-
portant for regulation of the information economy. 337 Dutch policymakers 
also articulated this idea when explaining why they opted for codes of con-
duct over traditional rules. 338 
The Dutch codes of conduct tell a very different story. 339 Government 
and industry representatives reported that while some negotiations could 
proceed smoothly and be wrapped up after two or three meetings, 340 they 




335. See infra Subsection V.A.2 (suggesting this). 
336. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text. 
337. See GREEN PAPER, supra note 10, at 19-20; cf BENNETI & RAAB, supra note 26, 
at 141 (explaining the view that codes are "flexible instruments and once negotiated can be 
adapted to changing economic and technological developments"). 
338. See supra Subsection IV.A.I. 
339. Some interviewees did describe codes as an adaptive form of regulation. 
Singewald Interview, supra note 287; Wierdak Interview, supra note 201; van Blokland 
Interview, supra note 314. However, these statements were at odds with the facts that they 
and others described regarding the amount of time it took to negotiate codes and the static 
nature of these documents once adopted, as described below. 
340. According to one former regulator, the codes that took the least time to negotiate 
where those in which the industry's information practices were already heavily regulated 
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were just as likely to require ten or even twenty meetings and from three to 
four years of work. 341 A former regulator explained that her "personal expe-
rience is that it takes a lot of time and effort from the branch organizations 
that are trying to get a code approved" and from the agency too. 342 A Minis-
try of Justice-funded evaluation of Data Protection Act cited observers' 
findings that "drafting codes of conduct is a long-term, time consuming, and 
expensive process. "343 
The Dutch experience is also at odds with the proponents' and the 
Obama Administration's claim that stakeholder groups can quickly revise 
codes of conduct in response to changing realities. The Dutch sectors sel-
dom revised a code during its five-year term. 344 To the contrary, a majority 
of the codes expired after their initial five years had ended, and in some 
cases, it took years for the industry and government to agree on a new ver-
sion. 345 During this period, the expired code lost its legal status and the in-
dustry, its safe harbor. 346 These are hardly the signs of a nimble and adaptive 
process. 
Instead, the Dutch experience suggests that both the industry and regu-
lators must invest a great deal of time and resources in the drafting and ne-
gotiation of a code and that, once they have done so, they are loath to re-
since this gave the parties a legal foundation from which to work and the codes in which the 
industry hired an information privacy specialist to represent it during the code negotiation 
process. Hustinx Interview, supra note 209. 
341. !d. The Financial Institutions Code was one of these. It took five years to reach 
agreement. van der Burgh Interview, supra note 223; Hustinx Interview, supra note 209. 
These time frames conflict with the Dutch Personal Data Protection Act, which requires the 
DPA to reach a decision within thirteen weeks of an industry's submission of the draft code. 
Personal Data Protection Act, supra note 26, art. 25(4). As was explained above, this dispari-
ty is due to the fact that most of the negotiations occur before the sector formally submits the 
draft code to the DP A. See supra notes 224-27 and accompanying text. The time frames 
discussed here reflect the actual length of time that the sector and regulators worked on the 
code, not the formal thirteen-week period that the statute describes. 
342. Wierdak Interview, supra note 201; see also Hustinx Interview, supra note 209 
(describing "extensive meetings, sometimes negotiations, sometimes about texts, article by 
article. Some were very ... frustrating for both sides"). 
343. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, FIRST EVALUATION OF THE PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION 
AcT, Summary at 3 (2007). 
344. Email from Richard Wishaw, former official, Dutch DPA (June 13, 2013, II :25 
EST) (on file with author); Email from Jacqueline Wierdak, former official, Dutch DPA 
(June 14,2013, 4:08 EST). 
345. See Appendix: Dutch Data Protection Codes of Conduct (identifying the codes 
that expired); Wierdak Interview, supra note 20 I; van der Burgh Interview, supra note 223 
(describing how the Financial Institutions Code lapsed for two years while negotiations over 
the revised code dragged on and concluded that "[i]t takes quite a lot of time to look into 
texts"). 
346. Wierdak Interview, supra note 20 I. 
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open the discussion until they are absolutely forced to do so. 347 That ex-
plains why many industries did not revise their codes until they had reached 
the end of their five-year term and, even then, allowed them to expire before 
negotiating a new code with the DPA. 348 The Dutch codes are relatively 
static regulatory instruments. While they may be no worse than notice-and-
comment rulemaking in this regard, they do not appear to be much better. 
This calls into question the Obama Administration's reliance on the 
adaptability of multi-stakeholder codes of conduct as one of its chief ration-
ales for utilizing this regulatory method. 349 Indeed, the Administration's 
intended multi-stakeholder processes, which require multiple parties to 
reach agreement on the codes, should prove even more difficult and time-
consuming to negotiate than the Dutch codes that require only industry and 
the government to come to terms. This should make the parties even more 
wedded to the codes that emerge from the process and less eager to re-open 
settled negotiations in order to revise them. If Congress and the Administra-
tion are to utilize codes of conduct, they will need to develop ways to make 
them more adaptable than the Dutch codes have proven to be, not less. 
C. The Substance of the Codes of Conduct 
As discussed above, commentators disagree not only about the value 
of collaborative processes, but also about the merits of the substantive rules 
that these processes are likely to produce. 350 The proponents argue that col-
laborative methods will tend to produce rules that are more tailored to busi-
ness realities, and more cost-effective, workable, creative, and up-to-date 
than those that notice-and-comment rulemaking generally yields.351 Others, 
however, maintain that collaborative processes will generate rules that are 
lenient and anti-competitive. 352 
1. Tailoring and Workability 
The Dutch codes offer quite a few instances in which the negotiation 
process led to more tailored and workable rules. One such example con-
cerns the private investigator industry. The Data Protection Act requires 
companies to notify data subjects before they collect personal information 
347. See BENNEIT & RAAB, supra note 26, at 142 (stating that government approval 
of codes "can bureaucratize a process that, in theory, is supposed to allow the flexibility of 
self-regulation"). 
348. See Appendix: Dutch Data Protection Codes of Conduct (identifying the codes 
that expired). 
349. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text. 
350. See supra Part II. 
351. See supra Section II.A. 
352. See supra Section II.B. 
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about them. 353 Obviously, such a requirement runs directly counter to the 
private investigators' business model, which is premised on collecting in-
formation about individuals without their knowledge. After negotiation, the 
industry and the DPA agreed that investigators could notify the data subject 
after the investigation, rather than before, and memorialized this arrange-
ment in the code. 354 Assuming that investigators do provide such notice, 355 
this should enable the notification requirement to serve its intended pur-
pose-i.e., allowing data subjects to exercise their rights of access and cor-
rection-without unduly harming the private investigator business. This is a 
good example of tailoring. 
Another example comes from the Financial Services Industry Code. 
While drafting its code, the banking industry identified a conflict between 
its payment system procedures and the Act's requirement that parties not 
transmit financial data without the data subject's prior consent. 356 Tradition-
ally, if a customer made an error such that its payment went to someone 
other than the intended person, the bank would provide the customer with 
the name of the recipient so that the customer could undertake the steps 
required to get its money back. 357 The DP A initially took the position that 
this information-i.e., receipt of the payment-was financial information 
and that the bank could only provide it to the customer if the mistaken pay-
ee consented. 358 The banks protested that this was unworkable since few 
such payees would give their consent. 359 After some negotiations, the parties 
worked out a solution. 360 The Code states that banks can share personal data 
for the "normal settlement of payment transactions" and for "verification 
and reconstruction purposes.m61 This small clarification allowed the banks 
to interpret the law in a way that would fit with important business realities. 
A representative of the banking industry described the tailoring function in 
this way: "Negotiation of codes provides an opportunity to educate the data 
protection authority about the specific features of the industry and how they 
353. Personal Data Protection Act, supra note 26, arts. 33-34. 
354. PRIVACY CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE PRIVATE INVESTIGATION INDUSTRY, supra 
note 300, § 8.1; Interview with Pieter ljfs, Dir., De Fraude Experts, in Amsterdam, Neth. 
(June 7, 2010) [hereinafter Ijfs Interview]; Wishaw Interview, supra note 209. 
355. Above, I described some situations in which the investigators have not provided 
such notice at the conclusion of the investigation. See supra notes 321-29 and accompanying 
text. This is a separate, albeit highly important, issue. 





361. PROCESSING OFPERS. DATA BY FIN. INSTS., supra note 298, § 5.2.3. 
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relate to the data protection law. Regulators would not otherwise know 
enough about the industry to regulate it intelligently."362 
2. Cost-Effectiveness 
Government-industry negotiations can also lead to more cost-effective 
rules. For example, the Data Protection Act requires that a company notify 
the DPA each time it begins to process personal data. 363 Initially, the DPA 
took the position that each bank had to provide such notice for each bank 
product that involved the processing of personal data, and for each change 
in such bank product. 364 The financial industry believed that this would 
"cause an enormous burden of red tape."365 It accordingly sought permission 
to streamline the notification requirement in two ways. First, it asked that 
each bank be allowed to develop a single, unified description of all of its 
activities that involve the processing of personal data and to notify the gov-
ernment of them in a single communication. 366 Second Rabobank, a large 
cooperative bank, requested that it be able to make a single notification on 
behalf of its hundreds of member banks, rather than requiring each member 
bank itself notify the DP A. 367 The banking representatives argued that, in 
addition to reducing compliance costs, these reforms would give regulators 
a more comprehensive picture of the banks' information processing than 
would multiple piecemeal notifications, and so would improve regulators' 
understanding of how a given bank handled personal data. 368 Ultimately, the 
DPA accepted this interpretation of the statute. 369 This reduced the banks' 
compliance costs considerably. 370 
362. van der Burgh Interview, supra note 223. A representative for the direct-
marketing industry expressed a similar sentiment, in slightly more evocative language: "You 
know the 'Streets of San Francisco,' the police series? ... There was a guy who always 
ended the briefing: 'let's do it to them before they do it to us.' ... [T]hat's my motto, let's do 
it to ourselves [through a code] before they do it to us." Singewald Interview, supra note 
287. This is better because then you get to "workable solutions." /d. 
363. Personal Data Protection Act, supra note 26, art. 27; Berkvens Interview, supra 
note 209. 
364. Berkvens Interview, supra note 209. 
365. !d. 
366. !d. 
367. /d. Rabobank, a large cooperative bank in the Netherlands, had one central bank 
and more than 1,000 member banks. !d. The central office requested permission to file a 
single notification on behalf of all of these member banks. !d. 
368. /d. 
369. !d. The DPA's permission to Rabobank to make a single notification on behalf 
of its members took the form of a letter to the bank that served as a supplement to the finan-
cial institutions code. Email from Jan Berkvens, Deputy Dir., Legal & Fin. Affairs, Ra-
bobank Nederland, to Dennis Hirsch, Professor of Law, Capital University Law School (Mar. 
4, 2013, 10:24 EST) (on file with author). 
370. Berkvens Interview, supra note 209. 
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3. Leniency 
Some have argued that that industry domination of the negotiation 
process will result in overly lenient rules. As already described, in one in-
stance, the private investigator industry pushed for, and achieved, a lenient 
interpretation of the Act. 371 That said, it would be unwise to draw sweeping 
conclusions from this one example. As was also described above, the DPA 
did not yield to the requests from an even stronger sector-the trade infor-
mation bureaus-where it felt them to be insufficiently protective of indi-
vidual privacy. 372 The strongest conclusion for which there is evidentiary 
support is that the code negotiation process can, at times, lead to overly le-
nient rules. 
One additional comment bears mention here. A former DP A Official, 
who personally negotiated several of the codes of conduct, said the follow-
ing about the agency's position during such negotiations: 
Now we are more or less dependent on what the opposite party is proposing. That 
is the polder model. Don't take the initiative, let's start with the organizations 
[themselves], what they think will be the best for the company .... One of the 
weakest points is that we cannot stipulate we want it that way .... The initiative is 
to the other party. We have to approve the code. At the end of the day, they can do 
nothing [without that approval]. But it is always a weak point for the regulator that 
he isn't able to take the initiative .... It's up to the company or organizations to 
start and to bring it further and to develop new texts. [This leads to problems in the 
final product]. ... You have to discuss to the bitter end. 373 
This comment suggests that, where industry gets to draft the code, it is able 
to frame the terms of the discussion. Regulators have to react to industry's 
language. Such a structure could yield weaker rules than those that a regula-
tor would have drafted. One way to assess this effect would be to compare 
Dutch codes with rules that regulatory agencies in other European nations 
have drafted using a more traditional rulemaking approach. Future research 
along these lines would be useful. 
4. Anti-Competitiveness 
The interviews revealed one potential instance in which an industry 
may have employed the code to keep out new entrants. A DPA official ex-
plained that, as drafted, the pharmaceutical code went beyond the Data Pro-
tection Act protections for consumer data. 374 The DP A initially found this to 
be perplexing but did not object. 375 Later, a party commenting on the draft 
371. See supra notes 321-29 and accompanying text. 
372. See supra notes 330-34 and accompanying text. 
373. van de Pol Interview, supra note 210. 
374. McLaggan-van Roon Interview, supra note 233. 
375. !d. 
US. Privacy Law and Dutch Privacy Regulation 139 
code complained that foreign companies would find it harder than domestic 
ones to comply with the provisions in question, and that the provisions ac-
cordingly created a barrier to trade. 376 In retrospect, the official believed that 
the extra-stringent provisions may have reflected a conscious industry at-
tempt to prevent foreign companies from entering the Dutch market. 377 At 
the time, however, the DPA did not require the industry to change the 
code. 378 Thus the interviews provided limited, anecdotal evidence for the 
claim that industry associations can use codes of conduct to keep out new 
entrants. 
D. Compliance and the Code of Conduct Approach 
Collaborative governance scholars also disagree on its impact on 
compliance. As was explained in more detail above,379 the proponents argue 
that traditional enforcement does not do a good job of ensuring compliance 
and that collaborative methods will improve it by increasing both industry 
ownership and acceptance of regulations, along with industry self-
policing. 380 Others counter that collaborative approaches will encourage 
regulators to adopt a cooperative rather than an enforcement-oriented mind-
set and that most sectors will not have the will to enforce rules against their 
own members. 381 
1. Traditional Enforcement 
The proponents of collaborative governance assert that, due to the lim-
ited number of inspectors, direct agency enforcement will often fail to pro-
duce adequate compliance.382 There is anecdotal evidence that this has been 
the case with respect to the DPA and the Data Protection Act. The DPA 
itself acknowledged several years ago that its previous enforcement efforts 
had been lacking. 383 It promised to "change course" and put greater priority 
on inspections and enforcement. 384 
It remains to be seen whether the DPA's new effort will make a dif-
ference. One former DP A official predicted that it would not, for reasons 




379. See supra notes 124-32, 147 and accompanying text. 
380. See supra Subsection II.A.3 and accompanying text. 
381. See supra Subsection II.B.3 and accompanying text. 
382. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
383. See Jacob Kohnstamm, Preface to the DATA PROT. AUTH.'S 2007 ANNUAL 
REPORT, at 69 (2007). 
384. /d. at 69-70. 
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forcement. 385 He maintained that the DPA, which he said has fewer than 100 
employees to handle policy development, compliance assistance, investiga-
tions, and enforcement for the entire Dutch economy, would simply not 
have the resources to carry out comprehensive monitoring and inspection. 386 
"For real enforcement, they are still too small. ... You have to monitor the 
whole society, to inspect, and that is impossible. So what they are doing is 
more enforcement actions, but it's relatively small actions .... In most cas-
es, it is reactive."387 This suggests that the DPA may lack the resources 
comprehensively to monitor data practices across the economy. 388 This, 
coupled with the fact that the DP A lacks authority to issue significant fines 
for violations of the Act, 389 suggests that traditional agency enforcement 
may not be enough to ensure compliance with the Act. 
2. Building Awareness 
Can the codes of conduct help to promote compliance? Business rep-
resentatives and regulators reported an interesting development in this re-
gard. They explained that the very process of developing a code of conduct 
forced companies to learn much more about their own data practices so that 
they could determine how the Personal Data Protection Act applied to 
them. 390 In this way, the code development process raised industry aware-
ness about how it collected, used, and shared personal data. One of the lead 
drafters of the banking code explained how this happened in his sector: 
In order to develop, and ultimately comply with, the Financial Institutions code, we 
had to find out what data our banks were using, how they were using it, and who 
was using it. ... We had to reconstruct the whole process of using personal infor-
mation in the bank. ... We had previously focused on the product relationship with 
the customer, not the back office processes. We had to make the back office pro-
cesses visible. 391 
As a result, "everybody, the back offices, front offices, the lawyers, they all 
learned a lot about their [own] processes in relation to the data protection 
issue."392 A DPA official confirmed that the code drafting and negotiation 
385. van de Pol Interview, supra note 210. 
386. !d. 
387. !d. 
388. See Cahn Interview, supra note 325 (stating that it is impossible for authorities 
fully to monitor compliance). 
389. Personal Data Protection Act, supra note 26, art. 66. 
390. Cf BENNETI & RAAB, supra note 26, at 141 ("The procedure of negotiating 
codes may enhance the understanding of the privacy problem within different sectors."). 
391. Berkvens Interview, supra note 209. 
392. !d. The DPA Commissioner in charge of negotiating the private investigator 
code suggested that a similar evolution had occurred there. van de Pol Interview, supra note 
210. He explained the industry had always assumed that its practices could not be reconciled 
with data protection, and so had spent little time thinking about the issue. !d. ("[W]e gave 
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process builds industry awareness of its data practices. 393 She also pointed 
out that publication of a code increases public awareness of an industry's 
data practices and so builds public expectations about how companies will 
handle personal information. 394 This, too, can promote compliance. 
3. Ownership and Acceptance 
Companies' role in drafting codes of conduct appeared, not only to 
build awareness, but also to increase their acceptance of the rules that they 
had a hand in writing. One industry representative reported that 
it's more acceptable to companies because they feel that they are involved .... If 
they like it, if they don't like it. They can come forward with their problems .... [If 
it is imposed by the government, then] they have to accept it but they will not 
comply because they were not involved. 395 
A former regulator also observed this: 
Out of experience, I know that if the regulator makes a code of conduct and drops 
it in that industry, they don't accept it. If you tell people this is how you should live 
then they say, well, I decide how I should live .... If they have a role in drafting a 
code, then they accept it. Their attitude is different. The members say, this is our 
document, we created it, and the authority approved it. ... [T]hey feel the code is 
part of them. 396 
Industry actions appeared to be consistent with these reports. For ex-
ample, trade associations routinely held sessions for their members at which 
they presented the code that they had drafted, explained what firms needed 
to do to comply with it, and encouraged them to do so. 397 This suggests that 
explanations. It is allowed to do your work under certain conditions. Took them out of the 
dark .... It gave them the opportunity to make clear what their practices were and under 
which conditions they could do what they always wanted to do. [The process of developing 
the code] raised awareness."). 
393. McLaggan-van Roon Interview, supra note 233 (stating that the need to draft a 
code forces companies and their industry associations to discuss the issue, and this helps to 
raise corporate awareness). 
394. /d. 
395. Singewald Interview, supra note 287. A private investigator involved in the 
drafting of that industry's code of conduct expressed a similar sentiment that companies are 
more likely to accept it if they have a role in shaping the Code. Ijfs Interview, supra note 354 
("As long as we feel that we have been made part of it and we are listened to and our inter-
ests are taken at heart and then something is construed with our interests in mind, then it is 
much easier to accept and abide than it being forced upon us."). 
396. Wishaw Interview, supra note 209. 
397. Berkvens Interview, supra note 209 (banking industry); van der Burgh Inter-
view, supra note 223 (banking industry); van Blokland Interview, supra note 314 (pharma-
ceutical industry); NVH Interview, supra note 285 (trade information bureaus); Olijslager 
Interview, supra note 209 (private investigators); see also Wishaw Interview, supra note 209 
(affirming this). As a representative for the banking industry explained it, "The code was a 
vehicle to educate the employees. When we completed the code, we gave it a lot of publicity 
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the process of developing codes of conduct increased the sectors' ownership 
over and acceptance of the rules. On a related front, Peter Hustinx, the for-
mer Chair of the Dutch DPA, has reported that the DPA's discussions with 
industry sectors regarding codes of conduct facilitated the "development of 
norms" as to how personal information should be protected. 398 
4. Self-Policing: Bringing up the Bottom 
Industry efforts at self-policing appeared to grow, not out of a sense of 
mutual accountability among the negotiating parties, but out of a desire to 
rein in smaller, less responsible firms-the "cowboys," as one industry rep-
resentative called them. 399 Those industries that were particularly sensitive 
to their reputations-direct marketing, private investigators, trade infor-
mation bureaus, banks-seemed to make the most efforts in this direction. 400 
In these sectors, the misdeeds of a small number of bad actors can damage 
the reputation of the industry as a whole. This can both drive away custom-
ers and create pressure for direct government regulation. The more respon-
sible firms in such industries therefore had an incentive to rein in irrespon-
sible ones-to bring up the bottom-lest the actions of these bad actors 
impose costs on the industry as a whole. 
The sectors employed codes of conduct to achieve this. They drafted 
codes that embodied a relatively high standard of data protection, one that 
more established firms were likely to meet but that less responsible ones 
might not. They then required, as a condition of association membership, 
that firms commit to comply with the code. 401 Finally, they expelled or oth-
erwise sanctioned member firms that violated the code in a significant 
and we discussed it within the banks and we made within the banks also instructions for the 
employees-how to deal with access requests, how to set up direct marketing activities, what 
is allowed, what is not allowed with reference to the Data Protection Act, [and] the interac-
tion between the business units." Berkvens Interview, supra note 209. 
398. Hustinx, supra note 28, at 286. 
399. Singewald Interview, supra note 287 (describing "the cowboy companies ... 
[who] don't care"). 
400. Cf BENNEIT & RAAB, supra note 26, at 141 (stating that codes allow organiza-
tions to "remove suspicions" about their collection and use of personal data). 
401. The private investigator industry took this a step further. In the Netherlands, 
private investigators must comply with regulatory requirements and obtain a license from the 
Ministry of Justice in order to operate. In an effort to make its code of conduct binding on all 
companies in the sector, the industry association successfully lobbied the Ministry of Justice 
to build the code into the regulatory requirements that firms must meet in order to obtain a 
license. Olijslager Interview, supra note 209; PRIVACY CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE PRIVATE 
INVESTIGATION INDUSTRY, supra note 300, § 2. This turned the code into a legally binding 
requirement for all private investigation firms, even those that did not belong to the industry 
association. 
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way. 402 Companies believed that such measures would preserve the indus-
try's reputation and head off public pressure for direct government regula-
tion.403 They further thought that they would give customers a way to differ-
entiate good actors from bad-to see the "difference between the black and 
the white sheep."404 
5. Self-Policing: Monitoring Peers 
While trade associations seemed eager to engage in policing of smaller 
companies that they perceived to be irresponsible, they seemed far less in-
clined to monitor whether their core members, the more established firms, 
were in fact complying with the code that they had agreed to follow. 405 In-
402. Wierdak Interview, supra note 201 (describing procedures); Singewald Inter-
view, supra note 287 (stating that the direct marketing industry expels); Olijslager Interview, 
supra note 209 (stating that the private investigator industry imposes fines). For example, the 
Direct Marketing Association learned that one of its members had shared personal infor-
mation with a third party in violation of the industry code. The Association forced out the 
member and then issued a press release explaining why it had done so. Singewald Interview, 
supra note 287. In another particularly interesting example of this, the DPA found a particu-
lar trade information bureau to be in violation of the Personal Data Protection Act, but, seek-
ing to reward the firm for its cooperation with authorities, refused to release its name. The 
industry trade association, in an effort to preserve the sector's reputation, sought the name of 
the violator so that it could publicly expel it from the association, but the DP A refused to 
provide it. The association ultimately sued the DP A in an unsuccessful attempt to get this 
information. Wishaw Interview, supra note 209; NVH Interview, supra note 285. The asso-
ciation ultimately figured out on its own the identity of the offending firm and pressured it 
into leaving the organization. NVH Interview, supra note 285. 
403. As a representative of the trade information bureaus explained: 
The industry as a whole has an interest in getting companies to sign up for the code 
so as to protect the name of the industry. With all the free riders around, you can 
expect the legislature will draw his own rules to prevent them from doing things. 
The more organized we are, the less the legislature will need to create rules for us 
that would be more restrictive. 
NVH Interview, supra note 285. A representative of the direct marketing industry expressed 
a similar sentiment, stating that the code provided a way to "protect our own business from 
[others in our industry] .... Our mantra is: 'united we stand, divided we fall."' Singewald 
Interview, supra note 287; see also Wierdak Interview, supra note 201; Wishaw Interview, 
supra note 209 (stating that where industry has a code of conduct, regulators "step back"). A 
representative of the banking industry explained that the sector developed its code in order to 
"demonstrate to the public and to the authorities that we take the data protection issue very 
seriously," Berkvens Interview, supra note 209, and representatives for the trade information 
bureaus said they developed theirs "to show the outer world how we are handling the data." 
NVH Interview, supra note 285. 
404. NVH Interview, supra note 285; see also Wishaw Interview, supra note 209 
(stating that the code of conduct builds trust among customers and that it can be a competi-
tive advantage within an industry). 
405. van Blokland Interview, supra note 314 (pharmaceutical industry); van der 
Burgh Interview, supra note 223 (banking industry); NVH Interview, supra note 285 (trade 
information bureaus). 
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stead, with one exception, 406 the associations eschewed monitoring and fo-
cused instead on responding to consumer complaints or DP A enforcement 
actions.407 Typically, industries used an independent supervisory board for 
this purpose. 408 The industry code would authorize the board to hear indi-
vidual complaints and perhaps to expel those companies it found to be in 
violation of the code. 409 However, neither the board, nor any other arm of 
the trade association, would monitor compliance or otherwise seek to un-
cover violations.410 
Such a reactive system almost ensures that many violations will go 
unnoticed. Most individuals know very little about how their personal data 
is collected and used and so will fail to spot violations. 411 Any system that 
relies on individual complaints to identify violations is therefore bound to 
miss many of them. Indeed, the lead data protection attorney for one indus-
try association candidly said that, due to the lack of monitoring, "we don't 
know" whether firms in the sector are abiding by the code, or not. 412 
There have, as yet, been no comprehensive studies of industry compli-
ance with the Dutch codes of conduct. Yet existing evidence suggests that 
industry's reactive system, even when combined with the DPA's rather lim-
ited enforcement efforts, is not terribly effective. In 2004 the Ministry of 
406. See infra notes 419-22 and accompanying text. 
407. Several codes of conduct do require firms to audit and certifY their own compli-
ance. These include the private investigators' code, the banking code, Olijslager Interview, 
supra note 209, and the direct marketing code, Singewald Interview, supra note 287. The 
evidence did not show the extent to which trade associations monitored and enforced com-
pliance with this self-certification requirement. However, I did learn that the banking code 
initially required members to conduct self-audits annually but later changed this to make the 
process less frequent. Compare PROCESSING OF PERS. DATA BY FIN. INSTS., supra note 298, § 
9 (annual self-audit), with CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA BY 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS. § I 0 (20 I 0) (less frequent); see also Olijslager Interview, supra 
note 209. 
408. Singewald Interview, supra note 287 (direct marketing industry); Olijslager 
Interview, supra note 209 (private investigators); NVH Interview, supra note 285 (trade 
information bureaus); van der Burgh Interview, supra note 223 (banking industry). 
409. Compare Singewald Interview, supra note 287 (stating that the Direct Marketing 
Association can expel members who violate the DMA's data protection code of conduct), 
with Berkvens Interview, supra note 209 (stating that the banking association is not author-
ized to take formal action against a member that violates the data protection code of con-
duct). 
410. van Blokland Interview, supra note 314 (pharmaceutical industry); van der 
Burgh Interview, supra note 223 (banking industry); NVH Interview, supra note 285, (trade 
information bureaus). 
411. The industry representatives that I interviewed reported that a very few individ-
uals had availed themselves of the trade associations' complaint process. See van der Burgh 
Interview, supra note 223 (noting that he "hardly ever" receives complaints); NVH Inter-
view, supra note 285 (noting only six complaints against trade information bureaus since 
2003). 
412. van der Burgh Interview, supra note 223. 
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Justice, acting in response to a series of complaints, commissioned the only 
in-depth evaluation of compliance with a sectoral code of conduct-the 
private investigators' code. 413 The resulting report offered a discouraging 
picture of industry compliance. It found that while firms complied regularly 
with some code requirements, they violated others more than half the 
time. 414 Compliance with the requirement to notify employees who had been 
investigated but then found innocent-the very requirement that the indus-
try had fought over in the code negotiation process415-was particularly 
poor.416 The study's "main conclusion ... [was] that there is an incomplete 
compliance with the Privacy Code."417 It attributed this, in part, to the indus-
try perception that the probability of detection of non-compliance was low 
and that this led some firms to take a more "free" approach to compliance 
with the code. 418 While one must be careful not to read too much into one 
study of a single industry, the report does raise important questions about 
the effectiveness of industry self-policing and about compliance more gen-
erally under the Dutch code of conduct system. Increased industry owner-
ship and acceptance of the rules may not be sufficient to ensure compliance 
with them. 
6. Third-Party Certification 
If agencies lack sufficient resources adequately to monitor and enforce 
data protection law, and industry trade associations lack the incentive to do 
so, then who can assure compliance with privacy codes of conduct? The 
Dutch experience suggests an intriguing answer to this question. In the af-
termath of the Ministry of Justice report, the Private Investigators Associa-
tion, seeking to improve the industry's damaged reputation, adopted a new 
program of required annual third-party compliance audits. 419 The Associa-
tion trained a group of independent "certifying professionals" on how to 
assess compliance with the industry code of conduct. 420 It then required each 
member company to hire an independent auditor every three years to exam-
ine both its current compliance with the code and its management system 
for achieving compliance in the future. Firms that received passing marks 
413. Regioplan Policy Research, supra note 328, at 9. 
414. The report found that, in more than half of their cases, private investigation 
firms violated the requirement that they utilize the least intrusive form of investigation. /d. at 
88. They violated the requirement that interviews be conducted by two or more investigators, 
and that they be recorded on tape, nearly two-thirds of the time. /d. at 89. 
415. See supra notes 321-29 and accompanying text. 
416. Regioplan Policy Research, supra note 328, at 88. 
417. /d.at13. 
418. /d. at 14. 
419. Cahn Interview, supra note 325. 
420. !d. 
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could display a Quality Mark logo as a sign of their sound data protection 
practices. 421 Those that did not would face the loss of their Association 
membership. 422 
The private investigator industry's Quality Mark program appears to 
address a number of the problems identified above. It reduces the trade as-
sociation's conflict of interest by taking the monitoring and auditing func-
tion out of the association's hands and placing it in those of an independent 
certifying organization (albeit one that the association has trained). It avoids 
the problem of limited agency resources by requiring the regulated party 
itself to pay for the audit. Finally, by granting a Quality Mark to those fmns 
that successfully pass muster, the program creates incentives for more re-
sponsible behavior. It is too early to tell how the Quality Mark program will 
affect compliance in the private investigator industry. A follow-up study 
that compared compliance under the Quality Mark, third-party certification 
program with that which the Ministry of Justice found in its 2004 report 
would be very useful. 
E. Unanticipated Functions ofthe Dutch Codes of Conduct 
Thus far, this Part has looked at what the Dutch experience can tell us 
about the theorists' views on codes of conduct. Once in existence, however, 
codes of conduct take on a life of their own. They function in ways that 
policymakers and scholars may not have predicted. The interviews revealed 
some of these unanticipated and emergent functions of the Dutch codes of 
conduct. 
1. A Dialogue About Statutory Meaning 
As originally designed, the Dutch code of conduct program assumed 
that the approved codes of conduct would be binding on the Data Protection 
DP A. 423 The codes would not, however, bind the courts, and they would 
remain free to interpret the Data Protection Act on their own. 424 But this is 
not the way it has worked out in practice. Instead courts, faced with the task 
of interpreting the Act, have in a number of cases turned to the relevant 
code of conduct and simply adopted its interpretation. 
For example, an insurance company hired a private investigation com-
pany to observe an insured who had claimed an injury. Over the course of 
four days the private investigator drove by the insured's home every three 
hours and observed him in his home carrying out activities that were incon-
421. !d. 
422. !d. 
423. See supra notes 232-33 and accompanying text. 
424. See supra note 236 and accompanying text. 
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sistent with his claimed incapacity. 425 When the insurance company refused 
the claim, the insured brought suit on the grounds that the investigator's 
observation of him in his home had violated his privacy rights. 426 In ruling 
on this claim, the court looked to the Privacy Code of Conduct for the Pri-
vate Investigation Industry and, in particular, to its provision governing 
observation of the subject of an investigation. 427 The court found the inves-
tigation agency to be in compliance with the Code. 428 Based largely on this 
fmding, the court concluded that the investigator had not abridged the plain-
tiffs privacy rights under the Data Protection Act. In short, the court looked 
to the Code in order to interpret the Act. 429 
The interpretative process did not stop there. In its opinion, the court 
added its own gloss to the Code provisions governing an investigator's ob-
servation of a subject. The relevant Code provisions stated observation 
"conducted in the public domain" generally will not violate the subject's 
privacy unless it is of a "lengthy and systematic character," in which case it 
is only "permissible under exceptional circumstances."430 This rather broad 
statement does not make clear how "lengthy" or "systematic" the observa-
tion must be before it becomes impermissible. The court decision clarified 
that drive-by surveillance of a person in his home every three hours over the 
course of four days is not "sufficiently lengthy and systematic" to make it 
wrongful. 431 The court decision thus interpreted, and added a judicial gloss 
to, the industry code. 
Court decisions can also influence industry codes of conduct more di-
rectly. Industry associations want to make sure that their codes are con-
sistent with governing law. Some will accordingly revise their codes in or-
der to incorporate recent court decisions. 432 For instance, court decisions had 
held that, during an investigation, it was only appropriate to observe another 
without their knowledge where there were "concrete indications" of wrong-
doing. 433 The private investigation industry, taking note of these court deci-
425. Rb. Zutphen 9 mei 2007, BB 2007, 1491 m.nt. Vergunst, Heenk en Willemse § 
5.10(Neth.). 
426. Id. §§ 4.2, 5.3. 
427. !d. §§ 5.5, 5.10; PRIVACY CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE PRIVATE INVESTIGATION 
INDUSTRY, supra note 300, § 7.4. 
428. Rb. Zutphen 9 mei 2007, BB 2007, 1491 m.nt. Vergunst, Heenk en Willemse § 
5.10 (Neth.). 
429. Id.; Olijs1ager Interview, supra note 209. 
430. PRIVACY CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE PRJVATE INVESTIGATION INDUSTRY, supra 
note 300, §§ 7.4.1-.2; 01ijslager Interview, supra note 209. 
431. Rb. Zutphen 9 mei 2007, BB 2007, 1491 m.nt. Vergunst, Heenk en Willemse § 
5.10 (Neth.). 
432. 01ijslager Interview, supra note 209. 
433. E-mail from Felix Olijslager, Dir. of the Dutch Info. Ctr. for Sec. & Law, to 
Dennis D. Hirsch, Geraldine W. Howell Professor of Law, Capital Univ. Law Sch. (Feb. 14, 
2013, 22:03 EST) [hereinafter Olijslager E-mail] (on file with author); see, e.g., Hofs-
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sions, amended its privacy code in 2009 to incorporate this judicial stand-
ard. The provision governing covert use of cameras, as amended, states that 
"[u]sing a concealed camera shall take place only on an incidental basis 
where there are concrete indications that a person is, or has been, guilty of 
conduct that is seriously reprehensible and/or criminal. "434 This example 
shows that, just as codes of conduct can influence how courts view statutes, 
so judicial interpretations can shape codes of conduct. The result is a con-
tinuing conversation between courts and industry associations through 
which the underlying statute becomes ever more elaborated. 
[I]t goes on and on and on. It is a dynamic circle. The code leads to the court deci-
sions, the court decisions lead to the code. It all gets more elaborated over time. 
And from that the private investigators get a better idea of what they can and can-
not do better than just from the broad terms of the statute. Yes. That's what hap-
pened.435 
2. Migrating Codes 
The courts' adoption of code provisions also has another fascinating 
effect. It expands the code's reach far beyond the companies that formally 
sign up to comply with it. This expansion occurs along two dimensions. 
First, judicial decisions bind all companies in a given industry. When a 
court adopts a code's interpretation of the Data Protection Act, the resulting 
judicial decision accordingly makes the interpretation binding on all similar-
ly situated companies including those that never agreed to follow the terms 
of the code.436 In this way, court decisions can expand a code's reach to 
cover not just those firms that have signed up to comply with it, but also 
those companies in the sector that have not done so. 
Judicial decisions can also cause codes to spread in another, even 
more far-reaching, way. The Data Protection Act, and judicial decisions 
interpreting it, binds all industries.437 Where a court adopts a code's inter-
pretation of the Act, that interpretation indirectly becomes part of the law 
binding on all industries. 438 In this way a code from one industry can, 
Hertogenbosch 4 januari 2004, AO 2004, 7567 m.nt. Vermeulen, Beuker-Tilstra en Goorden 
§ 4.1 (Neth.) (stating that observation is permitted where "concrete" reasons to believe 
wrongdoing has occurred). 
434. PRIVACY CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE PRIVATE INVESTIGATION INDUSTRY§ 7.5.1 
(2009) (italics in original) (on file with author); see also Olijslager E-mail, supra note 433. 
435. Olijslager Interview, supra note 209. 
436. Cf Wierdak Interview, supra note 201 (stating that the DPA will apply interpre-
tations contained in code to companies in that industry that have not signed up to comply 
with the code). 
437. Personal Data Protection Act, supra note 26, art. !(d) (defining "responsible 
party" to include any "legal person" that determines the purpose of and means for processing 
personal data). 
438. Olijslager Interview, supra note 209. 
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through judicial incorporation, "migrate" to other industries and influence 
how the Act applies to them. The Dutch experience provides a clear exam-
ple of this. The private investigator industry code does not bind insurance 
company investigators since they belong to a different sector. 439 But the 
Data Protection Act, and judicial decisions interpreting the Act, do apply to 
them. This has led some insurance companies voluntarily to adopt the pri-
vate investigators' code of conduct as a guideline for their own investigators 
in their efforts to verify claims. 440 The insurance companies believe that this 
will make it more likely that courts will uphold their employees' investiga-
tory practices.441 As one seasoned practitioner who has assisted both indus-
tries with data protection compliance observed: "What is interesting is that 
it started as an initiative from a specific industry [i.e. the private investiga-
tors], which was heavily under fire, ... and now this code evolves into the 
code of the insurers .... It goes beyond the scope of [the original] indus-
try.''442 
3. Codes to Integrate Statutes 
Industry also used the Dutch codes of conduct to bring together a wide 
variety of legal requirements relating to personal information-arising not 
just from the Data Protection Act, but from other statutes as well-and inte-
grate them into a single document, the code. This allowed companies to 
look to one document for all legal requirements related to personal infor-
mation and so made it easier for them to comply with these various provi-
sions. For example, both data protection law and telecommunications law 
govern how the direct marketing industry can use personal information that 
it collects. The industry accordingly integrated both sets of requirements 
into its data protection code of conduct, thereby providing itself with a sin-
gle, unified statement of its legal obligations. 443 A representative for this 
industry remarked that "something [that] is very powerful [about a code of 
conduct] is that you bring out all the bits and pieces relevant for your indus-





443. Singewald Interview, supra note 287. 
444. !d. (stating that a code of conduct prevents you from having to go through a 
whole pile oflaws); Olijslager Interview, supra note 209 (stating that the private investigator 
industry uses a code to integrate two provisions governing the use of hidden cameras); 
Wierdak Interview, supra note 201 (recounting that sectors used codes to integrate require-
ments from various laws and statutes into a single document). 
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4. Codes to Resolve Conflicts Between Statutes 
The Dutch sectors did not only use codes to bring various statutes to-
gether; they also employed them to resolve the conflicts between statutes. 
The pharmaceutical industry code provides an example of this. 
When a pharmaceutical company wants to test a new drug, it hires in-
dependent medical professionals to run the trials. These professionals col-
lect large amounts of personal data from the trial participants. A health care 
regulation requires the pharmaceutical companies to notify, or verify that 
the medical professional has notified, trial participants when the company 
learns that the drug being tested could be harmful. 445 The medical profes-
sionals accordingly made a practice of providing participants' initials, coun-
try of origin, birth date, birth year, and gender to the sponsoring pharmaceu-
tical companies. 446 This allowed the companies separately to identify each 
trial participant and so to verify that each had received the required notifica-
tion. 
The Data Protection Act limits the extent to which medical profes-
sionals can share "personal data" with a third party such as the sponsoring 
pharmaceutical company. Prior to 2007, the companies had assumed that 
since the information they were receiving did not enable them to identify 
the specific participant by name, it did not qualify as "personal data."447 But 
a 2007 opinion of the Article 29 Working Party448 made it impossible to 
hold this view. 449 Concerned about entities' increasing ability to use "anon-
ymous" personal information to identify the individuals concerned, the 
Working Party broadened its defmition of the types of personal information 
that, when used in combination, could be employed to identify an individu-
al.450 Under the revised definition, it became clear that the medical profes-
sionals were providing "personal data"451 and that their sharing accordingly 
violated the Act. 452 This put the Data Protection Act squarely in conflict 
445. van Blokland Interview, supra note 314. 
446. Id. 
447. Personal Data Protection Act, supra note 26, art. !(a) (defining "personal data" 
as "any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person"). 
448. The Article 29 Working Party is an E. D.-level entity that provides expert opin-
ions on data protection law. See TASKS OF THE ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING 
PARTY I (1995), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/tasks-
art-29 _en. pdf. 
449. See ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, OPINION 4/2007 ON THE 
CONCEPT OF PERSONAL DATA 13-14 (2007), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2007 /wp 136 _en. pdf. 
450. I d.; van Blokland Interview, supra note 314. 
451. van Blokland Interview, supra note 314. 
452. Id. 
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with the health care regulation, which implicitly required such sharing of 
data. 453 
The pharmaceutical industry trade association and the DP A used the 
code to resolve the conflict. First, industry members met and determined 
that, at an "absolute minimum," they needed participants' date of birth and 
year of birth in order to separate out the participants and comply with the 
health care regulation.454 After some negotiation, the DPA agreed that the 
industry could have these two pieces of information, but no more. 455 The 
parties implemented the agreement in Section 2. 7 of the pharmaceutical 
industry code, which provides that "date and [year of] birth are not usually 
traceable to an individual" and so do not constitute information that renders 
a person identifiable. 456 This short phrase allowed the pharmaceutical com-
panies to resolve the tension between two conflicting statutes.457 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY 
The Dutch experience shows that the code of conduct approach has 
important virtues. It can promote information sharing and problem solv-
ing;458 lead to more tailored, workable, and cost-effective rules; 459 increase 
industry awareness of its privacy impacts and give it a sense of ownership 
over the rules needed to mitigate them; 460 initiate an iterative process by 
which broad statutory requirements get interpreted and clarified; 461 and pro-
vide a means to resolve conflicts between statutes. 462 Yet the Dutch codes 
also reveal significant weaknesses in this regulatory method. The Dutch 
codes are slow-moving and static, not nimble and adaptive. 463 In some situa-
tions at least, industry can exert too much leverage in the drafting process, 
resulting in overly lenient rules. 464 Sectors do not routinely monitor their 
members' observance of the rules and, in one industry at least, a study 
453. /d. 
454. /d. The location of the trial would also give them country of origin. With these 
three pieces of information, they could separate out the various trial participants. 
455. /d. 
456. CODE OF CONDUCT CONCERNING THE PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA § 2.7 
(2002) (pharmaceutical industry); van Blokland Interview, supra note 314. 
457. See Singewald Interview, supra note 287, (stating that the direct marketing 
industry uses a code to resolve conflicting statutory requirements). 
458. See supra notes 289-91, 305-16 and accompanying text. 
459. See supra notes 353-70 and accompanying text. 
460. See supra notes 390-98 and accompanying text. 
461. See supra notes 423-35 and accompanying text. 
462. See supra notes 445-57 and accompanying text. 
463. See supra notes 339-48 and accompanying text. 
464. See supra notes 321-29, 371-72 and accompanying text. 
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found wide-spread non-compliance.465 Established players can use the codes 
to strengthen their own position and discourage new entrants. 466 
What lessons can be drawn from such a mixed picture? On one hand, 
the Dutch experience suggests that the strengths of the collaborative code of 
conduct approach are not mere figments of the theorists' imaginations. In-
formation sharing, problem solving, tailoring of rules-these things do hap-
pen, and the Dutch codes provide concrete examples of them. This suggests 
that the United States' move towards safe harbor programs and codes of 
conduct could be a productive one. At the same time, the Dutch experience 
suggests that if the United States is to utilize this approach, then it must do 
so in a way that is sensitive both to the strengths, and to the very real weak-
nesses, of this regulatory method. It must design its program so as to mini-
mize the weaknesses and maximize the strengths. The remainder of this Part 
suggests how policymakers might build on the Dutch experience in order to 
achieve this. 
A. Minimizing Weaknesses 
To begin with, policymakers could design the U.S. program to miti-
gate the weaknesses in the code of conduct approach. 
1. Require Third-Party Audits 
The Dutch code of conduct program demonstrated a weakness with re-
spect to monitoring, enforcement, and compliance. The small, understaffed 
Dutch DP A does not have the resources to monitor the many companies that 
use personal data. 467 Industry sectors show little interest in the kind of com-
prehensive self-policing that would be needed to fill this gap, choosing to 
rely instead on individual complaints. The Ministry of Justice's study of 
compliance in the private investigator industry, though limited to a single 
industry sector, showed widespread non-compliance. 468 The United States, 
with many more businesses for regulators to oversee, may well suffer from 
the same problem. 
How to address this weakness? The private investigator industry's 
third-party certification program provides a possible strategy. It addresses 
the agency resource problem by requiring industry to pay for the monitor-
ing, thereby allowing the regulators to focus their resources on evaluating 
and approving the auditors. It also overcomes the industry trade associa-
tion's reluctance to monitor its own members by placing the responsibility, 
465. See supra notes 405-18 and accompanying text. 
466. See supra notes 374-78 and accompanying text. 
467. See supra notes 385-88 and accompanying text. 
468. See supra notes 405-18 and accompanying text. 
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instead, in the hands of approved, professional auditors. It is worth noting 
that the private investigator sector did not fight this requirement.469 Instead, 
the more established members embraced it as a way to demonstrate their 
sound practices and differentiate themselves from less responsible competi-
tors.470 Neither the U.S. privacy bills, nor the White Paper, include third-
party audits of code compliance or of privacy management systems. The 
Dutch experience suggests that they should.471 
2. Build in Stakeholder Input 
The Dutch codes suggest another possible weakness. In some instanc-
es, industry may be able to exert disproportionate influence over the shape 
of the code, resulting in overly lenient code provisions. This Article con-
tains only· one clear example of this-the instance in which the private in-
vestigator industry was able to convince regulators that the employer who 
hired the investigation company, not the investigation agency itself, should 
notify an innocent employee that he had been investigated. 472 Still, such 
instances are a warning sign that industry groups may, in some circum-
stances, be able to tilt the codes in their favor. 
One way to mitigate this would be to open up the code negotiation 
process to include other stakeholders such as consumer or privacy advocacy 
groups. 473 The Dutch themselves seemed to be aware of this and, in their 
1989 Data Protection Act, required industry to consult with consumer repre-
sentatives during the code drafting process.474 However, the paucity of such 
groups in the Netherlands made it impossible for industry associations to 
comply with the requirement, and the 2000 Act accordingly dropped it. 475 
The United States faces no such shortage of sophisticated and well-
resourced consumer and privacy groups, and the idea should be revisited 
here. The presence of stakeholder groups in the code or safe harbor negotia-
tion process would have at least three beneficial effects. It would provide a 
counter-weight to industry influence and so promote more balanced rules. It 
would increase the transparency of the negotiation process and create more 
469. Cahn Interview, supra note 325. 
470. Id. 
471. Cf BENNETT & RAAB, supra note 26, at 171 (arguing that a code-based self-
regulatory process should include "a verification of those practices through some external 
and independent conformity assessment process"). 
472. See supra notes 321-29 and accompanying text. 
473. Cf Rubinstein, supra note 18, at 381 (calling for "openness" in co-regulatory 
privacy initiatives). 
474. Law on Personal Data Files, supra note 26, art. 15(2). 
475. Hustinx Interview, supra note 209 (stating that there were no appropriate candi-
dates, that sometimes it was impossible to find an appropriate stakeholder, and that this made 
the stakeholder input mechanism unworkable). 
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accountability for those involved in it. And it would bring another set of 
well-informed minds to bear on the issues. The U.S. proposals appear to 
understand the importance of stakeholder involvement. The White Paper 
calls upon multi-stakeholder groups to develop the codes of conduct. 476 
These groups will include "individual companies, industry groups, privacy 
advocates, consumer groups, crime victims, academics, international part-
ners, State Attorneys General, Federal civil and criminal law enforcement 
representatives, and other relevant groups."477 This is a significant departure 
from the Dutch program in which industry trade associations draft the codes 
largely on their own. 
While the White Paper's proposal is on the right track, it may pose a 
problem of its own. Government officials need industry information in order 
to regulate the fast-changing information economy. One of the main reasons 
for using codes is that they can encourage industry members to share more 
of this critical information with regulators. But will they do this with public 
interest stakeholders sitting at the drafting and negotiating table, as the 
White Paper envisions?478 Government officials who played key roles in the 
Dutch code negotiations answered with a clear and unequivocal "no." In 
their experience, the way to get industry to open up was to create a safe 
environment in which companies knew that the information they shared 
would not be used against them. As one regulator described it, industry pro-
vided information because "[ w ]e were not there in our role as regulator. Our 
aim was not to inspect. It was to see whether the code will work for reality. 
Why did they allow us? We trusted each other. It came down to personal 
trust."479 These government officials believed that including public interest 
stakeholders at the initial drafting stage could undermine this sense of trust 
and so either choke off the vital information flow or drive it underground.480 
One compared it to the legislative process: 
In a parliament, you have all the [relevant] parties ... in a room. And still, the real 
... deals are being made outside of the room. [T]he public part of a parliament 
serves the deal-making which happens elsewhere. [B]ringing third-party stake-
holders in the process would be great, but having them in the room all the time 
would not be helpful .... That would probably encourage telephone conversations 
to prepare [for] the meeting. 481 
Thus, according to the Dutch regulators, bringing stakeholders in at 
the initial drafting stage could actually make the process less transparent by 
476. WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 23. 
477. Id. 
478. Cf Harter, supra note 101, at 84 (explaining why "negotiation is a process best 
carried on in private"). 
479. van de Pol Interview, supra note 210. 
480. McLaggan-van Roon Interview, supra note 233 (including stakeholders at an 
early stage would make the negotiations too difficult). 
481. Hustinx Interview, supra note 209. 
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driving the real discussions underground. On the other hand, waiting until 
the public comment stage would be too late. At that stage, the agency has 
already made a public commitment to the draft code and commentators face 
an uphill battle in getting the agency to change it. 
A Dutch lawyer suggested an alternative solution: divide the drafting 
and negotiation process into two stages. 482 In the first, industry and govern-
ment would collaborate on an initial, tentative draft. 483 In the second, public 
interest stakeholders such as consumer or privacy groups would join the 
discussion and provide their reactions and ideas.484 Only later would the 
agency put the document out for public comment (at which point stakehold-
ers would have another chance to weigh in on it). 485 Stakeholders participat-
ing in the second stage would not be able to exercise veto power over the 
document. However, they would be able to review it and "cry foul" to the 
policymaking community, or even the media, if they believed it to be one-
sided. 486 This could add transparency and accountability to the process 
without undermining the trust and information-sharing that can emerge from 
government-industry interactions.487 Industry might even benefit from 
stakeholder involvement since it would give the code a "label of quality" 
that would increase consumer faith in the resulting document.488 U.S. poli-
cymakers should consider using such a staged approach. 
3. Protect New Entrants 
The Dutch experience further suggests that established firms can use 
industry codes of conduct as a way to deter new entrants. A U.S. code of 
conduct program should take measures to reduce this tendency. For exam-
ple, program rules might require that the industry representatives drafting a 
code include not only the larger established companies, but smaller, newer 
ones as well. In addition, the program might invite regulators from the 
FTC's Bureau of Competition to scrutinize codes for possible anti-
competitive effects. 489 Measures such as these could reduce any cartel-like 
tendencies in the code drafting process. 
482. Interview with Lokke Moerel, Head of Privacy Practice, De Brauw, Blackstone 





487. Wishaw Interview, supra note 209 (supporting this idea). 
488. van der Burgh Interview, supra note 223. 
489. See GUNNINGHAM & SINCLAIR, supra note 19, at 108. 
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4. Improve Adaptability 
The Dutch codes also display a third, important weakness. They are 
slow-moving, largely static instruments. Some took years to negotiate. 
Many remained unchanged during their five-year term. 490 Others expired at 
the end of their initial five-year period because industry and regulators 
could not reach agreement on whether and how to update them. 491 This find-
ing contrasts sharply with both the theoretical literature and with the Ad-
ministration policy papers, all of which claim that collaborative methods 
such as codes of conduct will be nimble and adaptable instruments and that 
this is one of their main advantages over traditional rulemaking. 492 
How to make codes and safe harbor programs more adaptable? This is 
a difficult question. There are ways to speed up and streamline the approval 
process. For example, the FTC could decide that notice-and-comment pro-
cedures apply only to the first version of a code, and not to subsequent itera-
tions. Or, it could take the position that "de minimis" code changes that do 
not pose a threat to individual privacy do not require agency approval. But 
such measures run the risk of enhancing adaptability at the expense of ac-
countability. Who, after all, would decide whether a given change is de min-
imis? If it is the FTC, then the process is not so streamlined after all. If it is 
the regulated industry, this creates a dangerous conflict of interest. 
Another approach might be to think, first, about what is it that makes 
the process static. The Dutch experience suggests that it is the high transac-
tion costs involved in negotiating an approved code of conduct. Once the 
parties have made it through the exhausting process and reached an agree-
ment, neither side is eager to reopen negotiations. The approved code thus 
sits untouched for its five-year period (and perhaps longer if the code ex-
pires). 
One way to combat this might be to require that, subsequent to code 
approval, the negotiating parties continue to meet on a regular basis to dis-
cuss code implementation and possible improvements. The process would 
never "end." The parties would always be looking for ways to improve their 
agreement-to make it more protective of individual privacy, more worka-
ble for business, and more in touch with changing realities on the ground. 
Such an approach might prevent the parties from becoming locked into the 
initial agreement, and instead cause them to see the process as one of con-
tinuous learning and improvement. Professor Freeman has called this a 
"commitment to provisionalism."493 She argues that negotiated forms of 
regulation, such as codes of conduct, should build in a "system for evaluat-
490. See Appendix: Dutch Data Protection Codes of Conduct. 
491. /d. 
492. See supra notes 89-95, 263-65 and accompanying text. 
493. Freeman, supra note 18, at 29. 
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ing and reassessing those agreements on a regular basis" in order to "facili-
tate revisiting and modifying rules."494 
The literature on adaptive natural resource management is relevant 
here.495 Adaptive management emphasizes "an iterative, incremental deci-
sion-making process built around a continuous process of monitoring the 
effects of decisions and adjusting decisions accordingly. 496 It stresses the 
establishment of monitoring and adjustment mechanisms that allow regula-
tors to learn and to act based on that learning. Were the code negotiation 
process to incorporate such an adaptive process-to institutionalize contin-
uous monitoring, feedback, and adjustment-it could both keep the negotia-
tion process from becoming ossified and, at the same time, increase moni-
toring and accountability. 497 Further research and experimentation are essen-
tial to determining how to increase code adaptability without sacrificing 
accountability. Adaptive management theory may offer a useful starting 
place for that inquiry. 
B. Maximizing Strengths 
Policymakers should also design the safe harbor program so that it 
maximizes the strengths of this regulatory approach. The Dutch experience 
provides a number of lessons on how to achieve this. 
1. Make the Safe Harbor Program Sector-Based 
Privacy regulators face a real problem. They must develop rules for a 
highly complex array of industries whose technologies and business models 
are changing at an incredibly rapid pace. Yet the regulators know little 
about the present state of these industries and even less about what they will 
look like in the future. To do their jobs, they need industry members to 
share their superior knowledge of current and upcoming technologies and 
business realities. The Dutch experience shows that codes of conduct can 
facilitate this exchange of information. Indeed, their key advantage appears 
to be their capacity to develop relationships through which an industry sec-
tor can share business information with regulators. This can lead to more 
tailored, workable, and cost-effective rules. 
Safe harbor programs that include companies from many different sec-
tors will find it difficult to tailor their rules to particular sectoral realities 
494. !d. 
495. See. e.g., ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSEMENT AND MANAGEMENT (C.S. Hol-
ling ed., 1978) (seminal book on the subject); J.B. Ruhl, Regulation by Adaptive Manage-
ment-Is it Possible?, 7 MINN. J. L. Sci. & TECH. 21 (2005) (describing this literature). 
496. Ruhl, supra note 495, at 28 (discussing Holling's work). 
497. Freeman, supra note 18, at 30. 
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and so will lose much of this benefit. 498 Yet that is precisely what the bills 
and the White Paper propose. For example, the Kerry-McCain Bill provides 
that any "nongovernmental" organization can initiate a safe harbor pro-
gram. 499 While such an NGO might design its program on a sectoral level, it 
need not do so. Indeed, NGOs that want to attract a large number of compa-
nies to their program will have an incentive to define the scope broadly. The 
other bills and the White Paper are similar. 500 
The Dutch experience suggests that this is a mistake. In order to 
achieve the principal benefit of the safe harbor approach-the sharing of 
information about industry realities-the programs should be drawn at the 
sectoral level. For example, the FTC could negotiate safe harbor agreements 
with the pharmaceutical sector, the utility sector (where the emerging smart 
grid will make privacy issues increasingly relevant), the data broker sector, 
and other such branches of industry. Following the Dutch model, the U.S. 
proposals should establish their safe harbor programs at the sectoral level. 
2. Include All Statutory Requirements 
If an industry sector can provide information that makes rules more 
tailored and intelligent, then it should be allowed to do this with respect to 
all statutory requirements, not just a few of them. Yet two of the three bills 
strictly limit the scope of their safe harbor programs. 5°' The Rush Bill ex-
tends the safe harbor approach to notice and choice (Title I) and accuracy 
and access (Title II), but not to data minimization, data security, and ac-
countability (Title III). 502 The Kerry-McCain Bill narrows the scope still 
further, defming safe harbor programs so that they set the rules only for the 
bill's requirements with respect to unauthorized uses of personal infor-
mation, and not for other statutory requirements. 503 The Dutch Data Protec-
tion Act, on the other hand, sets no such limits. It calls on industry sectors to 
498. Indeed, experience with broad-scope safe harbor programs under the Children's 
Online Privacy and Protection Act show that the NGOs have achieved little in the way of 
tailoring and have tended to seek information from government, rather than providing in-
sights to it. 
499. Kerry-McCain Bill, supra note 9, § 501(a). 
500. Rush Bill, supra note 12, § 401; Steams Bill, supra note 12, § 9; WHITE PAPER, 
supra note 1 0, at 23. 
501. Rush Bill, supra note 12, § 403(2)(D); Kerry-McCain Bill, supra note 9, §§ 
501(a)(l), 501(c). 
502. Rush Bill, supra note 12, § 403(2)(D). 
503. Kerry-McCain Bill, supra note 9, §§ 501(a)(l), 501(c). In a later provision, the 
bill suggests that the safe harbor will extend to all requirements contained in Titles II and III. 
I d. § 502(a). It is unclear how this relates to the earlier provisions limiting the scope of the 
safe harbor programs. Even under the broader reading, the bill still excludes from the safe 
harbor the statutory requirements in Title I governing security, accountability, and privacy by 
design. 
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address all aspects of the statute in their codes of conduct.504 As was illus-
trated above, Dutch sectors were able to utilize this authority to customize a 
wide variety of statutory requirements. The U.S. proposals should follow 
this model and should apply the safe harbor approach to all statutory re-
quirements. 
3. Pass a Baseline Privacy Statute 
The preceding recommendation assumes that the U.S. Congress will 
pass legislation that sets baseline privacy requirements for all economic 
sectors. But this is not a given. While the White Paper recommends such 
legislation, it also calls for using multi-stakeholder codes of conduct in the 
absence of a statute. The Dutch experience suggests that the Dutch sectors' 
main motivation for drafting their codes of conduct was that it allowed them 
to clarify the Data Protection Act and achieve a degree of regulatory cer-
tainty.505 This indicates that comprehensive privacy legislation may well be 
essential to the success of collaborative efforts. Without a statute, compa-
nies may not want to invest the resources needed to draft and negotiate a 
code. While the White Paper anticipates codes in the absence of legislation, 
the Dutch experience suggests it may have a hard time getting companies to 
answer this call. Congress should pass a baseline privacy statute, not only 
for the privacy protections it will bring, but also to provide a structure for 
the industry codes and to give companies a strong incentive to come to the 
table and negotiate a code of conduct. 506 
4. Recognize Safe Harbor Participants 
Another interesting lesson from the Dutch experience is that some 
companies invest in codes of conduct as a way to differentiate themselves 
from less responsible competitors. 507 The American proposals should build 
on this useful impulse by providing public recognition to those companies 
that sign up for a safe harbor program or code of conduct_5°8 For example, 
they could designate such firms to be "privacy leaders," or give them the 
right to display a special logo. Such measures would strengthen the reasons 
for participating in a safe harbor program. They could even create a virtuous 
504. Personal Data Protection Act, supra note 26, art. 25 (stating that codes of con-
duct "implement this Act"). 
505. See supra notes 277-83 and accompanying text. 
506. Cf Rubinstein, supra note 18, at 422 (calling for a new law that codifies fair 
information practices and includes a safe harbor program). 
507. See supra note 404 and accompanying text. 
508. See Rubinstein, supra note 18, at 417 (suggesting government recognition as a 
way to encourage firms to sign up for safe harbor programs). 
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cycle in which all companies in an industry come to believe they must sign 
up for the code in order to remain competitive. 
5. Use Codes to Create a Global Standard 
In the Netherlands, several sectors used their code of conduct as a 
means to integrate requirements from a number of different statutes, thereby 
providing themselves with a single, unified set of rules. This practice could 
suggest a solution to one of the most vexing problems in privacy regulation: 
how to harmonize conflicting national or regional privacy regimes. 
Data flows are global. But the laws that govern them are generally na-
tional or, in the case of the European Union, regional. Companies that 
transmit personal data across national boundaries accordingly have to keep 
track of various national and regional data protection requirements and 
make sure that they comply with all of them. This can be a complex and 
daunting task. 
Industry codes of conduct could provide a solution. Just as the Dutch 
sectors drafted codes that integrated a number of statutes, so too could 
American sectors craft codes of conduct or safe harbor programs that bring 
together and incorporate the requirements of the various national and re-
gional laws or principles. These other systems are already set up to accom-
modate this. The 1995 E.U. Data Protection Directive allows industry sec-
tors to propose, and the Article 29 Working Group to approve, community-
wide codes of conduct that create a safe harbor with respect to all E.U. 
member states. 509 Similarly, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) organization's Cross-Border Privacy Rules system allows approved 
"Accountability Agent[s]" to certify a single set of privacy rules as being 
compliant with privacy principles adopted by APEC member nations. 510 
Were an American sector to succeed in having the FTC, the Article 29 
Working Group, and an approved APEC Accountability Agent approve an 
industry code of conduct or safe harbor program as being compliant with 
their respective national or regional laws or principles, the resulting code 
would then constitute a single, globally interoperable, approved set of pri-
vacy rules. The emergence of such codes could facilitate cross-border data 
flows, reduce costs to business, and provide consumers with more con-
sistent levels of data protection as their personal information travels the 
globe. 511 The U.S.-E.U. Safe Harbor Agreement takes a step in this direc-
509. Council Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 151, art. 27(3). 
510. See Applications to Serve as Accountability Agents in the Asia Pacific Econom-
ic Cooperation (APEC) Cross Border Privacy Rules (CBPR) System, 77 Fed. Reg. 44,582 
(July 30, 20 12) (describing the role of accountability agents in the APEC system). 
511. Similar efforts are already being made on a firm-specific basis. Through the 
mechanism of Binding Corporate Rules, individual multi-national companies are obtaining 
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tion, and the Administration White Paper also expresses an interest in it. 512 
To facilitate such a development, the current U.S. proposals should seek to 
align their safe harbor program as much as possible with the E.U. code of 
conduct approach. This is another good reason to make the safe harbor pro-
grams sector-based, as opposed to making them free-form entities that en-
compass companies from many different industry sectors. 
CONCLUSION: TRANSFERABILITY AND THE QUESTIONS IT RAISES 
The United States and the Netherlands differ in their size, geography, 
population, culture, history, and many other areas. The Dutch codes have 
worked in some important respects. But will the approach function as well 
in the United States as it has in the Netherlands? Are the lessons from the 
Dutch codes transferable to U.S. soil? 
At first blush, it appears that they might not be. As explained above, 
specific aspects of Dutch history have forged a culture based on cooperation 
and consensus. 513 This may predispose the Dutch to the types of collabora-
tion and problem-solving that lie at the heart of the safe harbor approach. 
People involved in the Dutch codes of conduct, and scholars writing about 
them, have referred repeatedly to this history, and to the "polder model" of 
regulation to which it gave rise, as a reason for the program's success. 514 
As Robert Kagen has shown, U.S. regulatory culture is very differ-
ent. 515 It is rooted in interest representation and factionalism, not coopera-
tion. This has led to an adversarial regulatory style in which interest groups 
battle the regulators and each other to get as much of their agenda into law 
as possible. 516 This raises a real question as to whether American compa-
nies, regulatory officials, and public interest groups could drop their adver-
sarial postures long enough to engage in the type of cooperative discussions 
and problem-solving that the Dutch seem to have been able to achieve and 
that is essential to the safe harbor approach. 
approval of their global privacy policies from multiple countries, and so are developing a 
single set of rules that will constitute compliance in each of those nations. See generally, 
LOKKE MOEREL, BINDING CORPORATE RULES: CORPORATE SELF-REGULATION OF GLOBAL 
DATA TRANSFERS (2012). This Article proposes that branches of industry use sector-based 
codes of conduct to achieve a similar result for the sector as a whole. 
512. WHITE PAPER, supra note 10, at 31-33. The author and a colleague, Ira Rubin-
stein, suggested the idea in comments on the Department of Commerce's Green Paper. 
513. See supra notes 266-69 and accompanying text. 
514. See supra notes 270-75 and accompanying text. 
515. ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW, at ix 
(2001). 
516. See DANIEL J. FIORINO, THE NEW ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 186 (2006) 
(describing difficulties in transplanting the Dutch negotiated system to the United States with 
its adversarial style of regulation). 
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Yet, in considering the Dutch experience as a whole, one also has to 
wonder: could the adversarial American regulatory culture prove to be an 
advantage? As explained above, the safe harbor approach can allow industry 
representatives to exert too much leverage. 517 The Dutch themselves recog-
nized this problem and tried to bring consumer groups into the drafting pro-
cess as a way to mitigate it. 518 But the small number and limited resources of 
these groups made this impossible. 519 Were the United States to implement 
the safe harbor approach, the situation would be very different. Due to its 
adversarial culture and its greater size, the United States has an abundance 
of consumer and privacy advocacy groups with the resources and ability to 
negotiate a code of conduct. This is a real strength when it comes to imple-
menting the safe harbor approach. If these groups became involved in the 
negotiation process in the manner recommended above,520 they could serve 
as a counterweight to industry and so produce a more balanced, transparent, 
and accountable negotiation process. 
The U.S. code of conduct program would then confront the real ques-
tion: can the industry, government, and public interest stakeholders temper 
their adversarial nature sufficiently to cooperate together on crafting intelli-
gent regulation while, at the same time, retaining enough of it to check one 
another and ensure a balanced outcome? If so, then U.S. privacy codes of 
conduct could work even better than Dutch ones have. If not, then the pro-
cess would likely bog down in adversarial wrangling. The only way to find 
out is to give it a try. 
APPENDIX: DUTCH DATA PROTECTION CODES OF CONDUCT 
Sector O.,:aniutroo Name of Namtof Statute Date Date Expired? Eoglisb PubHc 
Code Code Approved Expires Trans- Participation in 
(Dakb) (Eoglbb) or lation? CodeDnftiog 
Renewed 
Personnel OrganWUion or Gedragscode Code of WPR Nov.18, Nov.28, Yes No Prepared with 
Recruitment Pcoonncl voorde Conduct 1990 1995 "V erenigining voor 
Agencies and Recruitment werving& With HogcrPcrnmeel" 
Executive Consullan~ seltttic- Regard to (Association for 
ScaiCh (Nedcrlandse branche Recruitment HigherPcrnmnel) 
br.mcheorganisatie and WBP JulyJO, JulyJO, Yes 
van bureaus voor Selection 2004 2009 
werving,sclectieen (amended 
executive search and 
(OAWS)) renewed) 
517. See supra notes 321-29 and accompanying text. 
518. See supra note 474 and accompanying text. 
519. See supra note 475 and accompanying text. 
520. See supra notes 476-88 and accompanying text. 
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Sector Orgaaizatioa Name of Name of Statuto Date Date E1pind? Eaglisb 1'11b6< 
Code Code Approved Expins Traa>- Putidpllioa ia 
(Dattb) (Eaglisb) or btioa? CodeDnftiag 
Rrarwtd 
Computing Association of cosso msso WPR Jan.IJ, Jan.IJ, Yes No mSSDCode 
Services CamputingSetvices gedrag«ode Code of 1991 (for 1994 prepared with 
and Software ~ Conduct three "Stichting 
Agrocies(COSSO) t-nties (Registration year;) Waabaambrid 
ofPrnonal Persooorrgistrat" 
Data) (Foundation for 
Watchfulness with 
Regard to the 
Rcgistratiooof 
Personal Data) 
Non-Profit Associatiooof VOl VOl Code WPR MayS, MayS, Yes No Consulted the Social 
Resea!th Resea!thlnstirutes gedrag«ode of Conduct 1991 (for 1996 and Ecooornic 
lnstirutes (Vereoigingvan ~ (Registration five years) Council of the 
Focusing Onderzoek lnstiruten t-nties ofPrnonal Netberlands(SER) 
on (VOl)) Data) and the Ootcb 
Behavioral Associntioo for 
and Social Soeiology and 
ScientifiC Aothropology,also 




M:ul.ct Association of Privacy- Privacy WPR June 12, June 12, Yes No Pn:paredwitll 
Research ManetResearch gcdragscode Code of 1991 1996 "Stichting 
Bureaus Bureaus (Verenging markt-cn Conduct Waahaamhcid 
van opinieonder.t: forManct Pcrsoonsrcgistratic" 
Mart.tonderzock:crs oek and 
(VMO))andthe Opinion 




caus en de 
Nedcrlandsc 
(NVvM) 
Direct DirectMancting Gcdragscode Code of WPR 0cL2, 0cL2, Yes No Pn:pared witll 
Mancting Institute of the Direct Conduct by 1992(for 1995 "Stichting 
Industry Netherlands (Direct M:ul.cting tile Dutch three Waak=ncid 
M:ul.ctinglnstiruut lnstituut Direct years) Persoonsregistratie" 
Nederland (DMIN) Nederland M:ul.cting 





(DMSA)) Ootcb Din::ctive No 
Dialogue 95/46/EC June 13, 
Ootcb Dislogue M:ul.cting 200J(by 
Mancting Associntinn Art.29 
Association (DDMA) Working 
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Sector Ollanizatioo Name of Name of Statute Date Date Expired? Eoglisb Pobtic 
Code Code Approved E1pires Trans- Participation in 
(Doteb) (Eoglisb) or btioo? CodeDnftiog 
Renewed 
Pbannaccu- Associationofthe NEFARMA NEFARM WPR Oct 13, Oct 13, Yes No Prepared with the 
tical industry Pbarmaccutical Privacy A Privacy 1992(for 1997 Koninldijke 
Industry Gedragsregels Rules of five yem) Maatsclulppijtot 
(Nedcrlandse Conduct bcvordcringdcr 
Associatie van de WPR May7, May7, No No Gcnccskwule 
Farmaceutischc 1998 2003 (KNMG),dc 
lndustrie Knninklijl:e 
(NEFARMA) WBP Aug.l6, Aug.l6, Yes No Maatsclulppijtcr 
2002 2007 bcvordcring dcr 
(amended Phannacie (KNMP) 
and en bet Landclijk 
reviewed) Patientcnl 
Consumcnten 





Veterinary Association of FIDIN- FIDIN WPR Nov. 27, Nov. 27, Yes No Prepared with the 
Produe~ Producers and Privacygedr-.gs- Privacy 1992(for 1997 Koninklijke 
lndustty Importers of regels Rules of fivey"") Nedcrlandsc 
Veterinary Products Cwuluct Maatsclulppij voor 
(Vereniging van Diergeneeskunde 
Fabrikanten en 1998 WPR July28, July28, (Royal Association 
IInportetm van version 1998 2003 for Veterinarians) 
Diergeneesmiddclcn (amended 





Mail Onder Dutch Mail Order Gcdmgo:ode Code of WPR Mar.IO, No No Prepared with 
Union (Ncdcrlandsc Nedcrlandsc Conduct 1993(for "Stiehting 
Postord<lbond) Postorderbond OntchMail three years) Waakzaarnh6d 




Commercial NethcrlandsAssoei3tio Gcdmgscode Code of WPR lone 17, June 17, Yes No 1993 Code prepared 
lnfonna.tion of Commercial Nederlandsc Conduct 1993 1998 with "Stichting 
Bureaus lnfonnation Bureaus Vcrcniging Association Waakzaarnheid 
(Nedcrlandsc van of WBP Aug.l4, Aug.l7, Yes No Persoonsregistratic" 
Verenigingvan Handclsinfor Commercial 2003 2008 
Handelsinformatiehore matieburcaus lnformation (amended 
us(NVH)) B=ws and 
renewed) 





Medical Federation of Gcdmgscode Code of WPR July 14, July 14, Yes No 1995 cndeprepared 
Research Medical Research Gezondbcids Condor! 1995 2000 with medical and 
Organizations oiHierzoek with scientific 
(Fedcratie van "Gocd Regard to WBP April19, Apr.l9, Yes No associations, key 
Medisch god!ag" Medical 2004 2009 figures from 
Wetenschappe-lij1e Rcscartb (amended stakeholder 
Verenigingco) "Best and organizations and 
Practices" renewed) the National Conn61 
forPnblicHcalth 
Banking The Netherlands Privacy Privacy WPR Oct 16, Oct 17, Yes Yes 1995 cndeprepared 
Bankers Association Gcdmgscode Code of 1995 1998 with "Stiebting 
(Nedcrlandsc Bankro Condu<t Waakzaarnhcal 
Verenigingvan for the Persoonrcgistrate" 
Bankro(NVB)) Bankin ~ 
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S<ctor Orgaoiution Name of Name of Statute Date Date Etpired? Eaglisb P\lbfie 
Cod• Cod• Approved Etpires Trans- Participation in 
(Dukb) (Englisb) or latioo? Codollraftiag 
Renewed 
fnsll!llll(( Association of GedJ1Igscode Code of WPR Feb.26, Feb.27, No No 1998 code preparol 
Companies Insurers in the Verwerking Conduct on 1998 21103 with"Stichting 
Netherlands PetSOODSgeg- the Waahaamheid 
(Verbondvan evens Processing PCISOOIISregistratie" 
Verzekeraaxsin VerLekeringsb ofPerwnal 




Financial Netherlands Bank"' Gedragscnde Code of WBP Jan. 27, Jan. 28, Yes No 
Institutions Association and the Verwerking Conduct for 21103 21108 
(banks and Association of PetSOODSgege the 
insurance lnsurminlhe vens Processing WBP Apr.ll, No No 
companies) Netherlands Financiele of Personal 2010 
(Nederlandse lnstellingeo Information (amended 
Vcrcnigingvan by Financial and 
Bankcn en het Institutions renewed) 
Verbond van 
VerLCkC!33!S) 
Private Privntelnvestigntion Privacygedrags- Privacy Code WBP Jan.l3, Jan.ll, Yes Yes 
Investigation Industry Association code of Conduct 21104 21109 
Industry (Verenigingvan scctorparticulic· forlhe 
Particuliere rc ondcrzoeks- Private WBP Oclll, No Yes 
Bcveiligingsorganisatie: bureaus van de Investigation 21109 




Bailiffs Royal Association of Privacygedrags- Privacy WBP Feb. IS, Feb.l9, Yes No 
BailiJTs (Koninklijke code inzake Code of 21104 21109 
Beroepsorganisatie vcrwerken Conduction 
van persoonsgege- on 
Gerechtsdcurwaarder vens doorlcden Processing 
s(KBvG)) van de Personal 
Koninklijke Data by 
Beroepsorganis- Memlmof 
atie van the Royal 
Gerecbtsdcnr- Association 
waanlers of Bailiffs 
(KBvG) 
Research MarketRcsearcb Gedragscnde Code of WBP Feb. IS, Feb.l8, Yes No 
and Association voor Conduct 21104 21109 
Statistics: (MarktonderLOCkuss Onderzoeken for 
Policy ociatie(MOA)); Statistiek Research WBP June21, No 
Research; Association for and 2010 
Statistical PolicyResearth Statistics (amended 
Research; 0/ereniging voor and 
Market Beleidsondcrznck renewed) 






University Association of Gedragscode Cndeof WBP Jan.3, Jan. 3, Yes No Prepancd with the 
Research Universities voorgebruik Conduct for 21106 2011 Social Scientific 
(Verenigingvan van Use in Council of the 
Univcrsitciten per.;oonsgege- PCJSOnal Netherlands 
(VSNU)) vens in Data in (KNAW)andthe 
wetenscbappe- Scientific Royal Netherlands 
lijk onderLOCk Research or Academy of Arts 




Health Association for Gedragscode Code of WBP Oce.ll, Oce.l3, No No 
Research Health Insurance Verwerking Conduct on 2011 2016 
Companies Persoonsgege the 
(ZorgverzekC!33!S -vens Processing 






166 Michigan State Law Review Vol. 2013:1 
Sector Organization Name of Name of Statute Date Date Expired? English Pnbtic 
Code Code Approved Expires Trans- Participation in 
(Dukb) (Englbb) or lation? Code Drafting 
Renewed 
Grid Gedragscodc Code of WBP May9, May9, No No 
Operators VCJWcrking Conduct on 2012 2017 
van Processing 
Persoonsgcge- of Personal 
vcnsdoor Information 
Nelbeho:rdcrs by Grid 
in bet kadcr Operators in 
van Installatie the Context 






Energy Netherlands Energy Gedragscode Code of WBP Jan.8, Jan8, No No 
Suppliers Association Lcvcrancicrs Conduct 2013 2018 
(VcrenigingEn<JEie Slimme for 
Nederland) Meters Suppliers 
of Smart 
Meters 
